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O co 

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The Journal of 
Historical Review 



A. R. Wesserle 

The New World 

Charles Lutton 

PearJ Harbor; 
Fifty Years of Controversy 

— Reviews — 

The Holocaust on Trial: The Case of Ernst Zuendel 
Stalin's Apologist, Walter Duranty: 
The New York Times's Man in Moscow 


Mercy for Japs: Letters from Yank 

— Historical News and Comment— 

An Interview with Admiral Kimmel 
Holocaust Education: Cui Bono? 
Roosevelt's Secret Pre-War Plan to Bomb Japan 



The Journal of 
Historical Review 


Editor: Theodore J. O'Keefe 
Associate Editor: Mark Weber 




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The Historical Review Committee 

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Table of Contents 

Volume Eleven, No. 4 Winter, 1991-1992 


The New World Disorder 389 
A.jR. WesserJe 

Pearl Harbor: Fifty Years of Controversy 431 
Charles Lutton 

Book Reviews 

Robert Lenski, The Holocaust on Trial: 469 
The Case of Ernst Zundel 
Mark Weber 

S.J.Taylor, Stalin's Apologist, Walter Duranty: 479 
The New York Times's Man in Moscow 
Jack Wikoff 


Mercy for Japs: Letters from Yank 491 

Historical News and Comment 

An Interview with Admiral Kimmel 495 

Holocaust Education: Cui Bono? 500 

Roosevelt's Secret Pre-War Plan to Bomb Japan 503 

About the Contributors 511 

From the Editor 

This issue of The Journal of Historical Review, the forty- 
fourth, completes Volume Eleven. Its two feature articles, Dr. 
Andreas Wesserle's passionate critique of George Bush's "New 
World Disorder" and Dr. Charles Lutton's survey of half-a- 
century's study (and evasion) of the facts beyond the 
December 7, 1941 "Day of Infamy," signal an advance and a 
return, namely to a Revisionism that looks beyond what 
French nationalist and populist Jean Marie Le Pen properly 
styled "a point of detail," i.e. the gas chambers and the 

Not that we're abandoning our critique of the lie of the 
Holocaust— the non-existent Hitler order to exterminate the 
Jews, the fraud of "the six million," and what Louis-Ferdinand 
Celine called "the magical gas chambers"- not at all. Just that, 
with the Holocaust Lobby in full flight, as IHR associate 
Bradley Smith places advertisement after unanswered 
Holocaust-debunking advertisement in the newspapers of 
America's leading universities (if it be agreed that throwing a 
grand mal epileptic fit and shrieking for more censorship is no 
answer); as two American presidential candidates (Pat 
Buchanan and David Duke) are dogged for their alleged 
Holocaust Revisionism by those journalists and politicos who 
hearken most carefully to Their Masters' Voice; and as the 
conmen and crooks who promote and profit from the twen- 
tieth century's emblematic hoax thrash and drown in the life- 
giving ocean of historical truth (those that aren't dead before 
they hit the water, that is), we Revisionists, with The Journal of 
Historical Review in the van, resume the assault begun by 
Harry Elmer Barnes and associates, on the key, and not yet 
properly answered, historical questions of the war and peace 
in this century. 

Dr. Wesserle's essay will surely generate controversy among 
Journal readers— its social-democratic, Middle-European, anti- 
imperialist viewpoint will stimulate and challenge Revi- 
sionists, just as it would enrage the bar-stool patriots and 
coffee-house cosmopolitans who sanction and support the 
media-consecrated, White-House-directed America-Last coali- 

Dr. Lutton has expertly and fluently reviewed, and if we 
may say, revived the Pearl Harbor debate, by reminding us of 
the solid Revisionist scholarship that skewered FDR's known 

(continued on page 430) 

The New World Disorder 


Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every 
rocket /ired, signifies, in the final sense, a theft from those 
who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and not 
clothed. This world in arms is not spending money alone. It 
is spending the sweat of its laborers, the genius of its 
scientists, the hopes of its children. 

President Dwight D. Eisenhower, 

Farewell Address 

As a bolt of lightning that flashes across the darkening sky 
is witness both to the approaching storm and to the 
unbearable tension which is giving birth to it, so the fires of 
the Gulf War have thrown a lurid light on the menacing return 
of a critical imbalance in world politics, and on the deep- 
rooted malaise— political, economical and social— in today's 
America. As to the actor who holds the international and the 
domestic halves of our globe together, President Bush's 
concern for image rather than reality has been little 

Despite his inaugural pledge in 1989 of a "kinder, gentler" 
nation, the only "thousand points of light" the president has set 
ablaze are the civilian and military targets that his air force 
and navy, and those of his client states, destroyed with a 
ferocity unequalled since the Second World War. George 
Bush's words— that it was not our goal to "destroy the nation of 
Iraq" -have been drowned out by his deeds: the total, 
unremitting warfare of the colossus among today's "military- 
industrial complexes" against a small, Third World country, 
and his unabated efforts to erase that country by stoking the 
flames of its civil war. Iraq has been "bombed back to the stone 
age." Following the war, it is expected to assume the 
staggering costs and reparations of a total war it did not even 
have the capacity to start. 



The Gulf War has been "neo-colonial," or two-faced. Shorn 
of its "high-tech" twenty-first-century trappings, it is embar- 
rassingly reminiscent of the imperial extermination expedi- 
tions of yesteryear, such as that conducted— with the aid of 
native askari— by Lord Kitchener against Abd Allah's Sudan in 
1898. Revealingly, the war has also moved in the time- 
hallowed tradition of political Crusades, in particular those of 
the Puritan-Calvinist type, redolent of Manifest Destiny. Here, 
the American executive's efforts at mobilizing the entire 
civilian population for permanent war (by enlisting one and all 
in the propaganda levge en masse of the "Homefront") was at 
least as important as the military offensive abroad. Bush's 
1991 State of the Union pledge of "a hundred years of peace" 
thus should be understood as simply another facet of his "psy- 
war" operations. What a desperate way of preparing his peo- 
ple for the sacrifices ahead! 

In fine, the disregard for diplomatic compromise and the 
single-minded concentration on offensive ways and 
means— against militarily inferior countries— which have 
characterized the Reagan and Bush administrations have 
made probable, also, that the twentieth century will end even 
more bloodily than it began: with colonial wars (and wars over 
colonies) escalating into continental conflicts and, if allowed 
to rage on, with eruptions into world-wide conflagration, 
domestic and international. 

The global auspices are plain. In the gathering storms be- 
tween the three major economic blocs: the Americas, ruled by 
the Dollar; the Indo-Pacific rimlands, dominated by the Yen 
(an area once known as the Dai To-A Kyo-e-ken, or the "Great 
East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere"); and Europe assembled 
under the leaking umbrella of the Deutsche Mark, America's 
Establishment, goaded by an ever-worsening domestic crisis, 
has now let it be known that it will stop at nothing to assure its 
hegemony in a "New World Order" by exploiting the destruc- 
tive capacity of its military and propaganda apparatus to the 
hilt. Thus, to paraphrase America's first wholeheartedly Im- 
perial President, Teddy Roosevelt, "We'll speak loudly and 
carry a big stick." 

The former Soviet Union, on the other hand, will play the 
role of a Global Gadfly, possibly as a reaction to the conditions 
of economic, social and political near-anarchy into which she 
has plunged herself in 1991-92. After the unsuccessful coup by 

The New World Disorder 


the Kremlin reactionaries (in which President Gorbachev 
played a murky part), Russian and the surrounding republics 
seem to be undergoing a replay of the March 1917 revolution. 
As then, the leaders and frontmen make up a volatile mix of 
the ancien regime (Gorbachev), the "social revolutionaries" 
(Yeltsin) and various Manchester Liberals who have just 
rediscovered Adam Smith. Will Yeltsin prove to be the new 
Kerensky destined to lead Russia into an even more radical 
upheaval, to be climaxed either by a remade proletarian 
Maoism or a return to Great Russian nationalism backed by 
the Pamydt ("Remembrance, Tradition") or related 
movements? Whatever the outcome, we will not have to wait 
long. The end result will also depend on the state of politics 
and economics in America. 

Some Western observers, particularly in Poland, may wish 
for Russia's total dissolution. Perhaps they pine for the days of 
that other Boris and the False Dimitrij of the Time of Troubles 
at the end of the Rurilcid dynasty in the early 1600's. But so 
negative a course of action would be unwise. 

Yes, the subject nations from the Baltic and the Ukraine to 
the borders of China must be, and are being, accorded in- 
dependence and sovereignty. But, for economic reasons and 
as a countervailing force against an overly dominant China, 
we should seek to support a multicentric, yet externally 
strong, Eurasian Confederation to take Russia's place. Could 
anyone doubt the fact— even before Secretary of State Baker's 
official visit to Beijing in mid-November, 1991— that a strong 
and stable Chinese State will reclaim, by diplomacy or force, 
those millions of square miles of territory lost to Russia during 
the nineteenth century and before? It bides its time, awaiting 
these conditions: a) chaos in Russia sufficient to render a 
Chinese invasion likely of success— if diplomatic initiatives 
fail; b) United States overextension abroad coupled to eco- 
nomic-social upheaval at home; c) the nonviolent union of 
Mainland China with Taiwan and Hongkong. The world 
stands on the threshhold of the stage of history when those 
conditions will be fulfilled. 

Violence will continue to tear the social fabric of the state of 
east-central Europe, as ethnic and economic warfare spreads 
and balloons. Those cobbled together artificially by the 1919 
Dictate of Versailles will suffer most. Marriages of force and 
convenience between disparate nations, growing out of a 
mosaic of minorities, they were re-established by frightful 



violence at the end of the Second World War. Now, in 1991-92 
and for years to come, in so-called Yugoslavia ("South Slavia") 
the ancient nations of Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia, Islamic 
Bosnia, the Turks, the Albanians and Hungarians will battle to 
overthrow the armies of overbearing Serbs; in Romania, 
millions of the underprivileged, the Hungarians, Bulgarians, 
Transylvania Germans, Greeks, Armenians, et al, will strug- 
gle for their freedom; in Czecho-Slovakia, the sad repository 
of a history of violence and brutality exercised by the ruling 
Czech minority against a majority of Germans, Slovaks, 
Hungarians and Ukrainians, the Slovaks and their neighbors, 
the Moravians, are striving desperately for national self- 

No doubt, these and other violent struggles for freedom 
might give an adventurous Russia more than one opportunity 
for interference, as of old. No doubt, also, the great nations of 
Central Europe might profitably join forces in a Rhine-Elbe- 
Danube Federation, as they did for 1,006 years prior to 1806. 

In the Near East and in South Asia, the war against Iraq 
may, far from defeating aggression, have given a final push to 
the area's seething cauldron of interstate and internecine 
violence. From the Atlantic to the Aegean, and from the Jor- 
dan to the Indus, especially at the junction of the borders of 
Pakistan, Kashmir, India and China, the world must brace 
itself for ever escalating rounds of mass conflict. Nor has the 
Muslim world, from Mauretania to Indonesia to Washington, 
D.C., yet spoken its final word. 

How on earth have we blundered into this mess? More im- 
portant, how can we get out of it? 

The tentative answers to these questions will keep us busy 
for the remainder of this paper, examining the power-political, 
military, historical and the moral-oeconomic dimensions. 
There can be no simple answer. But there can be an orienta- 
tion: an overall view that sees the traditionalist, or partly tradi- 
tionalist, majority of the societies of the earth trying desperate- 
ly to survive, salvaging their most precious values, while 
caught in the ever tighter grip of global industry and trade, of 
global politics and of "modernizing" ideologies. To that end 
they are adopting the most powerful features of the so-called 
model, developed, society: arms, industry and, above all, en- 
forced social-political cohesion. Failure to do so means loss of 
national independence, social and economic chaos, techno- 

The New World Disorder 


logized and unlimited mass murder carried out against the 
weak by the strong, and, for those mis6rables who manage to 
survive physically, the most thorough, the most dehumanizing 
enslavement devised during the last 5,500 years of human 
history— totalitarianism at last. 

A caveat: it can also happen to us. Perhaps it already has. 

A key word is "weakness." In the case at hand, both Iraq and 
the USA are weak, though in different ways. Saddam Hussein 
and his "Arab-Socialist" Ba'ath regime, all claims to the con- 
trary, were in 1990 still exhausted by the eight-year war with 
Iran, despite carefully selective military aid from the United 
States, France, the Soviet Union and China. Indeed, it was this 
weakness, together with strong historic claims, that prodded 
the Iraqi leadership to take increasingly active steps against 
oil-rich Kuwait, with official encouragement from the U.S. 
More fundamentally, the Ba'athists had inherited an Iraq com- 
prising disparate ethnic and religious communities, weighed 
down by poverty and inequality, riddled with illiteracy and 
saddled with a high rate of population growth (features most 
of which fit America to a T!). Caught in a classic situation of 
underdevelopment, the Ba'athists, who came to power follow- 
ing the 1958 Kassemite revolution, decided to modernize Iraq 
through social-economic reform carried out by an author- 
itarian regime— measures sure to keep them busy, and militari- 
ly and economically inferior relative to their rival Saudi 
Arabia and their enemy Israel, for decades to come. 

In contrast to an Iraq that has been faced with the stark 
choice of modernization or death, the United States, under 
Presidents Reagan and Bush, has seemed intent on turning its 
back on even the modest social reforms enacted and institu- 
tionalized during the five decades preceding 1981, in its pro- 
fessed program for allegedly "recapturing" the simpler values 
of a nineteenth century dominated by laissez-faire capitalism 
and classical liberalism. 

In reality, however, the United States is a classical case of a 
society suffering from Over-cum-Underdevelopment: the 
Establishment's increasing readiness to fight undeclared wars 
and its uncompromising commitment to world-wide trade 
and development have split twentieth-century America into 
two camps. An ever-wider societal gulf gapes between the Up- 
per Cliques on one hand, and the shrinking middle and 
burgeoning lower class on the other. The old song grows true: 
"The rich get richer and the poor get poorer." The former, 



internationally engaged, are free to secure and expand their 
financial and economic domination at home, and exploit it by 
political superiority abroad. The middle and lowers, harried 
by rampaging living costs, by chronic under- and unemploy- 
ment, menaced in their very lives by crime rates gone wildly 
out of control, and descending precipately from social anx- 
ieties to concrete, often self-alienating, fears, have all but given 
up on participating in, much less exercising control over, the 
political processes, save in one respect: that of mouthing for- 
mulas handed them from "above" and supplied by the elec- 
tronic and print media, a consumer product designated in 
Orwell's 1984: "prolefeed." 

In the Reagan-Bush years we have seen, if anything, a rigid 
reinforcement, an ossification, of the already huge and rigidly 
bureaucratized, military-corporate behemoth. Does this pic- 
ture of congealing social stratification, galloping impoverish- 
ment and the accelerated growth of a super-powerful oligar- 
chy bring to mind Imperial Rome in the third and fourth cen- 
turies A.D.? To be sure, there are obvious differences in style. 
But is the nominally free citizen of today better off— as a 
"morally autonomous" human being— than his ancestors, the 
serfs glebae adscripti of the older, greater, empire? 

It is only fitting that the government of a plutocracy be head- 
ed by— to expropriate a felicitous phrase of 1928 — a "Cabinet 
of Billionaires" and businessmen, led by Bush, Quayle, Baker 
and Brady and ably represented in Russia by the Texas 
Trickster, Robert Strauss. One main reason for the appoint- 
ment of this oil and gas wheeler-dealer, a former national 
chairman of the Democratic Party, to the post of United States 
ambassador in today's Russia is the leeway this affords him 
and his coterie for plundering the natural riches of that giant 

Questions: Will Yeltsin and his advisors prove strong 
enough to resist the economic-political-military blackmail ex- 
erted by the Bush-Baker-Bobby Strauss White House? Will to- 
day's Mother Russia prove strong enough to turn her vast 
natural resources to diplomatic advantage? Or will the coming 
instabilities of the world economy— when the outcry will be: 
"Save himself who can!"— plunge Russian-American relations 
to new lows? 

Now traditional sentiment has it that such enterprisers 
act— or should act— with grave circumspection, reckoning 
risks, overhead and rational chances for profit, and perhaps 

The New World Disorder 


even reflecting on an indeterminate entity known to previous 
centuries as "the common weal" (perish the thought!) bereft of 

Bunk. A look at some of the motives that precipitated Presi- 
dent Bush into the carnage of war against Iraq will teach the 
unbiased observer the facts of Life (that is: Death). 

Some Specific Reasons for America's War With Iraq 

1. Foreign adventurism; to distract the attention of the 
American people away from the crises at home and mobilize it 
against a Foreign Devil. 

2. An alarming drop in Bush's popularity ratings before 
August 1990, with dire consequences for '92: the feelings 
against him might have been summarized by the phrase: "All 
show, no go." 

3. A stimulus to the slumping U.S. economy. 

4. The intimate ties of Bush and Secretary of State James 
Baker to the oil industry in Texas and the Near East. 

5. Their alliance with reactionary cliques in Saudi Arabia, 
Kuwait, Bahrein and the other Gulf sheikdoms. These had 
grown increasingly alarmed at the success of Saddam Hus- 
sein's internal reforms, which reflected badly on the reac- 
tionaries' lack of political and social reform (particularly glar- 
ing with regard to the hundreds of thousands of Palestinian, 
Egyptian, Persian, Pakistani, etc. "guest workers" and 
businessmen living in those states). 

6. The golden opportunity to establish hegemony over the 
Gulf area, and all of southwest Asia, from the Bosporus to the 
Indus, for decades to come, meaning the elimination of a 
nucleus for future Near Eastern independence as, indeed, 
former nuclei for native resurgence, viz., Mossadegh's move- 
ment in Iran and later the Khomeini regime, were overthrown 
or hamstrung through American interference. 

7. After Bush's decision to destroy Saddam Hussein was 
made on or before the first days of August 1990, support for 
the parallel designs of our client state of Israel; today, this 
means support also for the expansionist aims of the Zionists: 
hegemony over the Near East from the Persian Gulf to the 
mouth of the Nile ("His kingdom will reach from sea to sea, 
from the Euphrates to the ends of the earth. The people of the 
desert will bow down before him . . ." Psalms 72, 8-9). 

8. The panic, now nearly forgotten, produced in the White 
House by the success of Gorbachev's foreign policy initiatives 
in western Europe; additionally, the worry over the liberation 



of central Europe from the Elbe to the Bug Rivers, once 
reliably occupied by the Soviets, and, conversely, the elation 
over the disorder in the USSR. An Imperial Imperative was 
perceived: push open the "window of opportunity" and seize 
world rule! 

Camouflage it all for the other nations (except the Russian) 
by passing it off as a con-dominium; call it the New World 

The plan worked brilliantly in 1990-91, chiefly because the 
then Soviet Union was too preoccupied with its own crises at 
home to run successful interference for Iraq. Reluctant, often 
financially strapped countries, such as the states of South 
America, the African members of the United Nations Security 
Council, as well as Egypt, Syria, Turkey, not to mention Israel 
and the USSR, were pushed and enticed over to our side, too, 
by showering them with promises of hundreds of billions of 
dollars, collectively, in aid and "debt forgiveness." 

Erratic policy, indeed, for a nearly bankrupt U.S. Govern- 
ment, whose citizens are expected to assume ever more 
crushing burdens in support of an ever smaller, ever more 
miserable slice of the pie, while shouldering the world- 
imperial predilections of the American Power Elite. 

"Quo usque tandem, Catilina . . .?" How much longer will this 
mix of domestic shrinkage and international aggrandizement 
stay glued together? 

No one knows. Mindful of the considerations advanced 
above, and drawing useful nudges from the fields of history, 
politics, military affairs and the human oeconomy, we shall be 
able to arrive at a few suggestions. 

Pacta Sunt Servanda, or: A Political History of Iraq 

Iraqi claims against all or part of Kuwait (the islands of War- 
ba and Bubiyan), anger at Kuwaiti slant drilling in the 
Rumailah oil field, and the very genesis and survival of the 
modern state of Iraq itself are part and parcel of the often 
violent processes of nation-building, of modernization, which 
is the legacy of the twentieth century for the peoples of Latin 
America, of much of Europe, of Africa and Asia. Iraq has 
often been the victim of both centrifugal and centripetal 
tendencies produced and exacerbated by a) its heterogeneous 
society, made up, among other groups, of the Indo-European- 
speaking Kurds and the ethnic Turks, both Sunni Muslim, in 
the north; the Muslim Arabs, many of them Shi'ite, of the 

The New World Disorder 


south; and the closely-knit Nestorian, Chaldaean, and Arme- 
nian Christian communities; b) successive waves of con- 
querors. The majority "Arab" culture of Iraq has undergone 
contradictory swings of frustration, reaction and accommoda- 
tion vis-a-vis these tendencies. 

From the beginning of recorded time, for over five thousand 
years, the land now known as Iraq and the sheikdom termed 
Kuwait have shared a common destiny. Taken together they 
form the central and southern portions of ancient 
Mesopotamia, which measure about 630 miles or 1000 km 
north-south, the "land between the rivers" of the Tigris, 
Euphrates and their confluence, the Shatt-al-Arab. Iraq, which 
means approximately "the roots, the rooted one," can vie for 
honors as the cradle of culture, politics and civilization, and 
Kuwait has been one of the border marches guarding its flanks 
against incursions from Arabia Deserta. The area has been 
marked and marred by vast contrasts: of climate, of untold 
wealth and grinding poverty, of ruler and ruled, and it lies 
athwart some of the most productive, and the most violently 
contested, routes for communication and trade on earth. 

Before the First World War, when most of the Near East was 
under the suzerainty of the Ottoman Empire, southern 
Mesopotamia, including Kuwait, had been for centuries ad- 
ministered through the vilayet (government district) of Basra, 
the largest city in southern Iraq. During the course of that war 
Turkish rule was supplanted by British imperialism. Then, in 
1919 and 1920, in the so-called peace settlements of Paris, 
Sevres and San Remo, Britain carved up the entire, huge, 
Pivot of Empire stretching from the Nile and the Bosporous to 
the Khyber Pass and the Gulf of Oman, following secret 
treaties concluded between His Majesty's Government, 
France and Tsarist Russia (the latter was eliminated from the 
spoils-sharing in 1917). These agreements, the most brilliant of 
which was the package known collectively as the Sykes-Picot 
treaties of 1915-1916, ran directly counter to other pacts the 
British concluded, such as the Balfour Declaration of 1917, 
which created a "national homeland for the Jews" in Palestine, 
and, even more glaringly, the understandings reached with 
the administrator of the Muslim Holy Lands, Sherif Hussein 
of Mecca, who was persuaded to rebel against Ottoman rule 
(Lawrence of Arabia!) by prospects of a united Arabia extend- 
ing from the Red Sea to the upper reaches of the Tigris River. 
(Sherif Hussein is the ancestor of both King Hussein of Jordan 



and the late King Faisal II of Iraq, who was killed during the 
anti-British revolution led by General Abdul Karim el-Kassem 
in 1958.) 

Britain grabbed the lion's share for itself. After plans for slic- 
ing up Mesopotamia were shelved in 1920 (due to its post-war 
role as a counter-balance to French influence in Syria, 
Lebanon and Turkey, as a barrier against the spread of suc- 
cessful nationalism beyond the boundaries of Turkey and 
Iran, and, not least, to the rich oil deposits of northern 
Mesopotamia), most of it was constituted as "Iraq," a British 
dependency nominally presided over by King Faisal I, a son of 
the Sherif Hussein of Mecca. It was camouflaged as a "Class A 
Mandate" granted to the United Kingdom by the League of Na- 
tions. Be it noted that the native Arabs demanded full in- 
dependence from the very start, as reported by the American 
King-Crane commission sent to the Near East by President 
Wilson, and that they were not fooled by the British 
maneuvers for an instant. 

It is unfortunate indeed that another U.S. president— in 
violent contravention of President Wilson's insistence on the 
right to popular self-determination— saw fit, in 1990-91, to 
maneuver the United Nations, successor organization to the 
League, into being pulled along in the wake of his attempts to 
crush or to dismember Iraq. "Might makes right," but, too, 
"Violence begets violence," and we may, at best, expect the 
subterfuges of 1991 to worsen disorder in the Middle East and 
around the world. 

During the period between the First and Second World 
Wars, the British were able to combine an apparent sympathy 
with insistent Arab and Iraqi strivings for independence with 
a ready reliance on armed might, including many sorties 
flown against civilian populations by the Royal Air Force. 
British "advisors" managed the tribal sheikdoms along the 
Gulf, including Kuwait. The ceremonial adoption of such 
documents as the Organic Law of 1924 (the constitution), the 
1930 treaty with the United Kingdom (which provided for a 
twenty-five-year "alliance" between Iraq and Britain, and— 
sure enough— was succeded by the U.S.-led Baghdad Pact of 
1955) and the 1932 admission of Iraq to the League of Nations 
did not alter the underlying realities. The relationship lasted 
through a series of internal Iraqi power struggles (the leaders 
of the various factions usually being well-subsidized by the 
British) until April 1941, when Rashid Ali al-Gailani estab- 

The New World Disorder 


lished a pro-German government, which was promptly 
crushed by Britain.. 

The politicians who dominated Iraqi society until the 1958 
putsch -and the British rule which was enacted through 
them— were characterized by these features: a) "gradualist" 
approach toward emancipation from colonialism; b) a conser- 
vative attitude— to put it mildly -toward social, economic, or 
political reform; c) the formation of an "Arab Federation" 
which comprised Iraq and Jordan; d) alienation from modern- 
ist Arab thought, then dominated by the Cairo of Gamal 
Abdel Nasser; e) widespread corruption; f) repressive rule. 
General Nuri es-Said was the period's most representative 
politician. Without trying to claim too much in favor of the 
1958 overthrow of that ancien regime, or in favor of the 
"nationalist-modernizing" governments which have come to 
power since then (many through coups d'etat), a very clear-cut 
choice has emerged for the majority of Iraqis: between a cor- 
rupt, repressive, colonial regime or one which is strong, na- 
tionalist, reformist, comparatively clean and, usually, dic- 

A third choice might be noted, one favored by such in- 
terested outsiders as Israel, Turkey, the United States and, 
formerly, the USSR (each for its own reasons): national 
weakness, civil war, chaos and dismemberment. 

If America truly is in favor of regional and world stability, 
an "Order" in which collective burdens (underdevelopment) 
and assets (human and natural resources) may be to an extent 
shared, then the first choice — colonialism — and the 
third— dismemberment— are precluded. 

"Stupidity Is a Diplomat's 
Only Unpardonable Crime" (Talleyrand) or, 
Nuclear Gunboat Diplomacy in the Global Village 

In the twentieth century, perversely enough, the most 
powerful nation-states seem to have turned von Clausewitz's 
dictum that "war is the continuation of politics by other 
means" upside down. Certainly Uncle Sam's international 
behavior seems to vary according to a Law of Inverse Propor- 
tion: the more "total" the military means applied, the less in- 
terest in negotiation through diplomacy. A second relation- 
ship determines the totality of means: the weaker a U.S. presi- 
dent perceives himself in terms of the economy and domestic 
politics, the more inclined is he to opt for war. This latter 



formula appears to apply to the Second World War (and to the 
First, with modifications), to the Korean and Indochina In- 
cidents and to our Gulf War. As psychic distances in the 
realms of economics and politics shrink (the Global Village), 
and as America's financial and domestic situation becomes in- 
creasingly precarious, our leaders move us and the rest of the 
world further down the road to total belligerency. In style, Un- 
cle Sam likely will favor the Iraqi model, or the "expanded- 
gunboat-diplomacy-in-Latin America" model, namely, in- 
tervention proceeding in stages of increasing violence: from 
embargo to blockade to all-out force in three easy steps, after 
which a country or a region of several countries can be reduc- 
ed to international impotence, domestic strife and chaos, and 
thus easy manageability by Washington and Wall Street. This 
three-step pattern of intervention has been, in whole or in 
part, evidenced already during the Reagan and Bush ad- 
ministrations, which have targeted a succession of countries 
and regimes, whether "leftist" or "rightist," that dared defy 
Washington's wishes: Nicaragua, South Africa, Grenada, 
Libya, Panama, the Philippines, and lately Iraq. Whatever 
their systems of government, these and other countries will be 
described as "democratic" if they accede to the wishes of 
America's imperial-minded power elite, "tyrannical" or an "ag- 
gressor" if they refuse. 

A Caveat 

In terms of unrestricted power politics it might be "logical" 
for us to engage in ever more ruthless applications of our ABC 
(atomic-bacteriological-chemical) and our PR (public relations) 
capabilities. Soon, however, the crying need for reforming our 
domestic and international relations might lead us to wiser 
choices: the models of ancient Rome, ancient Egypt, ancient 
China, which, learning from their mistakes, elected prudently 
to conserve their strength and abstain from a policy of perma- 
nent expansion to the lasting benefit of mankind, and of 

Professor Abbas Hamdani, of the history department of the 
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, has analyzed the 
diplomatic steps taken with regard to the problem of Kuwait, 
before and after August 1990, in careful detail. But it is this 
paper's task to document the very absence of the stuff of 
diplomacy that has characterized recent U.S. efforts in the 
field (and to suggest ways toward improvement): to show the 

The New World Disorder 


lack of intellectual substance and the erosion of moral integri- 
ty, the failure to achieve comprehensive vision, the decay of 

Who can trust a government, at home or abroad, that at- 
tempts to straddle the powder keg of the Middle East while 
lighting the fuse of war? 

The main stages of George Bush's descent into sham 
diplomacy have been roughly as follows: 1. His active in- 
volvement, as vice president of the Reagan years, in the mess 
of the Iran-Contra affair, a series of deeply corrupt transac- 
tions which involved secret arms sales during the Iraq-Iran 
War to Iran through Israel and, in the western hemisphere, il- 
legal arms shipments to the rebels in Nicaragua. Many details 
are still densely shrouded in secrecy, but Congressional in- 
vestigators learned that Vice President Bush made secret, of- 
ficial journeys to Honduras, Costa Rica, and Panama. The 
climax to these seamy maneuvers, which ultimately benefited 
only the Zionists' deals, came with the dispatch of a bible per- 
sonally signed by President Ronald Reagan to the Ayatollah 
Khomeini. 2. In the course of the December, 1989, invasion of 
the sovereign state of Panama by President Bush, the flagrant 
breach of international law and comity which occurred when 
U.S. troops stormed the extraterritorial premises of the em- 
bassies of Peru and Nicaragua, and threatened to do the same 
to the Vatican embassy. 3. The instructive exercises— either 
in duplicity or in deep ignorance— that took place when the 
United States ambassador to Iraq, April Glaspie, informed 
President Saddam Hussein that the U.S. viewed relations 
between Iraq and Kuwait as a purely "intra-Arab" affair, in July 
1990, and when the official spokesmen for the U.S. Govern- 
ment, Kelly and Tutwiler, openly and repeatedly declared that 
the United States had no "security arrangements" with or 
security concerns for Kuwait. In light of the fact that Iraq 
never has recognized the independence of Kuwait, that it tried 
to incorporate Kuwait in 1961 and 1973, and that, in July 
1990, there were obvious signs that Iraq was getting ready to 
occupy it, such official pronouncements must now be viewed 
as giving the "green light," or at least the "amber light," for ac- 
tion to President Hussein. 4. George Bush's bloodcurdling 
rhetoric in the course of fall and winter 1990-1991, of inflict- 
ing death and destruction on Iraq, his carrot-and-stick method 
of "persuading" the permanent and non-permanent members 
of the United Nations Security Council to issue Resolution 



No. 660, and the twelve resolutions which followed, calling 
for the "immediate and unconditional" withdrawal of Iraq 
from Kuwait and for the unconditional return of "sovereignty" 
to Kuwait, and his giving the "cold shoulder" to attempts by a 
long series of interested parties— ranging from repeated tries 
by the Soviet Union; the European Community; the foreign 
ministers and governments of Italy, Germany, France; the 
chairman of the Socialist International and former German 
Federal Chancellor Willy Brandt; to the governments of 
Algeria, Iran, Pakistan and even U.N. Secretary-General Javier 
Perez y Cuellar— to bring the Gulf dispute to a speedy end, as 
well as to convene a Mideast peace conference for solving the 
area's crises comprehensively. 5. Disregard for the apparent 
willingness of the Iraqi government to cooperate with peace 
efforts short of "unconditional surrender," such as the release 
of hostages; Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz's conference at 
Geneva with Secretary of State Baker; Aziz's proposal, again, 
of convening a comprehensive Mideast conference; and 
Aziz's flights to Moscow to appeal for Soviet mediation prior 
to the start of the violent phase of the land war. 6. President 
Bush's insistence on issuing unconditional ultimata followed 
by the application of raw force. Perhaps most serious of all, 7. 
President Bush's ignoring, passing over in silence, of the com- 
prehensive peace plan that his own Secretary of State, James 
Baker III, had worked out with Soviet Foreign Minister 
Bessmertnykh, which was to have been included in Bush's 
State of the Union Address to the assembled houses of Con- 
gress, but was not. Apparently the timely intervention of the 
government of Israel, alarmed at the prospect of having to 
reach a just solution to the Palestinian question, sufficed to put 
a comprehensive treatment of the entire Middle East crisis on 

Lest a further discrepancy not be forgotten either: George 
Bush endeavored stringently to enforce Security Council 
Resolution No. 660 within weeks of the provocation, and at 
the cost of probably hundreds of thousands of lives, military 
and civilian, all allegedly for the independence of the small 
sheikdom of Kuwait. But he and his predecessors have done 
very little to enforce U.N. Resolution No. 242 of November 
22, 1967. Significantly, this document emphasizes the "inad- 
missibility" of territorial conquest by war, shows the need for a 
just and lasting peace in the area, and calls for the "just settle- 
ment of the refugee problem." 

The New World Disorder 


This extraordinary concoction of confusion, ignorance, 
groundless fears, hunger for unrestrained power and instant 
readiness to exercise unlimited violence is no way to pacify a 
region and a globe already suffering from a surfeit of force. 

To be sure, Secretary of State Baker's "exploratory" trips to 
the Middle East and his meeting with a handful of Palestinian 
leaders deserve recognition. But these initiatives will remain 
charades aimed at television audiences unless the root prob- 
lems of expansionism, lack of national self-determination and 
vast inequities in the distribution of power and wealth are ad- 
dressed and corrected. This holds true especially after the ex- 
ploratory Madrid conference of October 1991. 

Finally, George Bush far exceeded the bounds of action 
authorized by the United Nations resolutions, even if they did 
specify— under U.S. pressure— that ". . . all necessary means" 
be used to clear Iraqi forces from Kuwait. The invasion and 
occupation of southern Iraq by the United States, the en- 
couragement of rebellion in the north and the south (if not an 
absolutely direct involvement in it), and open talk by 
American officials of establishing a lasting American presence 
and a "peace-keeping nerve center" in the Gulf region all point 
to Bush's aggressive regional and global intentions. 

Arguably, Bush, following in the footsteps of such imperious 
predecessors as Theodore Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson and 
Franklin Roosevelt, has not merely honored the non- 
interference principle of the Monroe Doctrine chiefly in the 
breach, but has stood it on its head, replacing the defunct 
European colonial empires with a single, neo-colonial, world 
power as chief global interventionist: the United States of 

Even the most determined "psy-warrior" can bend legal in- 
structions only so far without rupturing them. In the form of 
the UN Charter they prescribe: 

Article 33,1: The parties . . . shall . . . seek a solution by negotia- 
tion, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, judicial settlement, resort 
to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means 
of their own choice. 2: The Security Council shall, when it 
deems necessary, call upon the parties to settle their disputes by 
such means. [Author's emphasis] 

This is normative language. The use of peaceful means is 
not optional but mandatory. In short, George Bush has done 
violence to, not just the territories, the embassies and the 
peoples of sovereign nations, he has fractured international 



comity and law, and he has acted in open contempt of those 
and other allegedly sacred texts which ought to govern rela- 
tions between nations. 

Permanent War and the Military 

"QuoiJ tu veux qu'on t'^pargne et n'as rien dpargnd!" 
(What! You expect to be spared yet you have spared no one!) 

— Corneille, Octave 

There'll be no doubt that it's started. It will be massive. It'll be 

violent. It'll be fast It'll he everything you ever wanted in a war 

and never got. ^ _ 0 _ . p 

—General Norman Schwarzkopf 

Do ends, no matter how sublime they are assumed to be, 
justify the employment of any means in the course of war? No, 
they do not, not if the commander-in-chief and his generals in- 
tend to conduct "civilized" warfare as codified, in the twen- 
tieth century, by the Hague rules and the Geneva conventions 
concerning warfare and the roles of combatants and non- 
combatants in war. Alas, it seems safe to say that, in the war 
against Iraq, the commanders had no such intention and that 
those rules were honored chiefly in the breach. 

To judge by the reportage of the Pentagonized U.S. "news" 
media, all American and allied warriors, from the top down, 
threw themselves into the fight with gleeful abandon. Con- 
fronted by a numerically and technologically far inferior foe, 
they happily indulged in an orgy of organized mass killing and 
destruction. (On Saturday, February 23, 1991 -the official 
start of the land war-801,030 U.S. and allied troops faced 
545,000 Iraqi soldiers, most of them draftees. At the start of 
the air campaign, NBC-Television reported that Saddam Hus- 
sein had merely 70 aircraft capable of night operations; ap- 
parently most of them absconded to Iran, leaving thousands of 
U.S. and allied war planes, from F-16's to B-52's, to fly hun- 
dreds of sorties per day.) 

Pilots' references to a "turkey shoot," to "Daytona Beach on a 
spring break" abounded, while independent journalists 
somberly described the route of retreat out of Kuwait of the 
Iraqi divisions as "apocalyptic devastation." Northern Kuwait 
and southern Iraq were a "killing ground" on which Iraqi 
soldiers, seemingly confused by contradictory orders and ex- 
posed to murderous air attacks, were cut down by the tens, 
possibly the hundreds, of thousands. Accurate numbers are 

The New World Disorder 


The civilian population of Iraq fared little better. In pursuit 
of a policy of total war and unconditional surrender reminis- 
cent of Franklin Roosevelt's endeavors during the Second 
World War and Winston Churchill and Dr. Lindemann's pre- 
occupation with annihilating Germany by means of a strategic 
bombing offensive carried out by 10,000 heavy bombers, a 
technologically advanced space, missile, air and battleship 
campaign against an underdeveloped country of eighteen 
million (half of whom are under the age of sixteen) has wiped 
out Iraq's infra- and superstructure, to wit: schools, Moslem 
mosques and Christian churches— some of the oldest and 
greatest on earth— power plants, telephone exchanges, water 
and sewage facilities, bridges and mass transit, radio and 
television, as well as most other organized means of survival. 

By March 1991, with no running water, sewage treatment, 
or electricity— even for hospitals— big cities like Baghdad, 
(with four million people), Basra, Mosul, and Kirkuk faced 
widespread starvation and epidemic diseases such as cholera, 
with possibly hundreds of thousands, or millions, of civilian 

The sanctions (i.e., the total blockade) which the United Na- 
tions, under U.S. and British pressure, still enforces against 
Iraq, despite the ceasefire, have had to be relaxed somewhat to 
permit the shipment of a slight amount of medicine into the 

As for "surgical precision" airstrikes: in Tikrit alone, a small 
city of about 25,000 in northern Iraq, half of the population 
was reportedly killed when the town was leveled by bombing. 
Did Tikrit suffer because it was Saddam Hussein's hometown? 

There can be no doubt that, by the start of the air offensive 
in early 1991, the restrictive language of U.N. Security Coun- 
cil resolution No. 660 had been replaced, at least temporarily, 
by much more far-sweeping objectives: 1. the removal of Sad- 
dam Hussein from office and from life; 2. the elimination of 
Iraq as any kind of economic or military factor in the Middle 
East; and therefore, 3. the occupation of a "security zone" in 
southern Iraq by the allies, cutting off the port of Basra from 
access to the sea; 4. the literal annihilation of Iraq's armed 
forces as an effective whole, thus depriving her of any defense 
against her neighbors, adjacent or more removed; and 5. 
United Nations sanctions to keep her weak and divided for 
years or decades, or ripe for dismemberment when the time 



A special factor needs to be mentioned, too: that of the 
negative "image" of the 'typical Arab" created by the controlled 
U.S. "news" media. Particularly in times of seeming emergen- 
cy, he is depicted as a vicious "terrorist," an exact reversal of 
reality, for most of the manifold states and groups of the Arab 
world have been victims, victims repeatedly of expansionism, 
imperialism, mass murder and mass terrorism. It goes without 
saying that the "news" media and their captive audiences ex- 
tend the same type of sterotypic scapegoating to all Muslims, 
whether Arab, Pakistani, Indian, or American. One of the 
many revealing cases reported during the public hysteria of 
the Gulf War involved a driver of an airport bus at Chicago's 
O'Hare Field, who refused to pick up an Algerian 
businessman because he "looked Arabic." The F.B.I, was even 
busier than usual investigating Arab-Americans (recall that 
several years ago a number of resident aliens in Los Angeles 
were targeted for deportation— because they subscribed to a 
pro-P.L.O. periodical). 

The many revealing facets of military performance and pro- 
paganda in the Gulf War can scarcely be done justice to within 
these pages. Even the war's purely tactical questions are dif- 
ficult to assess, as all sides concerned have censored the news, 
not least the Pentagon. Still, from the limited evidence it ap- 
pears that the Iraqi forces were totally outclassed, not only by 
American superiority in space, in the air and at sea— despite 
Hussein's handful of obsolescent, restricted-range, Scud 
missiles— but even on land, where the majority of abandoned 
tanks seemed to be 35-year-old Soviet T-55s and 25-year-old 
T-62s. A legacy of carefully selective Soviet arms shipments, 
weakness dating from the brutal Iran-Iraq war, or both? At 
any rate, President Saddam Hussein was a military strawman 
whom the Pentagon, well knowing beforehand, could savage 
with impunity. 

By all indications, Saddam, his Western media image as a 
Foreign and Alien Devil to the contrary, was waging a strictly 
limited campaign with a limited objective, in the main by 
political means: the incorporation of Kuwait or, failing that, a 
phased retreat under face-saving but legitimate conditions, 
such as convening a conference to solve the Mideast's pro- 
blems, with the proviso of liberating the Palestinians from 
Israeli oppression. 

In fact, both Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney and General 
Schwarzkopf have agreed that, in the early days of August 

The New World Disorder 


1990, the Iraqi armed forces could have-and, by implication, 
should have— captured the Saudi supply bases located along 
the Persian Gulf a few hundred miles south of Kuwait, such as 
Dhahran, Djubail, Ras Tannura and the island sheikdom of 
Bahrain itself, into which U.S. supplies were pouring at a 
feverish pace. In those days, the Iraqis could have done so 
even with their antiquated equipment, since American and 
allied forces were few. But they abstained. 

This restraint was not reciprocated by Iraq's enemies. The 
Americans, the British (and their gulf protectorates), and their 
allies bided their time until they had amassed an overwhelm- 
ing numerical and technical superiority, then launched— not a 
limited Blitzkrieg with a few hundred tactical aircraft— but a 
paralyzing, total war of extermination against Saddam Hus- 
sein, his administration (the army and the civil service), the 
nation-state of Iraq (or its viability as such) and, by extension, 
against self-determination anywhere in the Middle East. Aside 
from the quasi-political, final aim of unconditional surrender, 
politics or traditional diplomacy did not enter into the pic- 
ture—again, a very Rooseveltian total, but ultimately self- 
defeating, pseudo-solution. 

Doubtless strategists everywhere have drawn the obvious 

1. Forget about conventional diplomacy except for the pur- 
poses of blinding your own people to your real goals and fool- 
ing the adversary whom you have selected as your next victim 
on the road to internationalist rule ("we have global respon- 
sibilities"); 2. prepare the field for total war by total global pro- 
paganda: be sure to "satanize" your adversary; 3. when the 
time is ripe, having achieved surprise, destroy your foe-of-the- 
moment's country or region by massive media-and-military 
firepower, sparing nothing and no one; 4. if there is the ghost 
of a chance of determined resistance, pulverize that chance 
ahead of time, and if need be, the entire civilian infra- and 
superstructure with it. 

The spirit and the logical, realistic development of the 
lessons drawn from the war against Iraq lead directly to the 
possibility of a third world war against nations far more com- 
petitive with perceived U.S. interests than is Iraq. The smart 
bombs, the missiles and the laser deathrays of Gulf fame have 
concluded the post-war years (as, following today's fashion, we 
look longingly back to World War II) and have, at last, ushered 
in the pre-war years leading up to the final global war, with 



their attendant domestic as well as global ramification. 

To add two more points to the Four-Point Program outlined 
above: 5. the destruction of rationality in Washington 
itself— which lately has not distinguished itself by reason or 
responsibility; 6. the total subversion of our political 

The Moral Oeconomy 

'We have met the enemy and he is us. " _ p ogo 

Today, in a limited but technologizing world, in which a 
scarcity of human resources (i.e. "heart," "mind," "brains," 
"guts") is chasing a rapidly proliferating shopping list of "goals" 
created by the analytical intellect driven by the will to absolute 
power, it is the first duty of public morality to intervene active- 
ly in the resulting "chaos," in the economy of forces, in order to 
preserve and enhance the value priorities of the human con- 
stitution and of the natural ecology. 

The first human value to be preserved is freedom, the 
capacity to choose rationally amongst a near infinity of goods 
and bads. I write this despite the excesses of "license" indulged 
in during such events as the French Revolution of 1789. In a 
society ruled by the military-industrial complex freedom is the 
first value to go. There, it is also the most important human 
property, for only freedom can power us out of such a 
society's culs-de-sac: megalomania, totalitarianism, internal 
and external war, and the type of ossification described in 
Oswald Spengler's Der Untergang des Abendlandes. 

Freedom has its domestic, group and individual (as it has its 
national, popular and international) dimensions. All are inter- 
related and intertwined. Today, as never before in history, all 
of our freedoms are in danger of being swept off the face of the 
earth by the technologized garrison state with its universal 
pretensions (perhaps disguised as a U.N. "New World Order"). 
Short of awaiting a natural cataclysm (such as the one that 
wiped out the dinosaurs) we should take heart and act accor- 
ding to the following insights: 

"GemeinwoW geht vor Eigennutz" ("The common good takes 
precedence over private gain"). This maxim, coined, though 
not invented, by the great organizer of rural cooperatives, 
Raiffeisen, if correctly understood as a good through the prin- 
ciple of subsidiarity, flies directly in the face of the accepted 
gospel truth of present-day plutocracy: the allegedly greatest 

The New World Disorder 


good for the greatest number through unrestrained, individual 
competition (society "red in tooth and claw"). The rather 
peculiar sort of Social Darwinism as practiced by America 
and in America today has but one result: the brutalization of 
domestic and international society (whether behind a facade 
of "Yuppie" conspicuous consumption and "United Nations" 
resolutions, or not). Raiffeisen's thought provides a timely an- 

Too, "government of the people, by the people, for the people" 
should not perish from the earth, but can and should be 

As never before in the past, in the twentieth century the 
lords of mass "communications" have twisted and subverted 
the truth in the service of easy commercial and political 
manageability. We know, on the contrary, that he who shouts 
"Stop, thief!" the loudest actually is the thief, that those who ac- 
cuse others of "shocking" misdeeds have in truth themselves 
perpetrated the most heinous crimes in history, physically, 
psychologically, morally. They are the killers of the human 
spirit, the murderers of freedom. They are the Enslaver. Day 
by day they seek to rule absolutely, through cliche and 

In brief, public morality as well as the more limited social, 
political and financial deeds of a commonwealth should form 
a Greater, a Moral Oeconomy. It might be defined, according 
to Webster, as the 

. . . husbanding, the "careful management of wealth, resources 
(of a . . . community or government); avoidance of waste by 
careful planning and use ..." [Webster's New World Dictionary, 
Second College Edition, 1986). 

Has the U.S. government since 1981 excelled in any sense of 
this definition? Has it understood the basic human need for a 
Moral Oeconomy? 

Not likely. 

Indeed, the former CIA chief and U.S. Secretary of Defense, 
James Schlesinger, has characterized "Reagonomics" as "the 
fiscally most irresponsible policy in history"— an apt hyperbole 
for most endeavors, domestic or international, of the Reagan 
and Bush years. 

We might profitably recall some of the "highlights," as the 
catastrophic impact of Reaganomics on the American people 
and on the world will be felt for decades to come. 



I. "Conventional" corruption— In terms of the hundreds of 
billions of dollars directly or covertly misappropriated and 
swindled from the American people— not to mention the 
thousands of billions stolen from the public on Wall Street and 
from coast to coast by dint of encouragement and rotten exam- 
ple from On High— the Reagan regime has left other presiden- 
tial contenders for the crown of public corruption, such as 
Warren Harding (Teapot Dome Scandal) or U.S. Grant's ad- 
ministration (during the era of the Robber Barons), wallowing 
in the dust. The Iran-Contra affairs, the HUD scandal and 
similar deeds will figure prominently in the annals of 
decadence, from Byzantium to Babylon. Both political parties 
leapt into the muck. Of the "Keating Five"-the five United 
States senators involved in the murky deals of the Arizona 
savings and loan executive— the one singled out for public 
blame by his colleagues was California's Senator Alan 
Cranston, a former Democratic presidential contender. 

II. Structural and attitudinal faults— A policy of "planned 
obsolescence" was applied to campaign promises from the 
start. Reagan and Bush administrations that had pledged to ex- 
tirpate the national deficit raised it instead to undreamed-of 
heights. "Adjusted" deficits (i.e., after more than $100 billion a 
year in Social Security payments— allegedly untouchable— has 
been "subtracted" from them) ranged from $200 billion to $245 
billion annually, mostly in favor of new outlays for the 
military. In contrast, domestic programs were drastically 
slashed. Even President Bush's first, new budget proposed on 
January 29, 1990 — a pre-Iraq budget— raised spending to an 
all-new $1.23 trillion, with an alleged $63.1 billion shortfall for 
1991. Instead of reducing the federal bureaucracy, as pledged, 
President Reagan installed 10,000 new bureaucrats in the Pen- 
tagon alone, according to former Secretary of the Navy 
Lehman, of "600-ship-navy" fame. No wonder $3 trillion were 
lavished on arms during ten Reagan-Bush years. No wonder 
the federal and the public debts skyrocketed. No wonder that 
existing disequilibria in the national economy worsened and 
that fresh financial problems and crises arose. 

Impelled by the movement toward "privatization" of the 
public domain launched by the White House and fuelled by 
the same, quasi-nineteenth-century "rags-to-riches" career that 
Ivan Boesky and Michael Milken typified on Wall Street and 
in Beverly Hills (the latter was rumored to have turned a tidy 
profit of $1 billion in 1988), savings-and-loan institutions, big 

The New World Disorder 


banks and gigantic insurance empires speculated in real 
estate, multi-billion-dollar loans to developing countries such 
as Venezuela, Brazil and Peru, and floods of "junk bonds"— all 
encouraged by the Reagan administration. When the develop- 
ing economies defaulted on their debts and the real-estate 
market (particularly in office buildings) turned sour (since it 
was totally overextended), the bottom dropped out of the mad- 
ly spiraling junk-bond boom, during the last Reagan year. The 
consequences will be with us for decades to come. In one field 
alone, the debacles in the insurance business— formerly the 
very bedrock of bourgeois financial respectability— will send 
tremors of instability throughout the economy for years. 

The S & L fiascoes will saddle the American taxpayer with a 
millennial debt of some $500 to $1000 billion dollars (as 
estimated by cleanup supervisor Seidman). The bank 
failures— over two hundred are expected to occur in 1991 
alone— will incur even huger sums, sums which the U.S. 
government can no longer make "liquid" unless it sells trillions 
of dollars worth of national assets to foreign creditors. Also, 
some of the shiniest names in U.S. capitalism, the Rockefeller 
family jewels of Citicorp and Chase Manhattan, Manufac- 
turers Hanover, Chemical Bank, and Bank of America, might 
follow the slide into nothingness of the Bank of New England. 
A severe and drastic currency-and-property reform might be 
the only rational solution. An easy solution is, and will be, an 
ever-accelerating spiral of foreign wars. 

Very likely the U.S. government, led by President Bush, will 
try a similar approach in "solving" his other crises, such as: an 
urban-and-regional planning picture and a physical infrastruc- 
ture that is falling to pieces; an educational system that is 
seventeenth in literacy in the world; a health "system" that is 
nonexistent for more and more middle-income Americans 
and for the poor, one that is in last place (alongside that of the 
Republic of South Africa) in providing adequate and vital 
health care to citizens, amongst all industrialized nations; a 
grave lag in basic research, outside of military applications 
and "SDI"; and the effects of a complete disregard for energy 
and environmental policy during the Reagan years. Despite lip 
service to a higher, more intelligent, ideal the Bush govern- 
ment follows in Reagan's wake. Perceived "emergencies," once 
more, may induce bigger and better wars. 

Let us elaborate a few illustrative examples. Urban, regional, 
and national planning— never America's strong suit, yet a vital 



function of any government that intends to endure— has been 
mortally neglected since 1981. The large cities that had been 
sliding downhill for decades under the growing burdens of 
blight, maladministration, poverty, a burgeoning proletariat 
and a murderous crime rate (in spite of rather spotty and 
symptom-oriented "help" from the federal government) have 
been cut off from any meaningful, moral, financial and ad- 
ministrative assistance by Reagan and Bush, and set adrift as 
national derelicts. In effect, the hundred million people who 
live in big urban centers are now considered so many "bums" 
on a collective skid row. Protracted, interrelated, planned ef- 
forts to reform and to clean up the nuclear industry (whether 
military or civilian); to build an energy policy; to rebuild the 
infrastructure of bridges, highways, and railroads; as well as 
projects to plan for new regional mass transit networks, have 
withered on the vine. Most of these, if carried out, would 
make a valuable contribution to a national environmental 
policy, and enable us to diminish our much-bruited 
dependence on imported oil. 

What is indeed "the shame of our cities" is worse, even, than 
it was around the turn of the century, when their plight at- 
tracted the muckrakers' attention. Philadelphia, perhaps the 
most historic of America's big cities, in struggling futilely to 
survive physically, let alone financially, but no one in 
Washington raises an eyebrow. For the second time in sixteen 
years, there is talk of receivership for New York City, the 
capital of world plutocracy. As always, there will be talk of 
running local and municipal government "according to ac- 
cepted business methods." Nonsense. It is exactly because 
American cities have been treated as money-making enter- 
prises, because the spirit in which they have been "run"— with 
the former exception of Social-Democratic (and German- 
American) Milwaukee— has been that of the unproductive, 
power-and-profit-mad "arbitrageur," that their ineffectiveness 
and corruption have reached a low unequalled in the history 
of the republic. 

Yes, they can be saved and they should be saved. Yet for that 
to happen America must recast its entire government and 
society in the image of a Moral Oeconomy. We must reallocate 
priorities drastically. No longer should a U.S. president be in a 
position to donate more than $13 billion toward the construc- 
tion of housing for immigrant Russian Jews in Israel (reported- 
ly to reward Israel for "staying out" of the war against Iraq) 

The New World Disorder 


while he allocates a mere $15 billion in federal bloc grants to 
all fifty U.S. states. Without a doubt, a single crisis-torn and 
crime-overwhelmed state such as New York, New Jersey, 
Pennsylvania or California could easily put all $15 billion in 
federal support to good use by itself. Additionally, George 
Bush has donated, or "forgiven," scores of billions of dollars to 
countries around the world, from Argentina to Egypt, Turkey 
and Poland, and— by implication— heavily subsidized the 
Soviet Union, all in the service of buying support for his 
military adventurism abroad. To top it all, he is spending, and 
is calculating to spend, further hundreds of billions of non- 
existent dollars for oppressive regimes around the world, and 
for the development of exotic new weapons systems— even 
after the huge tribute by America's client states is considered. 
When will the bubble burst? 

III. Skewed priorities and twisted logic — Why spend billions 
of dollars on expanded and "improved" armaments for the 
New World Order's millennial era of peace? It is indicative of 
White House paranoia that, instead of engaging in true, 
positive diplomacy to solve the root causes of crises, i.e. in the 
Middle East (or, alternatively, pursuing a hands-off, America 
First policy), in 1991 it is planning to construct a partial SDI- 
Star Wars directed against imaginary missile attacks on the 
U.S. by Third World countries, at a cost of $30, $40 or $50 
billion, knowing that a full-fledged SDI directed against the 
Soviet Union is technically impracticable. Furthermore, after 
misspending trillions of dollars on armaments, including the 
Stealth bomber and Stealth fighter (the stealthiest aspects of 
which were the secrecy with which they were kept from the 
American public), SDI, the MX, Minuteman and Trident 
missiles, the Reagan and the Bush administrations have 
prepared to spend a minimum of 280 billion additional dollars 
toward the construction of brand-new weapons systems: an 
ATF ("advanced tactical fighter," either the Lockheed YF-22 or 
the Northrop YF-23), the Seawolf submarine and the LTH 
("light tactical helicopter")— when well-nigh overwhelming 
weapons systems are more than capable of continuing into the 
future and were developed in the recent past at astronomical 

By contrast, even Bush's 1990 proposal for the 1991 budget 
already included $13.9 billion in cuts for domestic spending, 
$5.5 billion coming from a Medicare program that had pre- 
viously undergone repeated slashes. One may predict with 



with confidence that if George Bush's popularity in 1991 
assures his reelection in 1992, he will proceed to slash 
Medicare and other domestic "entitlements"— not excluding 
Social Security— with gusto, to subsidize his growing appetite 
for foreign aggrandizement. Beyond the unfortunate millions 
of the elderly and the infirm affected, perhaps even harder hit 
will be those 27 million Americans without any health in- 
surance, including 12 million poverty-stricken children. En- 
tire regions in the "Rust Belt" of the East and the Midwest, and 
in the rural areas of the South and the mountain 
states — already suffering from chronic, unregistered 
unemployment and grinding poverty— will disappear by the 
millions into the maelstrom of misery. 

These are some of the dimensions of what President Carter 
was accused of calling the Misery Index, the vicious conse- 
quences of what bourgeois economists term Karl Marx's Vere- 

They are very real, and they are growing. 

What Can We Do? 

"Lasciate ogni speranza, voi ch'entrate." 

(Abandon all hope, you who enter) —Dante's In/erno 

The growing menace of the establishment of a total "gar- 
rison state," with all that implies, at home and abroad (and it 
implies eventual "genocide," mass murder, at home and 
abroad) does not decree its inevitability. Historical deter- 
minism exists in the minds of those who preach it. However, 
its superficial opposite, pollyanna chamber-of-commerce 
sanguinism, is even more misleading, for it lends itself to mass 
manipulation by the corrupt. The sane fight for the rational ex- 
ercise of will. 

America does have choices. What are some of them? 

The first might be called, somewhat misleadingly, the Max 
Weberian alternative to Werner Sombart. The latter had writ- 
ten persuasively about the successive— and more or less suc- 
cessful—stages of capitalism, particularly about "Late 
Capitalism" (a phrase which seems to denote that the wish for 
its demise was the father to the thought). America's behavior 
since the Great Depression, at home and abroad, has in many 
striking ways corresponded to the various phases of Spdt- 
kapitaJismus; the Reagan-Bush era might be regarded as one of 
its ultimate stages of global panic. The "Reagan Revolution," in 

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other words, might be seen as a response to home and world 
conditions, semi-consciously homologous to the cries of: 
"Apres nous Je deluge!" and "Sauve qui peut!" from the French 
power elite before and during France's revolutionary crisis of 
the 1790's. 

Yet there is an important component missing from this 
equation: that of global hegemony. Scientific observers note 
that the United States is the heir— not to the over-romanticized 
"Anglo-Saxon-tradition of liberty"— but, more accurately, to 
the instititionalized attitudes of absolute domination, con- 
quest, power politics and plunder personified by the Norman 
founders of the "English" (and, fascinatingly, of the Old Rus- 
sian) states. Now, a millennium after the original conquests, 
their descendants are facing off in their ultimate "showdown," 
as de Tocqueville foretold in the nineteenth century. No one 
believes that the U.S.-Soviet "condominium" of the world of 
1990-91 — a very cramped and one-sided affair— will last for 
more than a few years. 

Today's Yankee Hot Warriors are in an enviable position 
geopolitically. Having conquered the Americas from Alaska to 
Tierra del Fuego, or keeping them in a state of manifold sub- 
jection without the inconvenience of physical occupation, 
they are in a position to dominate all landmasses laved by the 
Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. Indeed, at bottom they are not 
"capitalist" at all but "conquest plutocrats." They would readily 
shed the latter part of this label, too, continuing their expan- 
sionism even as socialists. 

Yet their decision to keep strategic portions of the Persian 
Gulf occupied, after making the mistake of attacking it 
physically rather than solving the problem politically- 
economically, reveals a glaring mental rigidity. 

How much wiser to follow the advice of Max Weber, the 
great social scientist, given at the time of the St. Louis World 
Exposition of 1904: systematically to create a rationalized, 
limited state through the establishment of a service 
bureaucracy motivated by honor, the idea of duty and the 
common good, and the notion of economy as "avoidance of 
waste by careful planning and use." 

Is it too late for that now, in 1991? I admit that such a truly 
Prussian solution seems unappealing in the short run, perhaps 
anywhere in America and Europe. But in the long run, in a 
few decades and centuries, when the crises, catastrophes and 
cataclysms brought on by following the erroneous "ideal" of 



Conquest Plutocracy with altogether too much ardor will have 
at length exhausted themselves, then any new society and 
government, to endure, will need to be built on rules close to 
Max Weber's heart. 

In a political culture which de-emphasizes and punishes 
medium and long-range planning (even of the economic kind), 
the "crisis" most government leaders' were concerned about in 
the first half of 1991 is the prevailing, moderate (at least, 
government spokesmen anxious to appear confident of the 
future call it so) economic recession. Should these conditions 
worsen it could mean dire things for our economy, govern- 
ment and society: firms and industries saddled with heavy, 
unproductive debts through "leveraged buy-outs" by "arbi- 
trageurs" find it difficult to adjust to the new, leaner economic 
climate. They are forced to lay off thousands, tens of 
thousands, indefinitely. Some firms go under. A vicious cycle 
develops, in which growing unemployment— unalleviated due 
to government inaction— fuels a worsening recession while it 
drains the public treasury further through passive unemploy- 
ment compensation. In order to "lighten the load" of an 
already disastrous deficit, the government feels called upon to 
cut "entitlements" further, plunging millions more of the 
middle-class and the poor into misery, and further reducing 
their buying power. Unemployment payments are slashed, 
too. More firms fail. The stock markets, which had been ex- 
tremely over-extended and buoyant in the wake of a successful 
war of the "foreign-adventurist" kind, turn sour. The Dow 
Jones average plunges 600 points in a week. In the meantime, 
tension spreads from coast to coast in urban regions which 
have lost millions of jobs over the last decade, collectively, and 
hundreds of thousands due to the recession. The economic 
picture worsens. Demagogues whip emotions to a frenzy. A 
single spark, in a society fractured along national, racial, and 
sub-caste lines, and race war erupts, tearing the fabric of socie- 
ty, throwing the economy into total chaos, causing trillions or 
more dollars in damage and killing thousands, and more, 
through violence, disease and exposure. 

Such conditions of anomie might also provide a welcome 
chance for the Soviet— or Russian— elite to redress its grie- 
vances against the West and the U.S., either in step-by-step 
progression or, more likely, by means of a surprise attack. 
Thus, logically and historically, the dislocations and down- 

The New World Disorder 


turns brought on by the "Reagan Revolution," the late and 
lamentable outcome of several centuries of evolution, quite 
possibly will conclude with the much-dreaded World War and 
World Revolution. The ultimate plutocrats would then be the 
executors of Karl Marx's last will and testament. 

In the short run, mankind might be granted a breather by 
the 1992 U.S. elections. Probably, President George Bush and 
Federal Reserve Board Chairman Allan Greenspan will pull 
out the stops in a last effort to create "rosier" economic condi- 
tions to achieve Bush's re-election. After that, it will be "every 
man for himself." Despite (or because of) the economic union 
of Europe in 1992, Germany will not be protected by its fellow 
Europeans but, on the contrary, will be exposed to increased 
levels of financial and political blackmail by the U.S., Israel, 
Britain, France, Poland and Russia. Added to the increased 
burdens of integrating the old Soviet Zone with West Ger- 
many, and denuded of any practical military defenses after the 
enforced concessions of 1990-91 ("The New Versailles"), even 
Germany may be unable to stomach the redoubled demands. 
Economically, socially and militarily, her downfall would 
plunge Europe into ballooning disorder— unless America 
desisted from her Divide and Conquer foreign policy and in- 
tervened diplomatically to aid her strongest ally in Europe. 
But, for several reasons, that is unlikely. If reelected in '92, 
Bush will slash domestic "entitlements" in a desperate effort to 
right the capsized economy. He will try to "shoulder off some 
of those outlays on Germany and Japan. Too, the probable in- 
crease in domestic U.S. unrest— heightened by the chauvinism 
left over from the Gulf War— will make Uncle Sam regard the 
comparative "tranquillity" for foreign competitors with a jaun- 
diced eye. He will seek to export his troubles, imprudently 
knocking out his main props. 

There are already many choices in the possibilities por- 

Here are some more, always keeping in mind that our pre- 
ferred option is to create a dialectics, a rational dialogue be- 
tween the idea of "community" in politics and economics and 
the idea of "freedom," with emphasis on the "legitimate self- 
determination of peoples" on all levels of politics, from the 
township to the international arena. 

Internationally, how intelligent is it for the United States, for 
instance, in its GATT-talks ("General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade") with the European Community, to insist that the 



Europeans cut their farm subsidies to the bone— while the 
U.S. does not reciprocate by slashing subsidies to its huge in- 
dustrial "farms" in California, Florida and elsewhere? Such a 
move by Europeans would jeopardize the highly labor-inten- 
sive, efficient, but tiny family farm in Europe, with roots going 
back four or five thousand years, and would depopulate the coun- 
tryside even more rapidly, adding to the urban proletariat and 
causing social-political crisis. After all, that's what happened 
two thousand years ago in ancient Rome. 

Will the "New Rome" of Wall Street and Washington recog- 
nize its own interest in preserving and building communities 
abroad, after its total war and its victory in Iraq? There can be 
no "total victory. " 

The Bessmertnykh-Baker plan for remedying the grave prob- 
lems of the Middle East comprehensively, and the Palesti- 
nian situation in particular, brooks no delay. Despite the fact 
that the U.S. irrationally injured its own interest in preserving 
the status quo in the Mideast by smashing Saddam Hussein 
and creating a power vacuum ready to be filled through the 
designs of Iran, Turkey, Syria and Israel, thus destablizing 
regional and world politics, we should subject our "unique 
relationship" with Israel to an agonizing reappraisal. That is 
what President Eisenhower did in 1956 (how things have 
changed!) We all know that Israel is the nuclear-military super- 
power of the Mideast and need fear no one on earth. By 
means of suitable but swift diplomatic maneuvers, we should 
make it clear to the ruling, reactionary cliques of Israel that: 
America will not stand for the oppression of the Palestinians 
by Israel; we insist on implementing U.S. Security Council 
Resolution No. 242 and similar resolutions with a view toward 
establishing a state for the Palestinians via the PLO; and 
America will never accept Israeli designs on neighboring 
states, and on Lebanon, Jordan, Syria and Iraq in particular. 
What are the chances for success of such a scenario in a Bush 

Turkey is the tertium gaudens, far from the international 
limelight focused on such prime players as the U.S., Israel or 
Iran, yet laughing with the contented glee of a peasant who 
stands in the shadow of greater Powers and has struck a good 
bargain. The Sancho Panzaesque figure of President Torgut 
Ozal had only reinforced that impression. 

Of course, Turkey in a geographically much larger guise, as 
ruled by the once great Ottoman dynasty of sultans and 

The New World Disorder 


caliphs [khalifa, the "successors to the prophet," the titular 
heads, temporal and spiritual, of all Islam), was the declining 
imperial power of North Africa and the Middle East before the 
First World War. At its end, only the outstanding leadership 
qualities of General Mustafa Kemal (later proclaimed "Atatiirk" 
or "Father of the Turk"), those of his aides, and the valor of the 
Turkish soldiers, combined with the squabbling of the prime 
imperialists: Britain, France and Italy and their tool, the 
Kingdom of Greece, as well as the assistance provided by the 
new Bolshevik regime of Soviet Russia, kept Turkey from 
begin ripped to shreds by the victors, preserving her from 
disappearing forever. A timely lesson for 1991. 

The new, republican Turkey was confined largely to 
Anatolia and the littoral of the northeast Mediterranean. She 
was forced to accept the subjugation of large, centuries-old, 
Turkish minorities in the new states of the East, ranging from 
the southern reaches of the Soviet Union to Yugoslavia and all 
the way to northern Iraq and Iran. In 1991 her claims to some 
of these regions, particularly to oil-rich northern Iraq around 
Mosul and Kirkuk, rest in part on the existence of these 
minorities. Further, advancing pan-Turanian ideas, the Turks 
have cast their eyes on the related Turkic majorities of 
northern Iran and of central Asia east of the Caspian. If the 
U.S. after 1991 rearms her, replacing her obsolete arms with 
smart, hi-tech weapons systems, we can expect Turkey to play 
a much more aggressive role in the Mideast. In the future, she 
might prove troublesome to either a shrinking or an expand- 
ing post-Soviet Russia. 

We need also to remember that republican Turkey has been 
no more lenient to her Kurdish minority than has Iraq. She 
will watch the masses of new refugees with eagle eyes and 
possibly misdirect them to advance her own aims against the 
Arabs. It is the tragic plight of the Iraqi Kurds to have believed 
the irresponsible pronouncements of an untrustworthy, and 
apparently irrational, Superpower. 

As for the Soviet Union or, more correctly, Russia, she has 
been the Turks' chief enemy since the imperial-expansionist 
days of the great Tsar Peter around the year 1700. Traditional- 
ly, Russia has also sought to break up, or to dominate, neigh- 
boring Persia (Iran). To the present day, her aim has been to 
extend her hegemony over as much of the Persian gulf region, 
and over Iran's eastern flanks of Afghanistan and Baluchi- 
stan, as practicable. It has been her sad lot to see her main aim 



of sole autocracy stymied, in the nick of time, by an even more 
powerful and even more ambitious rival from across the seas: 
up to 1941 by Britain and since 1946 by the United States of 
America. Unless Russia commits suicide, or is extirpated total- 
ly, in her present Time of Troubles— which seems unlikely— 
she will reassume her accustomed role in the not very distant 
future, with a vengeance. 

When— and if— she does, she will remember three past 
events. Soon after the outbreak of the Second World War, 
when Stalin invaded Finland in the infamous Winter War of 
1939-1940, Britain and France went to work to prepare a two- 
pronged invasion of the Soviet Union: in the north, through 
Norwegian and Finnish Lapland, and, in the south, out of 
Syria and Iraq. The operation was finally shelved when Hitler 
pre-empted Churchill by striking north to Narvik and Norway. 
Today, once again, the Soviets have reason to worry about the 
strategic threat to their "soft underbelly," especially with 
Georgia's declaration of independence on April 8, 1991, and 
the possibility of this setting an example all along the southern 
boundary of the USSR from Moldavia outside 
Romania (the Soviets annexed it in 1940) to the Muslim na- 
tions on the borders of Afghanistan and China. Let us not im- 
agine that the USSR, or an imperial Russia, will tolerate a 
strong U.S. or NATO presence in the Gulf Region for long. 

By contrast, Russia cherishes her memories of the time after 
June 22, 1941, when the leaf of history turned and she was in a 
position, again, to partition Iran between herself and Britain, 
supported by the U.S. In those heady times Stalin dominated 
Teheran. His power was sufficient to enable him to carve out 
virtual Soviet satellite states in Azerbaijan and the Kurdish 
areas, and to attempt to extend his sphere of influence by en- 
couraging the "independence" of the Kurds in Turkey and 
Iraq. The famed Kurd leader, Mustafa Barzani, and his clan 
were trained in Moscow. Soviet agents infiltrated the entire 
region. Not until 1946 and 1947 did British and then 
American resistance stiffen sufficiently to make it prudent for 
Stalin to heed Iranian demands for withdrawal. The Soviets 
cleared out— but only for the time being. 

A third event the Russians will bear in mind with distaste is 
the ill-disguised contempt they received at the hands of the 
Yankees before, during and after the war against Iraq, a 
former friend of theirs. Even though deep-seated divergences 

The New World Disorder 


were "papered over" at the U.N. and for the television watch- 
ing publics, the U.S. made it abundantly clear that she no 
longer deemed the Soviet Union a serious global factor diplo- 
matically, economically or, for that matter, militarily. It is a 
glaring indication of the mismatch in "clout" at the White 
House that the objections of Israel— a Levantine dwarf state on 
the face of it— prevailed over the Bessmertnykh-Baker agree- 
ment concerning a comprehensive solution to the Mideast's 
troubles, in which the foreign ministers of the two former 
World Superpowers had invested their prestige. No lip service 
to the "New World Order" for "a hundred years of peace" can 
gloss over that high-handed conduct. Not that hauteur is 
unrealistic, for the time being. But "realities" have a way of 
changing explosively, leaving those unprepared at the mercy 
of their panicky "flight-or-fight" response, whether inside the 
Beltway or at the Kremlin. 

No doubt the seeming disproportion between American and 
Soviet power, and the sudden successes of American 
weaponry against the largely antiquated Soviet equipment and 
tactics of the Iraqis — as well as the exaggerated ruthlessness of 
its application— meant but one thing to a Russian leadership 
worried about survival: the absolute necessity of once more 
catching up again to and, if possible, surpassing the U.S. in the 
creation of weapons of mass destruction— whether "conven- 
tional" or "unconventional"— in the shortest time possible. 
Thus, automatically, our war against Iraq has made the Rus- 
sian leaders more rigid in their outlook and in choosing their 
ways and means. It has produced the exact opposite of its an- 
nounced intention, has injured the peace, and dealt a body 
blow to the concept of international "law and order." Did we 
want that to happen? 

Naturally, when the motives of fear of the unknown, hatred 
for one's adversary, and ambition hold each other in approx- 
imate balance in both the White House and the Kremlin (with 
ambition overweening the former and fear dominating the lat- 
ter) an uneasy truce could be maintained for a time. But the 
Warsaw Pact has dissolved itself. Except for the continued 
survival of their Communist parties, the USSR has lost most of 
its hold over its central European satellites. Yet far from 
reciprocating in kind, Uncle Sam is holding on tightly to his 
NATO allies, even readying the expansion of his force-shield 
to cover the former Soviet zone of Germany, which still "plays 



host" to 350,000 Soviet troops. 

Indeed, leaning on his two main foreign props— Japan and 
Germany— financially, geopolitically and propagandistically, 
in 1991 Uncle Sam is accelerating rather than cutting his 
weapons expenditures, even though the Soviet menace seems 
to have diminished and the Third World should not be 
perceived as a "foe." When a single aircraft of a single weapons 
system (the B-2 "Stealth" bomber) costs nearly $1 billion, and 
the costs of other armaments trail closely behind, one should 
be able to calculate the following rather accurately: 1. the time 
before the American economy, already unbalanced and 
distorted, spins totally out of control; 2. the same for Ger- 
many, Europe, and Japan; 3. the irreparable injury to the 
social, political, health and educational fabric, and perhaps to 
the national integrity, of the American people; 4. the 
desperate attempts by the USA and the Great Britain to re- 
establish the shattered "concert of nations" by force and 
through the United Nations Security Council, based on the far- 
reaching and questionable political, financial, territorial and 
functional dictates imposed on a sovereign state, i.e., the far 
reaching precedents set by the U.N. in its subjugation of Iraq 
in 1991; 5. in case of failure: the rapid and unprecedentedly 
violent outbreak of global war. 

But there are choices. 

Here are some of them: 

1. If America desires to extablish and to strengthen stability 
and legitimacy in the Middle East, we need to strike a just 
balance between powerful, violent Israel and the multitude of 
militarily and socially weak Arab states. U.N. Security Council 
Resolution No. 242 should be implemented so that the Palesti- 
nians can at last have an independent homeland (and state) on 
their native soil, secure from Zionist encroachment. Equally 
important, the much-quoted "comprehensive solution" to the 
region's historic, political, social, economic and military 
troubles needs to put in place a lasting, insitutionalized level- 
ing of its abysmal divergences, a "regional development plan" 
for all. A regional "community" of interest should be grown, 
like a plant, encompassing all cultures and religions, while 
cherishing all organically grown groupings. 

Is it realistic to speak of such a modernized revival of the an- 
cient Ottoman millet system? Only time, and a nuclear-free 
zone stretching from the Mediterranean to the Ganges, and far 

The New World Disorder 


beyond, can tell. Let's rid ourselves of the illusion that Israel is 
America's terrible swift sword in the desert. 

2. America might choose to impose a New World Order 
through a superficially cordial entente with an ever-more 
desperate Russia. But we must face the fact that by reason of 
clashing global ambitions, lasting cooperation between the 
two is undesired by the White House, and unlikely, unless 
another convenient Foreign Devil, e.g. Japan or Germany, is 

If, on the other hand, we desire to honor our loudly pro- 
claimed "values" of freedom— infused into organic com- 
munities—and of popular self-determination, we should in- 
telligently and actively support the independence of the anti- 
Communist republics of Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Ukraine, 
Moldavia, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, and 
others, while Russia is preoccupied with its internal troubles. 

Such action would incur the risk of war with the Russians. 
But by most accounts we could hold their feet to the fire before 
they rain fire down on us. 

3. Above all, if, for the next several centuries, Americans 
wish their country to remain a nation worthy of its highest 
ideals, we might do worse than swear off our old Norman- 
Puritan habits of loot, plunder and mass destruction, as well as 
our immediate past of Plutocracy by conquest at home and 
abroad, and at last pursue a type of society and government 
that strives to do lasting and organized justice to the rooted 
human needs for community, freedom and truth, and to the 
cosmic demands of the ecologies of nature. 

"Omnes can tan t una voce tamen non est sin/onia." 

(Though all sing with one voice that still does not make a 
symphony) St Thomas Aquinas 

If we try to enforce rigid conformity at home and abroad, we 
shall come a cropper. Whipping up bellicose emotions, 
rebuilding FDR's detention camps of the Great American 
Desert for dissenters and engaging in global interventionism 
will merely multiply the crushing moral and material burdens 
already heaped on the sagging shoulders of the American peo- 
ple. How much wiser to promote community-building on all 
societal levels, in all political-geographic regions, a subsidiar- 
ity of responsibilities! 

At home, the American people— once we have recovered 
our healthy sense of skepticism— might elect to undo the 



Imperial Presidency, and choose to place in its stead a plural 
executive, a council of state patterned on Switzerland, with 
five to seven presidents, each to represent a major ethnic, 
racial or geographic constituency, with each president serving 
for the duration of one year. Abroad, let us shrug off the moral 
degradation, the abysmal functional and systematic failures of 
trying to be the World's Policeman! Encourage the formation, 
not of "pluralism," for that term has become a synonym for 
chaos, but of multicentricity, the building of strong power 
blocs on all populated landmasses, not excluding North, Cen- 
tral, and South America. The latter solution to the worsening 
crisis of the Americas was already envisioned by President 
Thomas Jefferson. 

Let us extend the hand of friendship to the peoples of Islam. 
Split and weak as they may be politically and militarily, and 
enslaved as they certainly are by underdevelopment and neo- 
colonialism, they are the living heirs to some of the world's 
most brilliant cultures: ancient Egypt, Mesopotamia, Persia, 
Hindu and Moghul India and Indonesia among them. Islam 
has contributed immeasurably to the growth of Europe, and it 
can do so again. Let the West beware lest we drive Islam into 
the isolation of hate, from which only organized violence will 
offer escape. 

Once they have divested themselves of the emanations of 
the will to absolute power, the preoccupation with exploits 
and exploitation— which have their most immediate origin in 
the Industrial Revolution and in the unreason of the 
Enlightenment of the 18th century- the great nations of 
Europe will be able to regain their historic callings: Spain, the 
great central European bloc that was the Holy Roman Empire, 
as well as Poland and Ukraine (the Old RoS), and others, will 
be re-awakened to new life. The spiritual, and political- 
geographic center, the historic orientation, they had lost will 
be resurrected. 

No matter what the future, the American People— the pre- 
eminent victim and foe of Conquest Plutocracy and the Im- 
perial Presidency— have greatness to give. A nation in- 
complete, a people not yet coalesced, which has brought forth 
such masters and masterworks as Herman Melville's Moby 
Dick; Robert Frost in his almost German simple-heartedness 
and profundity; Joseph Campbell and his supremely Protes- 
tant hyper-individualism, his longing for the merging of self 

The New World Disorder 


with the Absolute ( a property of "late" historical eras): such a 
nation— once it has sloughed off the notion of being history's 
Chosen People, leading a lowly flock to an earthly paradise— 
has much to contribute to the good of this world. By defini- 
tion, we note, an earthly paradise swamps the Moral 
Oeconomy with the rush of an infinity of manufactured sup- 
plies, it affects to abolish all suffering, all sacrifices for the at- 
tainment of some distant, greater, good; it is totally intolerant 
and destructive of any other path to perfection. In fine, it is 
evil incarnate. 

The choice is simple. Beyond all administrative reform, we 
must bend our hearts and minds, freely, toward creativity and 
responsibility, or Totalitarianism will do it for us by obliter- 
ating all mind, all hearts. 

Ponder the lines of England's poet laureate, of Alfred Lord 
Tennyson, written in 1842: 

. . . For I dipt into the future, far as human eye could see, 
Saw the Vision of the world, and all the wonder that would 

Saw the heavens filled with commerce, argosies of magic 

Pilots of the purple twilight, dropping down with costly 

Heard the heavens fill with shouting, and there rain'd a 
ghastly dew, 

From the heavens's airy navies grappling in the central blue; 

Far along the world-wide whisper of the south-wind rushing 

With the standards of the peoples plunging thro' the thunder- 

Till the war-drum throbb'd no longer, and the battle-flags 
were furl'd 

In the Parliament of man, the Federation of the world. 

There the common sense of most shall hold a fretful realm 
in awe, 

And the kindly earth shall slumber, lapt in universal law. 

Alfred Lord Tennyson, Locksley Hall 





Birkenhead, The Earl of, The Professor and the Prime Minister, The 
Official Life of Professor F.A. Lindemann, Viscount Cheiwell, River- 
side Press, Cambridge, 1962 

Bonds, Ray, ed., The Soviet War Machine, Salamander Books, Lon- 
don, 1976 

Bonds, Ray, ed., The US War Machine, Salamander Books, London, 
revised, 1983 

Bosch, Juan, Der Pentagonismus oder die Abldsung des Im- 
perialismus?, Rororo Taschenbuch, Hamburg, 1969 
Chant, Chris (editor), The World's Armies, Chartwell Books, 
Secaucus, N.J., 1979 

Congressional Quarterly, U.S. Defense Policy, Washington, D.C., 

Congressional Quarterly, The Middle East, 1975 (second edition) 

Copeland, Miles, The Game of Nations, Simon and Schuster, New 
York, 1969 

Endress, Gerhard, Islam: An Historical Introduction, Columbia Uni- 
versity Press, Irvington, New York, 1988 

de Gaulle, Charles, Memoirs of Hope: Renewal and Endeavor, Simon 
and Schuster, New York, 1971 

Harris, Sir Arthur, Bomber Offensive, Macmillan, New York, 1947 

Khalaf, Samir, Lebanon's Predicament, Columbia University Press, 
New York, 1987 

Khalidi, Rashid, Under Siege: P.L.O. Decisionmaking during the 1982 
War, Columbia University Press, New York, 1985 

Lenczowski, George, The Middle East in World Affairs, Cornell 
University Press, Ithaca and London 1962, third edition 

Messenger, Charles, 'Bomber' Harris, St. Martin's Press, New York, 

Miller, David and Christopher F. Foss, Modern Land Combat, 
Salamander Books, Ltd., London, 1987 

Mortimer, Edward, Faith and Power: The Politics of Islam, Random 
House, New York, 1982 

Schraeder, Peter J., ed., Intervention in the WSO's: U.S. Foreign Policy 
in the Third World, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, Colorado, 

Segev, Samuel, The Iranian Triangle, The Untold Story of Israel's Role 
in the Iran-Contra Affair, The Free Press, New York, 1988 

The New World Disorder 


Tillman, Seth P., The United States in the Middle East, Indiana 
University Press, Bloomington, 1982 

Waldo, Dwight, The Administrative State, The Ronald Press Com- 
pany, New York, 1948 

Wessell, Nils H., The New Europe, The Academy of Political 
Science, New York, 1991 

Television Documentaries: 

America's Defense Monitor, Center for Defense Information, 
Washington, D.C., Program No. 417: "Alternatives to War in the 
Middle East," 1991 

America's Defense Monitor, Program No. 420: "Consequences of War 
in the Gulf," 1991 

PBS Frontline, "Election Held Hostage," WMVS Milwaukee, April 
16, 1991 

PBS Frontline, "High Crime and Misdemeanors," WMVS 
Milwaukee, April 23, 1991 

Newspapers and Periodicals: 

Amerika Woche, Chicago, April 7, 1991; "Gerichtsprotokolle iiber 
alliierte Kriegsverbrechen" 

Amerika Woche, November 10, 1990; "Willy Brandt will Bagdad- 

Amerika Woche, March 30, 1991; "Verbote mit Hintertiirchen" 
Chicago Tribune, April 4, 1991; "Business: 'Reformer, Warning 
Haunt China Congress'; 'U.S. Trade Plan Extends Bar on Mexican 

The Council Chronicle, May 1991, the Chicago Council on Foreign 
Relations; "Is Free Trade on the Way Out"; "The New World Order" 

DeutschJand Nachrichten, March 22, 1991, German Information 
Center, 950 Third Avenue, New York 10022 
DeutschJand Nachrichten, March 29, 1991 

Investment Focus, Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, January 
1991; "Research Viewpoints: Looking toward the New Year" 

Investment Focus, April 1991; "Reform Taxes to Revive the Saving 

Der Luftkrieg iiber DeutschJand 1939-1945, DTV Dokumente, accor- 
ding to "Dokumente deutscher Kriegsschaden" published by the 
Federal Minister for Expellees, Refugees and those Damaged by 
War, Bonn; Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, Munich, 1963 



Merrill Lynch Ready Assets Trust, Annual Report, December 31, 

The Literary Gazette, "Literaturnaya Gazeta" International, Moscow- 
Washington, Volume 1, Issue 5, April 1990 

The Milwaukee Advocate, April 1991, "Operation Desert Profits" 

The Milwaukee Journal, January 29, 1990 

The Milwaukee Journal, February 24, 1991, "The Attack Begins" 

The Milwaukee Journal, March 24, 1991, "U.S. Taxpayers May Escape 
Footing the Bill for Gulf War" 

The Milwaukee Sentinel, February 28, 1991 "Victory!" 

The Milwaukee Sentinel, March 2, 1991, "Bush to Move Fast to Settle 
Mideast Rifts," "Highway to Hell" 

Pakistan Affairs, Embassy of Pakistan, 2315 Massachusetts Avenue, 
N.W., Washington D.C. 20008, November 7, 1990, "IJIIIslami 
jamhoori Ittehad/Wins Majority Seats in N.A."; "U.S. Has No Proof 
Pakistan Is Making Nuclear Device: Tutwiler"; December 1, 1990, 
"Huge Indian Military Build-Up Poses Regional Threat— President"; 
January 1, 1991, "U.N. Overwhelmingly Approves Pakistan's Pro- 
posals on Nuclear Disarmament"; February 16, 1991, "Prime 
Minister Embarks on Second Round of Peace Mission"; "President 
Comments on Gulf Policy"; March 23, 1991, Special Pakistan Day 
Issue, "Pakistan Has a Potential Role in Security of Persian Gulf and 
South Asia" 

Popular Science, April 1991 

Die Presse, Wien, March 28, 1991, "High Noon am Roten Platz," "Vor 
UN-Waffenstillstandsresolution"; "Vor Regierungswechsel in Jugo- 
slawien"; "Risse in der Achse Bonn-Paris" 

Rheinischer Merkur, Bonn, September 28, 1990 

St. Louis Post-Dispatch, September 24, 1989, "Contras Never Had a 
Chance to Win, Ex-U.S. General Says" 

St. Louis Post-Dispatch, October 11, 1989, "Degrade and Conquer" 
Suddeutsche Zeitung, Munich, July 6, 1989 

Scientific American, January 1991, "Essay— B.R. Inman and Daniel F. 
Burton, Technology and Competitiveness'" 

Scientific American, May 1991, "Science and the Citizen- 'Up in 
Flames, Kuwait's Burning Oil Wells Are a Sad Test of Theories'"; 
"U.S. Gags Discussion of War's Environmental Effects"; quote: ". . . 
Satellite images would reveal that Allied bombing of Iraqi refineries 
and oil reserves had 'created an appalling smoke cloud' comparable 
to the one created by the Iraqi sabotage of Kuwait's oil fields . . ." 
(recommended reading for a critique of Uncle Sam's censorship of 
the news") 

The New World Disorder 


The Washington Report on Middle East Affaris, September 1990 

The Week in Germany, November 23, 1990, German Information 
Center, New York 

The Week in Germany, April 12, 1991 



[continued from page 388) 

lies— that he, too, and his administration was taken completely 
by surprise, and that Admiral Kimmel and General Short, the 
Navy and Army commanders at Pearl, deserved censure and 
ruined careers for their unpreparedness— and works on, to- 
day, with exemplary fairness to establish the precise respon- 
sibility of Roosevelt and his lieutenants for the Pearl Harbor 

Two long book reviews complement these two long essays. 
JHR Associate Editor Mark Weber, an expert witness in the 
second trial of Ernst Ziindel, reports on Robert Lenski's 
substantial account of that trial. Jack Wikoff, a student of 
twentieth-century propaganda in word and image, contributes 
an assessment of S.J. Taylor's important biography of New 
York Times-man and Pulitzer-Prize winner Walter Duranty, 
who deliberately hushed up a real Holocaust, Stalin's annihila- 
tion of millions of Ukrainians and other Soviet subjects 
through starvation and disease, even as the Roosevelt ad- 
ministration hastened to recognize the mass-murderer and his 
regime in 1933. Thus work on another key Revisionist project 
picks up steam— rather than rehash the sordid crimes of Red 
Russia, known virtually as soon as they were committed by in- 
fluential Western opinion-makers, we focus on precisely those 
journalists, academics, politicians, and bureaucrats who con- 
cealed, minimized or defended (in the name of "anti-Fascism") 
our century's real laureates of tyranny and genocide. 

A new section, "Document" will attempt precisely that in 
this and forthcoming issues: to document from primary 
sources aspects of the Second World War unfamiliar to 
Americans schooled and spoonfed on the authorized pro- 
paganda of the "Good War." Our GI's sometimes less than 
scrupulous about taking prisoners? Read and weep. Or better, 
read and think . . . 

A 1958 commentary and interview with the late Admiral 
Husband E. Kimmel by the late, distinguished American 
lawyer and educator Dean Clarence Manion (of Notre Dame 
Law School) moves and informs not merely for its revelations 
of Kimmel's views of Pearl Harbor, but for the principled, non- 
interventionist American conservatism that we have all but 
lost to the baying pack of "neo-cons" and "new rightists." Carl 
Hottelet says what must be said about "Holocaust education": 

[continued on page 468) 

Pearl Harbor: Fifty Years 
of Controversy 


At 7:49 a.m. on Sunday, December 7, 1941, 183 Japanese 
dive- and torpedo bombers, accompanied by Zero 
escorts, launched the first of two attacks against the American 
base at Pearl Harbor. A second wave of 168 Japanese aircraft 
arrived at 9 a.m. Eighteen operational warships, including 
four battleships, were sunk or heavily damaged; 188 aircraft 
were destroyed. 2403 Americans were killed, among them 68 
civilians, and 1178 were wounded. 

Although the Japanese achieved local surprise, their success 
was less than complete. The Pacific Fleet's three aircraft 
carriers were not in port. Nine heavy cruisers, all but three 
light cruisers, and virtually all of the destroyers remained 
afloat. None of the fleet's submarines was lost. And the 
commander of the Japanese task force, Admiral Chuichi 
Nagumo, refused to authorize a third strike that could have led 
to the destruction of Pearl Harbor's naval dockyards and oil 
storage tanks, the loss of which would have neutralized 
Hawaii as a forward base for counter-offensives against 
Japanese moves towards the Philippines, Malaya, and the 
Dutch East Indies. 

The attack solved President Franklin D. Roosevelt's most 
pressing problem: how to overcome the American public's 
opposition to involvement in the war that had been going on 
in Europe for the previous sixteen months (on the eve of Pearl 
Harbor, polls indicated that 80 per cent of the people did not 
want the United States to enter the war as an active 
participant). Roosevelt received overwhelming support when 
he asked Congress for a declaration of war against Japan. The 
grass-roots America First movement quietly disbanded. On 
December 11th, Germany and Italy declared war against the 
United States. American resolve to "defeat the dictators" was 
near unanimous. 

If the public united behind Roosevelt and Churchill in the 
war effort, almost from the first there were serious questions 



raised about the attack that had brought America into the 
world conflict. Who was accountable for the disaster? Was it 
avoidable? Why had the Japanese attacked? Had there been 
any American provocation? And why had Pearl Harbor's able 
Navy and Army commanders, Admiral Husband E. Kimmel 
and General Walter Short, been caught off guard? Why were 
they quickly retired under unusual circumstances? 

To head off congressional and public criticism, Roosevelt 
hastily appointed a special commission to investigate the 
attack. Chaired by Associate Supreme Court Justice Owen J. 
Roberts, a leading supporter of the pro-interventionist 
Committee to Aid America by Aiding the Allies, the President 
had no fear that the commission would do anything to 
compromise the spirit of unity that now prevailed. Justice 
Roberts completed his report on Friday, January 23, 1942. The 
Administration released it to the public in time for the Sunday 
newspapers. Key members of the Washington political and 
military establishment were absolved of any blame. The fault, 
they said, lay with Admiral Kimmel and General Short. 

First Revisionist Critiques 

But not all were convinced. In September 1944, John T. 
Flynn launched Pearl Harbor revisionism when he published 
a forty-six page booklet entitled The Truth about Pearl Harbor. 
Flynn argued that Roosevelt and his cronies had been plotting 
war against Japan at least since January 1941. The 
Administration continued needlessly to provoke the Japanese 
government throughout the rest of the year, and on November 
26, 1941, delivered a diplomatic ultimatum that no 
government could possibly accept. Flynn also suggested that 
Kimmel and Short were given the wrong instructions from 
Washington headquarters, thus aborting the taking of effective 
measures at the base. 

In early 1945, a thirty-year-old historian, William L. 
Neumann, published a brochure, The Genesis of Pearl Harbor. 
He reviewed the diplomatic background to the outbreak of the 
war and pointed out how the Roosevelt Administration had 
launched an economic war against Japan in the summer and 
fall of 1941. Neumann concluded that both sides were 
responsible, but that Washington could not have been 
surprised by the attack at Pearl Harbor, given FDR's 
diplomatic activities in the months and days preceding 
December 7th. 

Pearl Harbor: Fifty Years of Controversy 


Army and Navy Reports Released 

After VJ-Day, President Harry Truman permitted the release 
of the Army and Navy special investigations of the Pearl 
Harbor attack. The Navy Court of Inquiry, headed by Admiral 
Orin G. Murfin, met from July 24-September 27, 1944. They 
concluded that Admiral Harold R. Stark, the Chief of Naval 
Operations, had failed to provide Admiral Kimmel all of the 
information possessed in Washington, thereby denying the 
Hawaii command a more complete picture of the situation. 
Kimmel was exonerated. His plans were judged "sound," but 
were dependent on "advance knowledge that an attack was to 
be expected." And given his limited military resources, 
Kimmel had conducted long-range aerial reconnaissance 
appropriate to the intelligence he had been given and the 
number of aircraft available. 

Lt. General George Grunert chaired the Army Pearl Harbor 
Board, which met from July 20-October 20, 1944. Evidence 
from 151 witnesses was collected in Washington, D.C., San 
Francisco, and Hawaii. While the Board was critical of 
General Short, for the first time attention was directed toward 
General George Marshall and the War Department. Marshall 
was censured for failing to keep Short fully apprised of the 
deteriorating state of U.S.-Japanese relations; of failing to cor- 
rect Short's "sabotage alert" preparations at Pearl Harbor (U.S. 
aircraft were bunched wing-tip to wing-tip on December 7th, 
because Washington had told Short to guard against sabotage. 
Had he been alerted to a possible air attack, the planes would 
have been scattered and sheltered in revetments to guard 
against bomb blast); of failing to send critical information to 
Short on the evening of December 6th and the morning of 
December 7th; of failing to determine if the state of readiness 
at Pearl Harbor was commensurate with the potential threats 
to the base's security. General Leonard Gerow, Chief of the Ar- 
my's War Plans Division, was also reproved. He had failed, the 
Board concluded, to keep the Hawaiian command informed 
about Japanese moves that were known in Washington; of fail- 
ing to make the November 27th warning clear and concise; 
and of failing to see that joint Army-Navy plans were properly 

Needless to say, Secretary of War Henry Stimson and Navy 
Secretary James Forrestal were alarmed that blame for the suc- 
cess of the Japanese attack had been shifted from the local 



commanders to their superiors in Washington. To supplement 
the report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, Major Henry 
Clausen was selected to head a one-man investigation. But no 
public report was released. Forrestal had Admiral W. Kent 
Hewitt continue to investigate Pearl Harbor. No separate 
report was issued, but on August 29, 1945, Forrestal announc- 
ed that, on the basis of Hewitt's inquiries, "Admiral Husband 
E. Kimmel and Admiral Harold R. Stark, particularly during 
the period 27 November to 7 December, 1941, failed to 
demonstrate the superior judgment necessary to exercising 
command commensurate with their rank and assigned 

The Army and Navy Reports provided fresh ammunition to 
the redoubtable John T. Flynn, who, in September 1945, 
issued a fifteen-page report entitled The Final Secret of Pearl 
Harbor. Flynn's findings were not limited to review by a small 
circle of interested friends, but were given wide circulation 
thanks to the Chicago Tribune, which highlighted his work. 
Flynn concluded that Franklin Roosevelt was to blame for 
diplomatic mismanagement; for keeping the Pacific Fleet sta- 
tioned at the insecure Pearl Harbor base; and for stripping 
Pearl Harbor of needed defensive equipment. 

Reviewing the diplomatic prelude to the attack, Flynn ex- 
plained that FDR undermined the position of Japanese 
moderates and so orchestrated events that General Tojo and 
the "War Agitators" took power in Tokyo. Despite provoca- 
tions, it became clear that Germany was not going to declare 
war against the United States. It was at this point, said Flynn, 
that Roosevelt turned the screws on the Japanese. 

Flynn went on to note the "Gift from the Gods" that the 
cracking of the Japanese diplomatic codes represented. Flynn 
was under the impression that the British had first broken the 
Japanese code and supplied Washington with copies of 
messages between Tokyo and its foreign representatives. He 
underscored the significance of the fact that Washington was 
aware that Japan had given its diplomats a November 25th 
deadline to reach an understanding with the U.S. 

In a section, 'The Fog at Pearl Harbor," Flynn emphasized 
that the commanders at Pearl Harbor were told "literally 
nothing" about the intercepted Japanese messages and the 
rapidly deteriorating state of affairs. Short was ordered to 
guard against sabotage and internal disorder from the large 

Pearl Harbor: Fifty Years of Controversy 


Japanese population in Hawaii, and warned that Japanese 
military operations could be expected soon, but against such 
targets as the Kra Peninsula, Guam, Singapore, and Malaya. 
And Flynn re-emphasized a point that is still too often 
obscured in discussions of the attack, namely, "that KimmePs 
fleet was not there to protect Pearl Harbor. The harbor was 
there merely as a fuel and supply base for it. The fleet had a 
task assigned to it in case of war. The protection of the base 
would be the duty of the Army and the base naval installa- 

In his discussion of "The Night Before Pearl Harbor" Flynn 
charged that the story given the public about Roosevelt being 
surprised by the attack on Pearl Harbor was "utterly 
fraudulent." Based on the intercepted messages, FDR knew 
that hostilities were soon to commence. What "warnings" were 
finally sent to Hawaii were deliberately delivered by the 
slowest possible means, as a face-saving measure. 

Flynn went on to show how blame for the disaster was 
cleverly shifted from Washington to the Hawaiian com- 
manders, Kimmel and Short. He further discussed how the 
fleet had come to be based at Pearl Harbor over the objections 
of KimmePs predecessor, Admiral Richardson, who was con- 
vinced that any ships berthed there would be an easy target* 

In his summary of the tragedy, Flynn reiterated his view that 
Roosevelt had decided to go to war with Japan, despite his 
public pledges to the American people not to make their sons 
fight in foreign wars, and that he had promised the British to 
fight long before December 7th. When the attack came at Pearl 
Harbor, the "amateur Commander-in-Chief , tried to place the 
blame on Kimmel and Short. "Now," he concluded, "if there is 
a shred of decency left in the American people, they will de- 
mand that Congress open the whole ugly business to the light 
of day.** 

*As is the case today, the Pacific Fleet was based on the West coast 
of the United States (San Diego, San Francisco). FDR personally 
ordered it moved to the unprepared Pearl Harbor facility in 1940. 
**Long out-of-print, John T. Flynn's The Final Secret of Pearl Harbor 
can be found as an appendix in Cover Up: The Politics of Pearl Har- 
bor, 1941-1946 by Bruce Bartlett (New Rochelle, New York: Arl- 
ington House, 1978). 



The Congressional Hearings 

A concurrent resolution of Congress brought into being the 
Joint Congressional Committee on the Investigation of the 
Pearl Harbor Attack. The Administration hoped that the Com- 
mittee, which had a majority of Democrats, would satisfy 
public curiosity while safeguarding the standing of the 
political party in power. Senator Alben Barkley (D-Kentucky) 
served as chairman. The five other Democrats included 
Senator Walter F. George (Georgia), Senator Scott Lucas (Il- 
linois), Rep. J. Bayard Clark (North Carolina), Rep. John W. 
Murphy (Pennsylvania), and Rep. Jere Cooper (Tennessee), 
who was Vice Chairman. The Democrats selected the legal 

Four Republicans were on the Committee: Senator Owen 
Brewster (Maine), Senator Homer Ferguson (Michigan), Rep. 
Bertrand Gearhart (California), and Rep. Frank B. Keefe 
(Wisconsin). The Republican Minority were not provided with 
their own staff. However, John T. Flynn raised funds from 
private sources to permit Percy Greaves, a former associate 
research director for the Republican National Committee, to 
assist the Republican members of the Joint Congressional 
Committee. Without Greaves's able work, much of the Pearl 
Harbor story would have remained hidden from the public. 

The Committee sat from November 15, 1945 to May 31, 
1946. The Democratic majority managed to steer the hearings 
in such a manner as to deflect as much criticism as they could 
from the late President Roosevelt. Thanks to the persistence of 
Senator Ferguson, aided by Greaves, "inconvenient" testimony 
was extracted from a number of the witnesses, and evidence 
that contradicted the Roberts Commission Report was placed 
on the record. The evidence, exhibits, hearings, and con- 
cluding report came to some forty volumes. 

The "Majority Report" concluded that Japan's brilliantly 
planned attack had been entirely unprovoked and there was 
no evidence that the Roosevelt cabinet had maneuvered Japan 
into launching a first strike in order to force Congress into 
declaring war. Indeed, the Democrats asserted that Roosevelt, 
Hull, and Stimson had done everything they could possibly do 
to avoid war with Japan. The disaster at Pearl Harbor was due 
to the failure of the local commanders to take adequate 
measures to detect a possible attack and maintain proper 
readiness to meet likely threats. The report did suggest that the 

Pearl Harbor: Fifty Years of Controversy 


War Department should have notified Gen. Short that his 
"sabotage alert" measures were not enough. In addition, Army 
and Navy intelligence should have realized the significance of 
Japanese efforts to keep abreast of the location of U.S. war- 
ships berthed at Pearl Harbor (the "Bomb Plot" messages that 
military intelligence had decoded). Finally, during the forty- 
eight hours prior to the attack, the War and Navy Departments 
should have kept on a higher state of alert and notified Pearl 
Harbor about the impending diplomatic break that the 
Japanese had scheduled to take effect from 1 p.m. Washington 
time on December 7th. 

A "Minority Report" was issued under the signatures of 
Senators Brewster and Ferguson. They listed some twenty 
"conclusions of Fact and Responsibility." President Roosevelt 
was held "responsible for the failure to enforce continuous, ef- 
ficient, and appropriate cooperation among the Secretary of 
War, the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Staff (General 
Marshall), and the Chief of Naval Operations (Admiral Stark) 
in evaluating information and dispatching clear and positive 
orders to the Hawaiian commanders as events indicated the 
growing imminence of war." Roosevelt was especially at fault, 
between Saturday night December 6th, and Sunday morning, 
the 7th, for failing "to take that quick and instant executive ac- 
tion which was required by the occasion." 

Rep. Frank Keefe submitted his own "Additional Views" 
after having, with Republican Rep. Gearhart (who was in a 
tough re-election campaign) signed the "Majority Report." 
Keefe admitted that the "concept of an Incident' as a factor 
which would unify public opinion behind an all-out war effort 
either in the Atlantic or Pacific had influenced the thinking of 
officials in Washington for a long time." As early as October 
1940, Roosevelt had considered blockading Japan. Keefe also 
found it significant that just days before the attack on Pearl 
Harbor Roosevelt personally ordered the Navy to dispatch 
three small vessels from the Philippines into the path of 
Japanese warships then steaming towards Southeast Asia. The 
Congressman felt that this singular action was intended to 
provoke an "overt" Japanese attack on American ships that 
could serve as the incident needed to bring the United States 
officially into the war. 



On November 22, Tokyo informed its special envoys to the 
United States, Kichisaburo Nomura and Saburo Kurusu, that 
if an agreement was not reached with the U.S., British, and 
Dutch by November 29th, "the deadline absolutely cannot be 
changed. After that things are automatically going to happen." 

In another message that Washington read, Tokyo informed 
its Ambassador to Berlin on November 30 that diplomatic ef- 
forts to resolve differences with the United States "now stand 
ruptured— broken." He was instructed to inform Chancellor 
Hitler "that there is extreme danger that war may suddenly 
break out between the Anglo-Saxon nations and Japan 
through some clash of arms ... the time for the breaking out of 
this war may come quicker than anyone dreams." 

During the Joint Congressional hearings, Captain Laurance 
Safford, the Chief of the U.S. Navy's Security Intelligence 
Communications (Op-20-G), testified that Tokyo broadcast the 
"East Wind Rain" message in its overseas news broadcast of 
Thursday, December 4, 1941, at 8:30 a.m., Washington time. 
The U.S. Navy receiving station at Cheltenham, Maryland, in- 
tercepted the message, which wjas forwarded to the Navy 
Department in Washington. Safford informed the Congres- 
sional Committee that, "There was a 'winds' message. It meant 
war- and we knew it meant war." But Washington refused to 
pass this critical information on to the commanders at Pearl 
Harbor. And, as Morgenstern revealed, efforts were made to 
strip all files of evidence of the receipt of the "Winds" intercept 
and to discredit Capt. Saf ford's testimony. 

Morgenstern made it clear to his readers that Kimmel and 
Short took the appropriate action, given the information and 
instructions they received from their superiors. But he 
reiterated that: 

they were denied three principal categories of intelligence: 

1. Knowledge of the conduct of America's side of the 
ddiplomatic negotiations, showing that Japan had been put in a 
box where it must knuckle under or fight. 

2. Knowledge of hundreds of significant Japanese 
diplomatic code intercepts informing Roosevelt and his circle 
not only that Japan would fight, but when war was coming. 

3. Knowledge of messages to and from Tokyo and its corps 
of spies in Hawaii, pointing precisely to Pearl Harbor as the 
target for attack. 

Pearl Harbor: Fifty Years of Controversy 


By late November, Roosevelt and his inner circle knew that 
war was coming. Morgenstern cited Secretary of War Henry 
Stimson's diary entry of November 25, 1941: 

He [FDR] brought up the event that we were likely to be 
attacked, perhaps [as soon as] next Monday, for the Japanese 
are notorious for making an attack without warning and the 
question was how we should maneuver them into the position 
of firing the first shot without allowing too much danger to 

Finally, having considered the evidence, the author took up 
the question of "who was guilty?" He reminded readers that 
Roosevelt and his defenders failed to disclose: 

. . . the part played in bringing about the result of December 7 
by its campaign of economic warfare, its secret diplomacy, its 
secret diplomacy, its covert military alliances, the submission 
of demands which Japan found "humiliating," and its own com- 
plete abandonment of neutrality in favor of nondeclared war . . 
. When it became apparent, a few days after Pearl Harbor, that 
the manifest failures which contributed to the crushing defeat 
at Oahu could not be blamed solely on the Japanese, Roosevelt 
and his associates in the civilian government and high com- 
mand invented some new villains to divert the guilt from 
themselves. For the defeat at Pearl Harbor the blame— all of the 
blame, not part of it— was apportioned between Adm. Kimmel 
and Gen. Short. 

Later, as the war drew to an end and new doubts were 
raised, President Truman shifted blame from Washington to 
the American people as a whole. Said Truman, "The country 
was not ready for preparedness ... I think the country is as 
much to blame as any individual in this final situation that 
developed in Pearl Harbor." But it was not the American peo- 
ple who had waged economic warfare against Japan. And it 
was not the public that had shipped weapons to Britain and 
Russia at the expense of the U.S. armed forces. 

Morgenstern rejected Truman's arrogant charge and instead 
directed the blame precisely where the evidence indicated that 
it lay: 

The United States was neither informed nor alerted when 
Roosevelt and the men whose intentions coincided with his 
(because their fortunes rode with him) were warping the nation 
into war in 1941. The motives of these men are to this day 
obscure. They are even more obscure in the light of the default 
of all promises concerning the objectives of World War II . . . 



All of these men must answer for much. With absolute 
knowledge of war, they refused to communicate that 
knowledge, clearly, unequivocally, and in time, to the men in 
the field upon whom the blow would fall. The silence in 
Washington can yield to no other explanation than a desire to 
do nothing that would deter or forestall the attack which would 
produce the overt act so long and so fervently sought. When 
the price of silence proved to be 2,326 lives, it was necessary to 
add two more victims to the list— Adm. Kimmel and Gen. Short 
. . . They failed— with calculation -to keep the United States 
out of war and to avoid a clash with Japan . . . The "warnings" 
they sent to Hawaii failed— and were so phrased and so 
handled as to insure failure. 

Pearl Harbor was the first action of the acknowledged war, 
and the last battle of a secret war upon which the administra- 
tion had long since embarked. The secret war was waged 
against nations which the leadership of this country had 
chosen as enemies months before they became formal enemies 
by a declaration of war. It was waged also, by psychological 
means, by propaganda, and deception, against the American 
people, who were thought by their leaders to be laggard in 
embracing war. The people were told that acts which were 
equivalent to war were intended to keep the nation out of war. 
Constitutional processes existed only to be circumvented, until 
finally the war-making power of Congress was reduced to the 
act of ratifying an accomplished fact. 

It is encouraging to report that George Morgenstern's classic 
account of the Pearl Harbor tragedy has at long last been 
reprinted (by the IHR). Despite the passage of time, and the 
disclosure of new evidence, Morgenstern's basic thesis 
remains unshaken. 

A Growing Debate 

The Revisionist case was firmly grounded in evidence made 
available during the Congressional Hearings and in other post- 
war disclosures. This did not silence the defenders of 
Roosevelt and the "New World Order" that had been forged at 
Teheran, Yalta, Potsdam, and San Francisco. Far from it. A 
stream of books defending, "explaining" and excusing 
Roosevelt and his chief aides rolled off the presses to the 
accolades of the Establishment mass media. Representative 
examples of this literature were The Road to Pearl Harbor, by 
Herbert Feis (Princeton University Press, 1950); Roosevelt: 
From Munich to Pearl Harbor by Basil Rauch (Creative Age 
Press, 1950); and The Challenge to Isolation (Harper and 

Pearl Harbor: Fifty Years of Controversy 


Brothers, 1952) and The Undeclared War (Harper and 
Brothers, 1953), both by William L. Langer and S. Everett 

If George Morgenstern's Pearl Harbor remained the best 
answer to the Establishment's version of the attack, other 
writers were taking a closer look at the New Deal and placing 
the Japanese attack on Hawaii within the context of American 
foreign and domestic policies during the Roosevelt Era. Of 
especial note are studies by Charles A. Beard, President 
Roosevelt and the Coming of the War, 1941: A Study in Appear- 
ances and Realities (Yale University Press, 1948); William 
Henry Chamberlin, America's Second Crusade (Henry 
Regnery, 1950); Frederick R. Sanborn, Design for War: A Study 
of Secret Power Politics, 1937-1941 (Devin Adair, 1951); and 
Charles Callan Tansill, Back Door to War: The Roosevelt 
Foreign Policy, 1933-1941 (Henry Regnery, 1952). The volumes 
by Beard and Tansill were especially unwelcome among the 
defenders of Roosevelt's policies, as Beard had been one of the 
pre-eminent historians of the first half of the twentieth cen- 
tury, while Tansill was a distinguished Georgetown Univers- 
ity professor of American diplomatic history. All of the above- 
mentioned titles are still worth reading, not only from the 
historiographical standpoint, but also for their factual 
disclosures and interpretations of events. 

The Barnes Symposium 

Harry Elmer Barnes (1889-1968) was a scholar of immense 
range who had been a path-finder in World War I revisionism. 
Later a critic of New Deal policies, he wrote on diplomatic 
history and international relations and gave generous 
encouragement to others to explore various aspects of recent 
history. He saw this "quest for truth" as not a mere intellectual 
exercise, but as an endeavor that might help bring justice and 
peace to a troubled world. 

In 1953, under Barnes's editorship, Perpetual War for 
Perpetual Peace (The Caxton Printers, Ltd.) appeared. Here 
Barnes assembled leading critics in a survey and appraisal of 
the development, course, and consequences of American 
foreign policy during Roosevelt's presidency. He was confi- 
dent that the views expressed in this volume could withstand 
whatever rejoinder Roosevelt's defenders might deliver, 



There is no probability that later evidence will require any 
moderation of the indictment of our foreign policy since 1914, 
and, especially, since 1933. If there were any still secret 
material which would brighten the record of the Roosevelt and 
Truman foreign polices, we may rest assured that their court 
historians and publicity agents would have revealed it to the 
public long ere this. 

The symposium opened with an introduction to "Revi- 
sionism and the Historical Blackout," wherein Professor 
Barnes explained how dissident views were suppressed by the 
very elements which claimed to defend the First Amendment 
to the Constitution. Had not the small firms Henry Regnery 
and Devin-Adair been willing to publish Revisionist books, it 
is doubtful whether Morgenstern, Sanborn, Tansill and others 
would have managed to get their most significant work in 
print. In his essay 'The United States and the Road to War in 
Europe," Dr. Tansill discussed the European background of 
the origins of World War II, as well as Japanese- American 
relations up to the attack on Pearl Harbor. Frederick R. San- 
born considered the origins of Roosevelt's interventionism 
and the failure of his un-neutral policies toward Hitler, in 
"Roosevelt Is Frustrated In Europe." Professor William L. 
Neumann drew attention to "How American Policy Toward 
Japan Contributed to War in the Pacific." 

Two essays dealt with Pearl Harbor and its aftermath: "The 
Actual Road to Pearl Harbor," by George Morgenstern, which 
summarized and updated the case he had made in his full- 
length book, and "The Pearl Harbor Investigations," by Percy 
L. Greaves, Jr. Greaves took a look at the nine Pearl Harbor in- 
quiries and showed how blame had been redirected away 
from the real culprits. He revealed how General Marshall was 
forced to make a series of damaging admissions under sharp 
questioning by Senator Homer Ferguson, among them how 
the United States had secretly initiated military agreements 
with the British and Dutch, directed against the Japanese, and 
that the agreements had gone into effect before the Pearl Har- 
bor attack. Nevertheless, the campaign to protect those who 
were responsible for the Pearl Harbor debacle continued. As 
he observed: 

Those who have participated in this great conspiracy against 
the American people undoubtedly believe that the end justifies 
the means. They probably all join the editors of Life [magazine], 

Pearl Harbor: Fifty Years of Controversy 


who tell us in their Picture History of World War II that "In 
retrospect Pearl Harbor seemed clearly the best thing that 
could have happened to the U.S." 

William Henry Chamberlin reminded readers that none of 
the stated goals that the United Nations were supposed to be 
fighting for were realized by war's end. In his essay, "The 
Bankruptcy of a Policy," he argued that the Roosevelt foreign 
policy was a catastrophe, the dire consequences of which 
would endure for decades to come. The final essay, by Pro- 
fessor George A. Lundberg, considered "American Foreign 
Policy in the Light of National Interest at Mid-Century." Here 
he compared internationalism and interventionism with what 
had been our traditional policy of continentalism before 
America's involvement in the First World War. Under the old 
policy, the United States had been safe and grew prosperous. 
The New Internationalism had made us less free, less safe, less 

Nearly forty years after they were first published, the 
articles in Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace have indeed 
withstood the test of time and are still valuable historiography. 
No one since Barnes has attempted, in a single volume, to 
cover the history reviewed therein. Regrettably, it is unlikely 
that such a project could be undertaken today, as there are not 
enough scholars working on those topics to fill a large volume 
of essays. 

The Admirals Speak Up 

Thanks to the Roosevelt apologists, including the biased 
Roberts Commission, Majority Report of the Joint Congress- 
ional Committee, and the pro-Administration books, it is no 
wonder that the public was confused about which branch of 
the service was responsible for the security of Pearl Harbor (a 
condition that continues even today). The various investiga- 
tions established that it was the Army, not the Navy, that was 
charged with the defense of the Pacific Fleet when it was in 
port Thus, the chain of command in 1941 went through the 
Army Chief of Staff, General Marshall, to his commander at 
Hawaii, Lt. Gen. Short. Admiral Kimmel was supposed to 
cooperate with the Army, which at that time also included the 
Air Force (which throughout World War II was actually the 
Army Air Force). Kimmel's job was to take care of naval opera- 



Over the decades that the debate over Pearl Harbor has 
raged, a number of observers have noted that, by and large, it 
has been Navy men who have taken an interest in seeking the 
truth about the attack. Gen. Short never published his own 
memoirs. Nor have men close to Marshall given an "inside" 
account of those fateful days. 

Rear Admiral Robert A. Theobald was commander of the 
Pacific Fleet's destroyers at the time of the attack and was at 
Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. Later he was commander 
of the Northern Pacific Force. At the time of his retirement 
from active duty he was Commandant of the First Naval 

Theobald assisted Kimmel in his testimony before the 
Roberts Commission. After his retirement, he devoted years to 
studying the attack and its aftermath. The results of his 
research were first published in March 1954, when Devin- 
Adair released The Final Secret of Pearl Harbor: The 
Washington Contribution to the Japanese Attack. 

It was Admiral Theobald's impression that from the fall of 
France, in June 1940, Roosevelt was convinced that the U.S. 
must fight on Britain's side and that the primary objective 
remained the defeat of Germany. On September 27, 1940 Ger- 
many, Italy, and Japan entered into the Tripartite Pact, which 
provided that each would declare war on any third party that 
went to war against one of the three (this did not affect Ger- 
many and Japan's relations with the U.S.S.R.). From this date, 
then, war with Japan meant war with Germany and Italy, and 
this came to play an increasingly important role in Roosevelt's 

In an effort to circumvent the American public's reluctance 
to enter the war, Roosevelt took a number of steps that 
Theobald went into considerable detail explaining. In brief, 
they were: 

1) He introduced a massive arms buildup; 

2) He repeatedly provoked Germany through an 
undeclared naval war in the Atlantic; 

3) He applied increasing economic and diplomatic pressure 
on Japan, reaching a climax in late July, 1941, when the U.S., 
Britain, and the Netherlands froze Japanese assets. Japan lost 
75 per cent of its foreign trade and 90 per cent of its oil supply; 

4) In August 1941 he met with Churchill at Newfoundland, 
where FDR promised that any Japanese attack on British or 

Pearl Harbor: Fifty Years of Controversy 


Dutch possessions would bring the United States into the war; 

5) He had Secretary of State Hull deliver an insulting 
diplomatic ultimatum to the Japanese government on 
November 26, 1941, "which gave Japan no choice but 
surrender or war"; 

6) He "retained a weak Pacific fleet in Hawaiian waters, 
despite contrary naval advice, where it served only one 
diplomatic purpose, an invitation to a Japanese surprise 

7) He "furthered that surprise by causing the Hawaiian 
Commanders to be denied invaluable information from de- 
coded Japanese dispatches concerning the rapid approach of 
the war and the strong probability that the attack would be 
directed at Pearl Harbor." 

Theobald, in his review of the MAGIC diplomatic decrypts 
that were available in Washington, emphasized that this vital 
material was not passed along, and that there had been an 
"almost complete denial of information, during the three 
months preceding the Pearl Harbor attack." Then he posed a 
series of questions that Roosevelt's defenders have yet to 
answer satisfactorily: "Why was such irrefutable evidence of 
the coming attack so withheld? Why did Washington con- 
tribute so completely to the surprise feature of that attack?" 
Theobald reasoned, 'There can be only one answer— because 
President Roosevelt wanted it that way!" 

The FinaJ Secret of Pearl Harbor included a review of the 
findings of the various post-attack investigations, and offered 
a point-by-point refutation of the Majority Conclusion of the 
Joint Congressional Committee, which he dismissed as "the 
last act in the attempt to preserve the Pearl Harbor Secret." 

The American moves leading up to the Japanese attack are 
summarized in his final chapter, in which Admiral Theobald 
re- emphasizes that: 

. . . the recurrent fact of the Pearl Harbor story has been the 
repeated withholding of information from Admiral Kimmel 
and General Short . . . The denial to the Hawaiian Comman- 
ders of all knowledge of Magic was vital to the plan for enticing 
Japan to deliver a surprise attack upon the Fleet . . . because as 
late as Saturday, December 6, Admiral Kimmel could have 
caused that attack to be canceled by taking his fleet to sea and 
disappearing beyond land-based human ken. 

Evidence placed on the record indicated to Theobald that: 



Everything that happened in Washington on Saturday and 
Sunday, December 6 and 7, supports the belief that President 
Roosevelt had directed that no message be sent to the Hawaiian 
Commanders before noon on Sunday, Washington time . . . 
Never before in recorded history had a field commander been 
denied information that his country would be at war in a 
matter of hours, and that everything pointed to a surprise at- 
tack upon his forces shortly after sunrise. 

Nevertheless, Theobald was forced to concede, 
Roosevelt's strategy accomplished its purpose: a united 
people rallied behind the president's war effort. The 
author left it up to his readers to ponder the ethics of that 

Contrary to the popular impression, Admiral Kimmel 
and General Short were never formally charged with 
errors of judgement or dereliction of duty. There was 
never a court martial proceeding. Admiral Kimmel and 
General Short were relieved of their commands and, in 
early 1942, placed on the Retired list. Neither was afford- 
ed an opportunity to defend himself against the 
criticisms contained in the Roberts Commission Report. 

However, during the 1944 Naval Court of Inquiry, 
Kimmel was permitted to retain legal counsel (Charles B. 
Rugg and Edward B. Hanify), to introduce testimony, 
and cross-examine witnesses. It was during the course of 
the Navy Inquiry that Kimmel learned about the MAGIC 
intercepts that had not been passed along to him and 
General Short. Thereafter, Kimmel tried to obtain as 
much information as he could in order to set the record 
straight. In December 1954, Henry Regnery Company of 
Chicago published Admiral KimmeJ's Story. 
Kimmel did not merely restate the findings of Morgenstern 
and Theobald. He presented his readers with a fresh perspec- 
tive on why the Pacific Fleet came to be based at Pearl Harbor 
at the insistence of Roosevelt, and how he and General Short 
had tried, for many months, to remedy the serious short- 
comings of that facility. There were never enough aircraft 
available to conduct 360-degree searches on a regular basis; 
the base lacked radar sets and trained personnel; the entrance 
to the anchorage was so narrow that warships were forced to 
enter and exit in single file. KimmePs superiors repeatedly 

Pearl Harbor: Fifty Years of Controversy 


advised him that there was no danger of torpedo attack, 
because, they were confident, the harbor's waters were too 
shallow and any airdropped "fish" would simply sink to the 
bottom (the Japanese solved this problem by affixing special 
fins to their torpedoes; U.S. Naval Ordnance did not think this 
was possible). 

As had been brought out during the Congressional Hear- 
ings, and gone into detail in the studies by Morgenstern, 
Greaves, Barnes, and Theobald, Kimmel and Short were kept 
in the dark about the worsening diplomatic situation with 
Japan and were denied all of the information contained in the 
MAGIC decrypts. Kimmel went on to reveal that he was in- 
formed by the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Stark, that 
an attack against Pearl Harbor was not likely and was ordered 
to have his fleet ready to move against the Marshall Islands 
upon the outbreak of hostilities in the Pacific. 

Immediately after the Pearl Harbor attack, angry citizens 
bombarded Kimmel with denunciations and even death 
threats. More than one politician publicly suggested that he 
should consider suicide. A sample of this vilification was in- 
cluded in the ninth chapter of his book. 

Admiral Kimmel's Story makes for sobering reading, even to- 
day. Reflecting on Kimmel's account, it is likely that most 
readers will agree with Fleet Admiral William F. Halsey's 
judgement that, "Admiral Kimmel and General Short [were] 
splendid officers who were thrown to the wolves as scape- 
goats for something over which they had no control. They had 
to work with what they were given, both in equipment and in- 
formation. They are our outstanding military martyrs." 

Stimson's Embarrassing Diary Entry 

On November 25, 1941, President Roosevelt met with 
Secretary of Sate Hull, Navy Secretary Frank Knox, Secretary 
of War Henry Stimson, General Marshall and Admiral Stark. 
Relations with the Japanese was the main topic discussed. 
FDR observed that the Japanese had launched surprise attacks 
at the outset of previous wars and that the U.S. might be under 
attack by the following Monday. Stimson was keeping a diary 
at this time and the defenders of Roosevelt's innocence have 
long been frustrated over the following entry from his diary, 
dealing with the conference of the 25th: 

"The question was how we should maneuver them [the 
Japanese] into the position of firing the first shot without 



allowing too much danger to ourselves. It was a difficult pro- 

After discussing the matter, Roosevelt and his closest ad- 
visers agreed that: 

In spite of the risk involved, however, in letting the Japanese 
fire the first shot, we realized that in order to have the full sup- 
port of the American people it was desirable to make sure that 
the Japanese were the ones to do this so that there should re- 
main no doubt in anyone's mind as to who were the aggressors. 

Richard N. Current, a professor of history at the University 
of North Carolina, came up with an inventive explanation for 
this remarkable bit of evidence that was made public during 
the Joint Congressional Hearings. In Secretary Stimson: A 
Study in Statecraft (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 
1954), Dr. Current conceded there was no denying that Stim- 
son et al. were anticipating an attack. But, he claimed, not on 
United States, rather on Dutch or British, territory. Roosevelt's 
challenge was how to make a Japanese attack on Dutch or 
British territory appear to be an attack on America. I leave it to 
the reader to consider whether or not this is a convincing ex- 

Wohlstetter and Morison 

Two books which remain standards in the pro-Roosevelt 
literature appeared in 1963: Samuel Eliot Morison's The Two- 
Ocean War (Boston: Little, Brown) and Roberta Wohlstetter's 
Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decisions (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press). Both were widely, and favorably, reviewed. 
Morison's became a book club selection and best seller. 
Wohlstetter's academic reputation as a specialist on in- 
telligence analysis and strategic decision-making was secured 
with the acceptance of her book. 

Morison was hired by the Roosevelt Administration to write 
the official History of United States Naval Operations in World 
War II. The passage of time did little to mellow his dedication 
to the cause of his war-time employer. Chapter 3 of The Two 
Ocean War dealt with Pearl Harbor. Here, the author claimed, 
that "Actually, the Administration and the heads of the armed 
forces were doing their best to prevent or postpone a war with 
Japan." The various MAGIC messages that Washington failed 
to send word of to Hawaii simply got mixed up with other 
warnings of forthcoming Japanese moves against Siberia, 

Pearl Harbor: Fifty Years of Controversy 


Peru, and other unlikely places. Morison blamed Kimmel and 
Short for not taking proper action, and went so far as to ac- 
cuse them of "ignoring" an ambiguous "war warning" sent 
from Washington on November 27th. In the end, Morison 
chose to waffle, by claiming that, "Fundamentally, however, it 
was the system, the setup both at Washington and at Pearl 
Harbor, rather than individual stupidity or apathy, which muf- 
fled and confused what was going on." Roosevelt, Stimson, 
Hull, Marshall, and Stark did not have any blame affixed to 
their reputations in this narrative. 

Admiral Morison joined the chorus in describing Mrs. 
Wohlstetter's Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision, as "The best 
book by far on the question of why we were surprised at Pearl 
Harbor." More recently, Captain Roger Pineau and John 
Costello (who should know better), have referred to her efforts 
as a "scholarly study." 

Wohlstetter was not interested in assigning blame for the 
disaster. Rather, it was her thesis that "The United States was 
not caught napping . . . We just expected wrong." Pearl Harbor 
was "a failure of strategic analysis" and "a failure to anticipate 
effectively." Yes, in retrospect, the record indicated that 
Washington might well have warned Kimmel and Short. But 
what we had here was a "national failure to anticipate" that the 
Japanese would actually attack Hawaii, instead of some other 
target. And no, there certainly wasn't any "conspiracy" involv- 
ing Roosevelt and his cronies. 

Percy L. Greaves who, by common agreement, knew more 
about Pearl Harbor than any man living at the time, wrote a 
scathing critique of Wohlstetter's book that should have led to 
its being quietly removed from library shelves and consigned 
to the recycling plants. 'The Mystery of Pearl Harbor: 25 
Years of Deception," was included with essays by Harry Elmer 
Barnes and Vice Admiral Frank Betty in the December 12, 
1966 issue of National Review magazine. Later reprinted in the 
special "Pearl Harbor: Revisionism Renewed" edition of The 
JournaJ of Historical Review (Volume Four, Number Four, 
Winter 1983-84), Greaves noted that a first reading of her book 
disclosed over one hundred factual errors, "not to mention 
child-like acceptance of Administration releases in preference 
to obscured realities." One fundamental error of assumption 
undermined her entire argument. Treating the intelligence 
phase of the story, she never learned that there was a five-hour 



difference between Navy time and Washington, D.C. time. As 
Greaves remarked, "How valuable is a book on pre-attack in- 
telligence that is five hours off on the timing of all Naval com- 
munications coming out of Washington? How dependable is a 
Naval historian who acclaims such a book the best on the sub- 
ject? . . . One could go on and on for a hundred more blunders. 
The facts were just too much for Mrs. Wohlstetter." It says 
volumes about the quality of the current generation of 
academic historians that Wohlstetter's book continues to turn 
up on lists of "recommended" titles dealing with the Pearl Har- 
bor catastrophe. 

Further Contributions by Barnes 

Harry Elmer Barnes continued to investigate the attack on 
Pearl Harbor long after the publication of Perpetual War For 
Perpetual Peace. He not only conducted his own research, but 
gave warm encouragement to others, both people who had 
some "inside" knowledge of the events, as well as unbiased 
scholars who were not afraid to pursue avenues of inquiry that 
might lead to findings that were unpopular with the political 
and historical establishments. 

The twenty-fifth anniversary of Pearl Harbor was marked at 
the Chicago Tribune with a Special Pearl Harbor Supplement. 
George Morgenstern organized this undertaking with assis- 
tance from Dr. Barnes. The highlight of the December 7, 1966 
Chicago Tribune was an essay by Admiral Kimmel. Barnes 
contributed an insightful piece on General Marshall. 

Commander Charles Hiles wrote the best article yet to be 
published concerning the "Bomb Plot" Messages. Tokyo re- 
quested specific information about the movement and loca- 
tion of major warships berthed at Pearl Harbor. On December 
3, the Japanese consul in Honolulu, Nagao Kita, informed 
Tokyo that he had set up a system of codes confirming the 
movement of various American warships through the use of 
signals in windows at Lanikai Beach, which could be spotted 
by off-shore "fishing" boats and submarines. This vital infor- 
mation could then be passed on to the Japanese carrier task 
force. The signal system would operate through December 
6th. The Kita messages to Tokyo were intercepted and 
decrypted by U.S. intelligence. Thus, Washington knew that 
Pearl Harbor was likely going to be attacked and by what date. 
None of this information was passed along to the U.S. Army 
and Navy commanders at Pearl Harbor. 

Pearl Harbor: Fifty Years of Controversy 


Articles by the Tribune's veteran Washington Bureau Chief, 
Walter Trohan, and their aviation editor, Wayne Thomis, 
rounded out this issue. 

The following year, on December 7, 1967, Morgenstern 
gave front-page coverage in the Tribune to the publication of a 
number of documents relating to Pearl Harbor, with commen- 
tary by Barnes. Although this information was well known to 
those who had kept up with the debate over the years, 
members of the public at large found much of the material that 
Barnes collected shocking, and revealing a chapter of history 
they were ignorant of. 

Harry Elmer Barnes died on August 25, 1968 at the age of 
79. Less than a week before he passed away, he had completed 
the final draft of Pearl Harbor After a Quarter of a Century, a 
132-page summary of the entire controversy. This incisive 
study originally appeared in print as an entire issue of Left and 
Right: A Journal of Libertarian Thought (Volume IV, 1968). It 
has since been reprinted in its entirety by the Institute for 
Historical Review. 

He observed that all of the careful research conducted by 
Revisionists had yet to alter the general public perception of 
this event: 

Only a small fraction of the American people are any better 
acquainted with the realities of the responsibility for the attack 
than they were when President Roosevelt delivered his "Day of 
Infamy" oration on December 8, 1941. The legends and 
rhetoric of that day still dominate the American mind. 

For the last time, Barnes outlined what he felt were the 
policies and events which had led to the attack on Pearl Har- 
bor. Over the years, Barnes had revised a number of his own 
assumptions. One of these concerned Roosevelt's December 1, 
1941 order to Admiral Hart at Manila, ordering the immediate 
dispatch of three "small vessels" armed with a machine gun 
and deck cannon, each commanded by a U.S. Naval officer, 
and flying the American flag. The three little ships were 
directed to sail into the path of Japanese Navy convoys that 
Washington knew were then steaming southward. Had the 
American ships been attacked by the Japanese, Barnes was 
now confident that this would have saved Pearl Harbor. 
"There can be little doubt that the Cockleship plan of 
December 1st was designed to get the indispensable attack by 
a method which would precede the Pearl Harbor attack, avert 



the latter, and save the Pacific Fleet and American lives," he 
wrote of this aspect of the mystery. 

A part of the story that had hitherto been largely over- 
looked, even by many Revisionists, concerned the secret 
agreements Roosevelt had entered into with the British and 
Dutch and which led to America technically being at war with 
Japan four days before Pearl Harbor. As Barnes succinctly ex- 
plained, in April 1941 the U.S., British, and Dutch agreed to 
take joint military action against Japan if the Japanese sent 
armed forces beyond the line 100° East and 10° North or 6° 
North and the Davao-Waigeo line, or threatened British or 
Dutch possessions in the southwest Pacific or independent 
countries in that region. The agreements were known as 
ABCD. Thereafter, Admiral Stark said that war with Japan 
was not a matter of if, but rather when and where. Roosevelt 
gave his approval to the attendant war plans in May and June. 
On December 3, 1941, the Dutch invoked the ABCD agree- 
ment, after Japanese forces passed the line 100° East and 10° 
North, and were thought to be headed toward Dutch territory 
as well as the Kra Peninsula and Thailand. The U.S. military 
attache in Melbourne, Australia, Colonel Van S. Merle-Smith, 
was contacted by the Australians, British, and Dutch and in- 
formed that the Dutch were expecting the U.S. Navy to offer 
assistance. Merle-Smith relayed this information to his 
superiors by coded message. It should have reached 
Washington in the early evening of December 4. 

Like a number of other students of the period, Barnes 
suspected that FDR had sought a "good war" to solve the 
serious economic problems that persisted throughout the New 
Deal. Whatever his motives, it was undeniable, he concluded, 

The overwhelming responsibility for the war and the attack 
was, of course, Roosevelfs deliberate refusal to settle the rela- 
tions between the United States and Japan in a peaceful man- 
ner by honest diplomatic negotiations, to achieve which Japan 
made unusually impressive gestures and offered very 
reasonable terms that protected all legitimate vital American 
interests in the Far East. 

Pearl Harbor After a Quarter of a Century remains a note- 
worthy contribution to the literature on the topic. It is as good 
an introduction to the issues involved as is currently in print. 

Pear] Harbor: Fifty Years of Controversy 


Additional Pieces of the Puzzle 

In the October 1962 issue of the United States Naval In- 
stitute Proceedings, Rear Admiral Kemp Tolley gave his ac- 
count of having been the commander of one of the "little ships" 
hastily ordered out of Manila to monitor the Japanese Navy in 
early December of 1941. Although the bare essentials of the in- 
cident had been revealed during the Joint Congressional Hear- 
ings, Tolley's article sparked much comment. Additional 
research resulted in the publication of his book, The Cruise of 
the Lanikai: Incitement to War (Annapolis: Naval Institute 
Press, 1973). 

The Lanikai was a 67-ton two-masted auxiliary schooner 
engaged in inter-island traffic. Chartered for $1.00 by the U.S. 
Navy, it had a crew of five Filipino civilians, who could not 
speak English. Commander Harry Slocum informed a startled 
Lt. Tolley that 'the President has personally ordered" him to 
set sail as soon as possible. The sailing ship was turned into a 
vessel of war by lashing to its deck an old 3-pounder gun left 
over from the Spanish-American War and two World-War 
I-vintage .30 caliber machine guns. The only radio available 
could receive messages but not transmit them. Nevertheless, 
he was ordered to set sail for the coast of Indo-China and told 
to have someone work on the radio set while they were at sea. 

In the event, neither the Lanikai, nor the other ships ordered 
out, the Isabel and the Molly Moore, were able to cross the 
paths of the Japanese. Only after the war did Tolley fully ap- 
preciate the role intended for the Lanikai— that of "live bait." 

Another book on this topic was Cover Up: The Politics of 
Pearl Harbor, 1941-1946 by Bruce Bartlett (New Rochelle, 
N.Y.: Arlington House, 1978). The core of this volume was 
taken from his 1976 Georgetown University masters thesis in 
history, which explored what various interest groups hoped to 
gain from an inquiry into Pearl Harbor. It offers little to the 
student of the episode that cannot be found in other, and bet- 
ter, treatments. Its chief interest today is that it includes, as an 
appendix, a reproduction of John T. Flynn's pathbreaking 
pamphlet, The Final Secret of Pearl Harbor, discussed earlier 
in this essay. 

The Strange Case of Gordon Prange 

Gordon W. Prange served as Chief of General Douglas 
MacArthur's G-2 Historical Section in Japan from October 



1946-July 1951. During that time he conducted numerous in- 
terrogations of Japanese military personnel. Upon completion 
of his stint in Asia, he returned to the United States, where he 
taught history at the University of Maryland until his death in 
May of 1980. 

Prange obtained an advance (reputed to amount of $25,000) 
for a book on Pearl Harbor. For whatever reasons, he never 
turned in a completed manuscript, but kept on doing research 
for thirty-seven years. Upon his death, two former students of 
his, Donald Goldstein, an associate professor of Public and In- 
ternational Affairs at the University of Pittsburgh, and 
Katherine V. Dillon, a former intelligence analyst, revised his 
3500-page draft. Over the following eight years, four books at- 
tributed to Gordon Prange rolled off the presses and onto the 
"new releases" lists of the Book of the Month Club, History 
Book Club, and other distributors of "safe" popular history. To 
the surprise of McGraw-Hill, Goldstein and Dillon managed to 
turn Prange Enterprises, as the copyright holder was called, 
into a paying proposition. 

The first book attributed to Prange was At Dawn We Slept: 
The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor (New York: McGraw-Hill, 
1981). It is a military history of the attack as seen from the 
Japanese and American perspectives. It only touched on the 
larger issues of Japanese-American foreign relations, which 
have always served as the backdrop for Revisionist treatments 
of this topic. Prange had long felt that, "in the context of the 
time," a war between the United States and Japan was "virtual- 
ly inevitable." 

In truth, about the only genuinely "untold" aspect of this 
story was that Prange had failed to get his book ready in the 
early 1950s, when it would have been "new." Shortly before At 
Dawn We Slept was at long last on its way to the printers, the 
Carter Administration released a mountain of previously 
classified U.S. naval records to the National Archives. 
Prange's literary heirs did not have the time to sift through this 
massive volume of new material. However, this did not stop 
them from adding, as an appendix, an essay entitled, "Revi- 
sionists Revisited," in which they made the astounding claim 
to have made a thorough search "including all publications 
released up to May 1, 1981." While allowing that "the Presi- 
dent made his mistakes in 1941, as did almost everyone else 
involved in Pearl Harbor," they went on to make the menda- 

Pear] Harbor: Fifty Years of Controversy 


cious assertion that, "we have not discovered one word of 
sworn testimony that substantiates the revisionist position on 
Roosevelt and Pearl Harbor." 

Among the many records that Prange, Goldstein, and Dillon 
did not consult was the remarkable testimony of former Chief 
Warrant Officer Ralph T. Briggs, who was working at the 
Cheltenham, Maryland intercept station in late 1941. Contrary 
to the defenders of Roosevelt and his coterie, who during the 
various investigations swore that there had been no "East 
Wind Rain" message received prior to the attack, Briggs con- 
firmed that he had intercepted the 'Winds" execute and had 
even located a Navy memoir buried in the records, indicating 
that he had read the message as early as December 2, 1941. 
During the later investigations, Captain Laurence Safford was 
the only person directly concerned with this matter who had 
the courage to testify that there had indeed been a "winds" 
message forwarded to Washington before the attack. It was 
Safford who first alerted Admiral Kimmel to the existence of 
these messages. During the Congressional Hearings, Briggs 
was ordered by his superiors not to testify and not to have 
anything further to do with Safford. Briggs's damning 
evidence was released by the National Archives on March 11, 
1980 as document SRH-051: "Interview with Mr. Ralph T. 
Briggs," which was an official transcript of remarks made to 
the Naval Security Group. Long before At Dawn We Slept had 
gone to the printers, the Briggs testimony was freely available 
at the Military Reference Branch of the National Archives and 
copies immediately began to circulate among serious students 
of the affair. It was reprinted, in full, in the Fall 1980 issue of 
the Newsletter of the American Committee on the History of 
the Second World War, which is an affiliate of the American 
Historical Association. 

Prange and Company also failed to exploit new documenta- 
tion available from General Marshall's declassified files, which 
suggested that Kimmel and Short had in truth been made 
scapegoats for Washington. Nor did they refer to other 
records found among the Army Chief of Staff reports, 
documenting General Mac Arthur's blundering during the 
Philippine campaign. 

Those wishing more details about the manifold shortcom- 
ings of At Dawn We Slept should consult Percy L. Greaves, Jr., 
"Three Assessments of the Infamy of December 7, 1941," The 



Journal of Historical Review (Volume Three, Number Three, 
Fall, 1982) and Rear Admiral Edwin T. Layton, Captain Roger 
Pineau, and John Costello, "And I Was There": Pearl Harbor 
and Midway— Breaking the Secrets (New York: William Mor- 
row, 1985), pp. 495-511. As Greaves trenchantly observed in 
The JHR, "it would take another book of 800 pages to balance, 
correct and refute the one-sided presentation of the book's 
selected 'facts' and deductions." Pineau and Costello show in 
their own examination of this book: 

Although widely praised for its apparently exhaustive 
research, Prange's account did nothing to provide new 
understanding of what had really gone wrong in Washington. 
At Dawn We Slept merely served to reinforce the politically 
loaded thirty-five-year-old report produced by the (Democratic 
majority of) the congressional investigating committee. 

At Dawn We Slept is still very much in print and has just 
been re-released in a Pearl Harbor "50th Anniversary Edition" 
available in hardcover from Viking for $35.00 and in paper- 
back from Penguin for $16.95. For unwary students and the 
general public, this is the version of the story that is most com- 
patible with the world view of our predominant political and 
historiographical regime. 

John Costello's Cautious Revisionism 

John Costello, a former BBC producer turned historian, had 
co-authored two successful books, D-Day and The Battle of the 
Atlantic, before turning his attention to the Pacific campaigns. 
Costello's manuscript was near completion when the National 
Archives received the vast collection of Navy files in 1980. He 
was able to incorporate some of the new material in The 
Pacific War (New York: Rawson Wade, 1981), which appeared 
almost simultaneously with At Dawn We Slept. His treatment 
reflects his basically pro-Churchill, British bias, and the first 
hardcover edition was marred by sloppy proofreading and 
careless editing. Still, it was a more honest effort than the 
Prange work and, in two final chapters, Costello considered 
some of the newly released material that, among other things, 
indicated that eleven days before Pearl Harbor Roosevelt 
received a "positive war warning" from Churchill that the 
Japanese would attack the United States at the end of the first 
week of December. He also referred to John T. Briggs's impor- 
tant disclosures. Wrote Costello about the war: 

Pearl Harbor: Fifty Years of Controversy 


There is every indication that a month before the attack on 
Pearl Harbor, it was the United States that had decided to bring 
about the rupture of discussions and was about to prepare for 
the worst. There is now evidence for believing that President 
Roosevelt was not only expecting war but possibly knew exact- 
ly when it would break out. 

According to a confidential British Foreign Office report "the 
President and Mr. Hull were . . . fully conscious of what they 
were doing". . . Whether such an accommodation [the modus 
vivendi] would have worked out in practice is less important 
than the fact that it was the United States which decided to 
abandon the modus vivendi— thereby making a Pacific War in- 
evitable ... In the light of subsequent events, this decision 
proved to have been one of the most momentous in American 

The Evolution of John Toland 

John Toland has been one of the most commercially suc- 
cessful writers of popular history over the past thirty years. 
Winner of the Pulitzer Prize for But Not in Shame (1961), he 
said that the Pacific war was caused by an unprovoked act of 
Japanese aggression. His 1970 book, The Rising Sun, reported 
that Pearl Harbor had been the consequence of both American 
and Japanese miscalculations and mistakes. However, Toland 
continued to explore the question of how America and Japan 
came to go to war. His revised view of these events was 
published in 1982 and created an immediate sensation. In- 
famy: Pearl Harbor and Its Aftermath (New York: Doubleday) 
witnessed Toland's conversion to the Revisionist position. It 
was now beyond question, wrote Toland, that Roosevelt and 
his closest advisers, including Marshall and Stimson, knew 
about the impending attack on Pearl Harbor before December 
7th, but had withheld this information from Kimmel and 
Short. After the Japanese delivered their "surprise" first-strike, 
the Roosevelt Administration launched a massive "cover up," 
that involved the suppressing or destroying of evidence, per- 
jury, and making the Army and Navy commanders at Hawaii 
scapegoats. These were conclusions that Morgenstern, 
Barnes, et al., had reached over thirty years earlier. 

What distinguished Infamy was that Toland managed to un- 
cover additional information which lent further weight to the 
Revisionist case. The focus of his book was the nine post- 
attack investigations. This is by far the most readable account 
of the efforts made by various individuals, including Kimmel, 



Safford, Greaves and the Republican Minority on the Joint 
Congressional Committee, to overcome the official roadblocks 
and obtain the truth about what led to the attack on Pearl Har- 

Toland went on to reveal that his own "tenth investigation" 
had uncovered evidence suggesting that the Dutch had passed 
on information to Washington about the forthcoming attack 
and that the Office of Naval Intelligence was also aware that a 
Japanese carrier task force was steaming toward Hawaii. The 
edition of Infamy one should consult is not the first hardcover 
printing, but rather the revised 1983 version, which includes 
an important Postscript incorporating material not available 
for the first printing. This recommended edition is currently 
in print: Infamy by John Toland (New York: Berkley Books, 
397 pp., $5.50, ISBN: 0- 425-09040-X). This represents an im- 
portant breakthrough for Revisionism, since Toland's was the 
first Revisionist treatment of Pearl Harbor to be published by a 
major commercial house and the first to reach the New York 
Times bestseller list. Writing in the JHR, Percy L. Greaves 
described Infamy as "probably the best volume on the subject 
to date." 

Contributions by Martin and Greaves 

For many years, this reviewer distributed copies to students 
of what he has long considered to be the best brief introduc- 
tion to this question, James J. Martin's essay, "Pearl Harbor: 
Antecedents, Background and Consequences." First published 
as a chapter in his 1977 book, The Saga of Hog Island fr Other 
Essays in Inconvenient History (Ralph Myles, Publisher, P.O. 
Box 1533, Colorado Springs, Colorado 80901), it was later in- 
cluded as a chapter in a volume directed especially toward a 
Japanese audience, Beyond Pearl Harbor: Essays on Some 
Historical Consequences of the Crisis in the Pacific in 1941 
(Plowshare Press, RR 1, Little Current, Ontario POP 1KO, 
Canada, 1981). Within the confines of seventeen pages, Dr. 
Martin manages to explain why Pearl Harbor has continued to 
be an issue provoking controversy, reviews the most impor- 
tant literature, and discusses what some of the results have 
been for the United States. 

Beyond Pearl Harbor included a previously unpublished 
essay by Martin, 'Where Was the General? Some New Views 
and Contributions Relative to the Ongoing Mystery of Pearl 
Harbor." Marshall's role in this affair has long been a question. 

Pearl Harbor: Fifty Years of Controversy 


As Chief of Staff, Marshall was responsible for reviewing the 
defense of Pearl Harbor. He had access to the MAGIC inter- 
cepts that were not passed along to General Short. He was at 
Roosevelt's side through the critical months preceding the out- 
break of the war. And he managed to disappear from the late 
afternoon of December 6th, when Washington started to 
receive decrypts of the Japanese diplomatic messages, inform- 
ing its ambassadors that the break was coming with the 
United States, until late on the morning of December 7th. 

During the various investigations, Marshall claimed that "he 
couldn't recall" where he was on that fateful date. Martin was 
able to incorporate the sensational John T. Briggs testimony in 
his discussion. [The best guess is that Marshall was hiding out 
at the White House.] "Where Was General Marshall?" was first 
made available to American readers when it was included in 
the special Pearl Harbor issue of The JHR (Volume four, 
Number Four, Winter 1983-84). At the time of his death in 
1984, Percy L. Greaves, Jr. had long been at work on a book on 
Pearl Harbor. Tentatively titled, The Real Infamy of Pearl Har- 
bor, it has never been published. Four chapters of his draft 
were published, with his permission, as part of The JHR Pearl 
Harbor special issue. Two of these chapters dealt with General 
Marshall and his efforts to obscure what Roosevelt and the 
rest of them knew about the attack. A chapter on the MAGIC 
intercepts explained why it was impossible to assert that 
Roosevelt was "surprised" by the outbreak of the war. This 
issue of the JHR also reprinted Greaves's article, "Was Pearl 
Harbor Unavoidable?," which showed how, over a period of 
years, the Roosevelt Administration missed opportunities to 
reach a peaceful settlement to Pacific questions plaguing 
Japanese-American relations. "The Mystery of Pearl Harbor," 
was taken from National Review of December 12, 1966, and 
contains his critique of Roberta Wohlstetter's Pearl Harbor; 
Warning and Decision. The last essay by Greaves, "What We 
Knew," reviews the information available in Washington by 
the time of the December 7th attack. 

Admiral Layton's Memoirs 

On December 7, 1941, Edwin T. Layton was intelligence of- 
ficer for the U.S. Pacific Fleet, an assignment he retained 
throughout the war. Like his superior, Admiral Kimmel, he 
was indeed surprised when the Japanese bombers hit the base. 
But he was not cashiered in the aftermath. 



Following his retirement in 1962, Layton was encouraged 
by many people, in and out of the military, to write his own ac- 
count of what had happened. Over the following years, Rear 
Admiral Layton collected material and wrote articles and 
reviews for the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings. The publica- 
tion of At Dawn We SJept provoked him to complete the work 
he had begun almost twenty years earlier. He found the book 
riddled with misstatements and distortions of fact, and was 
outraged that Prange, Goldstein, and Dillon had blamed Kim- 
mel and Short for the disaster, while absolving Washington. 

At the time he suffered a fatal stroke in April 1984, Layton 
had largely completed the first draft of his manuscript, which 
recounted his version of events up to the Battle of Midway. 
Captain Roger Pineau, who had assisted Samuel Eliot 
Morison with his multi-volume History of United States Naval 
Operations in World War II, and John Costello both knew 
Layton, and were retained to complete his book, which ap- 
peared in 1985 as "And I Was There": Pearl Harbor and Mid- 
way—Breaking the Secrets (New York: William Morrow, 596 
pp., ISBN: 0-688-04883-8). 

Naturally, the question arises as to just how much of this is 
really Layton and how much may have been "edited" by 
Pineau and Costello. As David Irving reminds us, the publ- 
ished versions of many "memoirs" often differ greatly from the 
original manuscripts. With that reservation in mind, this 
reviewer can report that Layton's central thesis is that he and 
Kimmel were "short changed" of intelligence information by 
Washington. He confirms that Admiral Richmond Kelly 
Turner, Chief of the War Plans Division, failed to relay vital in- 
telligence to Kimmel: 

It should now be indisputable that the information that might 
have averted the disaster had been received by the Navy 
Department by 6 December 1941 ... the bomb plot message, or 
even the eleventh-hour "lights code" message, could have 
alerted Pearl Harbor to the threat. 

Layton thus reconfirms what Kimmel and Theobald wrote 
in their accounts. Other insights found in this volume include 
evidence that Stalin had very precise knowledge about when 
the Japanese were going to launch their strikes, and another 
report confirming that a council-of-war convened at the White 
House the night of December 6th. 

Pear] Harbor: Fifty Years of Controversy 


Some Recent Scholarship 

The war between Japan and the United States continues to 
be studied by academic historians. A book that includes eigh- 
teen essays by American and Japanese scholars is Pearl Har- 
bor Reexamined: Prologue to the Pacific War, edited by Hilary 
Conroy and Harry Wray (Honolulu: University of Hawaii 
Press, 200 pp., 1990, $22.00, ISBN: 0-8248-1235-2). Japanese 
and American diplomacy leading up to the attack is reexamin- 
ed here, with a number of the contributors disputing the still 
popular notion that "war was inevitable." 

The symposium opens with a review of Japanese-American 
relations from 1900 to 1940 by Harry Wray, a former history 
professor at Illinois State, now on the faculty of the University 
of Tsukuba, Japan. Akira Iriye then looks at U.S. policy toward 
Japan before World War II. He makes the case that the 
Japanese were very reluctant to make a drive to the south and 
were not necessarily antagonistic to the United States. The 
Roosevelt Administration, he argues, lost many opportunities 
to reach a peaceful resolution of outstanding issues. In his 
essay "Franklin Delano Roosevelt, the New Deal, and Japan," 
Gary Dean Best, of the University of Hawaii, argues that FDR 
ignored the counsel of his more knowledgeable advisers, and 
followed his own notions, influenced by his "ancestral connec- 
tions" to the China trade. Hull was a "mediocrity" who "knew 
nothing about foreign affairs." Roosevelt sabotaged the World 
Economic Conference. The New Deal was a "war waged 
against business and banking in the United States ... By 1938 
almost every industrialized nation in the world was well 
ahead of the United States in recovering from the depression, 
some of them having surpassed their pre-depression economic 
levels." Like Barnes and other earlier Revisionists, Prof. Best is 
convinced that: 

The events of December 7, 1941, resulted in part from the at- 
titudes and policies that began to direct the United States in 
1933. A new President launched the United States on mistaken 
foreign and domestic policies that ended in the prolonging of 
the depression and in war, rather than in recovery and peace. 

The late John K. Emmerson, a one-time U.S. Foreign Service 
officer assigned to the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo during Joseph 
Grew's ambassadorship and later a senior scholar at Stanford, 
points out that Grew and others familiar with Japan were not 
listened to. The State Department's favorite "expert," Stanley 



Hornbeck, had little genuine knowledge; his "only experience 
is Asia had been a teaching stint in China." It was Hornbeck 
who helped torpedo a proposed Pacific summit between 
Roosevelt and Prime Minister Konoye. 

Ikei Masaru of Keio University and author of Gaisetsu Nihon 
Gaikoshi (A Survey of Japanese Diplomatic History), highlights 
"Examples of Mismanagement in U.S. Policy toward Japan 
before World War II." He argues that a more cautious attitude 
on the part of Washington might have postponed or avoided 
war with Japan altogether. American hard-liners, such as 
Hornbeck, misread Japanese intentions and did not under- 
stand the psychology of the officer corps, who would not ac- 
cept submission, writes Hosoya Chihiro, vice-president of the 
International University of Japan. 

Tsunoda Jun, former professor of history at Kokushin 
University and editor of the eight-volume Taiheiyo no senso e 
no michi (The Road to the Pacific War) considers the Hull- 
Nomura negotiations. He considers that "there was no signifi- 
cant issue that would have made a war between Japan and the 
United States inevitable." Konoye's bid to hold a summit 
meeting with Roosevelt was completely genuine and was 
worth attempting. 

Not all of the contributors to this volume support Revisionist 
positions. Michael Barnhart, associate professor of Japanese 
history at the State University of New York at Stony Brook, 
contends that Hornbeck was a realist and the United States 
was better off for having followed his advice. Alvin D. Coox, 
chair of the Japanese Studies Institute at San Diego State 
University, writes on "Repulsing the Pearl Harbor Revi- 
sionists: The State of Present Literature on the Debacle." He 
reveals his own lack of qualifications to make an informed 
judgement when he avers that "the late Professor Gordon W. 
Prange demolished the supposed deviltry of Roosevelt and 
company in his book, appropriately titled At Dawn We Slept." 

For many readers, PearJ Harbor Reexamined will be their 
first exposure to contemporary Japanese historical analysis. 
Three of the American contributors to this volume share the 
view that Roosevelt and Hull were not very interested in 
Japanese peace overtures. More books of the quality of this 
collection of essays would make a welcome addition to the 
literature of other hotly debated topics. 

Pearl Harbor: Fifty Years of Controversy 


The Role of Winston Churchill 

Students of the Second World War are well aware that 
Roosevelt and Churchill were working together long before 
the United States was officially at war against the Axis. The 
Tyler Kent affair has shed light on the secret communications 
the two engaged in, even before Churchill was Prime Mini- 
ster. British wartime Cabinet papers released in January 1972 
disclosed that at the August 1941 Newfoundland, Canada 
meeting, where the "Atlantic Charter" was announced, 
Roosevelt promised Churchill that the U.S. would enter the 
war by the end of the year. 

Questions have persisted: Did Churchill know about the 
Japanese design against Pearl Harbor? Did he pass along what 
information he had to Roosevelt? 

At the Ninth International Revisionist Conference, British 
historian David Irving dealt with these and related matters in 
his paper, "Churchill and U.S. Entry into World War II," 
which was subsequently published in The JHR, Volume Nine, 
Number Three, Fall 1989, pp. 261-286. While working on the 
second volume of his wartime biography of Churchill, Irving 
reported that he discovered that all British intelligence files 
relating to Japan during the fall of 1941 have been removed 
from the archives and are closed to review by researchers. His 
fellow British historian, John Costello, was told by the British 
Ministry of Defence that it is "not in the national interest" to 
have these files made available to the public. 

In his remarks, Irving pointed out that from September 1939 
the British were able to read the Japanese fleet operational 
code, known as JN-25 (Japanese Navy). He went on to reveal 
that by mid-November of 1941, Churchill knew that the 
United States was soon to be attacked by the Japanese and that 
he "probably knew" that an attack would fall at Pearl Harbor. 
Said Irving, "I think Churchill deliberately allowed the attack 
on Pearl Harbor to go ahead in order to bring the Americans 
in. He did everything to avoid having the Pacific Fleet 

This thesis has been developed by James Rusbridger and 
Eric Nave in their newly released book, Betrayal at Pearl Har- 
bor: How Churchill Lured Roosevelt into WW II (New York: 
Summit Books, Simon & Schuster, 302 pp., photographs, in- 
dex, 1991, $19.95. ISBN: 0-671-70805-8). Rusbridger, formerly 
with Britain's Secret Intelligence Service, has written on in- 



telligence and military history since his retirement. While do- 
ing work on a book dealing with signals intelligence, he en- 
countered Captain Eric Nave, "the father of British codebreak- 
ing in the Far East." The two then collaborated to produce this 
volume, which discloses that the British, and very likely the 
Americans, too, were indeed reading the Japanese Navy 
operational code well before the attack on Pearl Harbor. 

By their account, the British certainly knew that the 
Japanese fleet was going to set sail on November 26, 1941. The 
most likely targets were the Philippines, the Dutch East Indies, 
Singapore, or Pearl Harbor. When the Japanese were not 
sighted in the south, this was, by process of elimination, a fur- 
ther indication that they were sending units towards Pearl 
Harbor. On December 2, five days before the attack on 
Hawaii, the British intercepted Admiral Yamamoto's signal, 
"Climb Niitakayama 1208," meaning that an attack would com- 
mence on December 8, Tokyo time, which was December 7 in 

They charge that Churchill must have known that Pearl Har- 
bor was going to be attacked, but that he refused to pass his in- 
formation to Roosevelt. Had FDR known about the impending 
Japanese first-strike, then "as a totally honorable President," he 
would have warned Kimmel and Short at Pearl Harbor. They 
conclude their narrative: 

Roosevelt was thus deceived by Churchill, who took a ghast- 
ly gamble to bring America into the war in a manner that 
would sweep aside all opposition; and he was also badly served 
by his own divided and jealous subordinates. The combination 
of the two brought a reluctant ally into the war. Churchill's 
gamble paid off even if, in the process, Britain lost an empire. 

Anyone familiar with the Roosevelt record can see the flaw 
in their conclusion, even if they are correct that the JN-25 code 
had been broken by the early fall of 1939. The authors com- 
pletely misread Roosevelt's position. They make no mention of 
his commitments to the British and Dutch, and the dilemma 
he was placed in when the Dutch called on the U.S. to own up 
to its part of the bargain four days before the attack on Pearl 
Harbor. There is no reference to Roosevelt's "live bait" ploy of 
sending three little ships out of manila on a "defensive infor- 
mation patrol" the week before Pearl Harbor. Greaves, and 
others, long ago argued that while FDR may not have welcom- 
ed the loss of life at Pearl Harbor, that after the failure of his 

Pearl Harbor: Fifty Years of Controversy 


"three little ships" gambit, and with the Dutch and British in- 
voking their agreements that went into went effect after the 
Japanese crossed the imaginary line in Southeast Asia, the at- 
tack on Pearl Harbor solved Roosevelt's most pressing pro- 

Rusbridger and Nave have undoubtedly uncovered addi- 
tional parts of the mystery. With the reservations I have out- 
lined, their book is of interest to students of this episode. 

Revisionism and Pearl Harbor 

Over the past half-century, Pearl Harbor Revisionism has 
come of age. From the first writings of John T. Flynn, to 
George Morgenstern's masterful study, to the work encour- 
aged by Harry Elmer Barnes, the testimony of participants in 
the events, and the latest findings of "second-generation" 
historians who are not satisfied merely to retell the standard 
accounts, this endeavor to uncover the truth has not been 
marked by paranoid "conspiracy theories" or reactionary 
"Roosevelt baiting." What Revisionists have accomplished is a 
sober re-appraisal of the origins of the Pacific War, and the 
making of a strong case for remembering December 7, 1941 as 
President Roosevelt's "Day of Infamy." 



[continued from page 430) 

let us know if you believe this letter to a newspaper editor 
should be published in pamphlet form. 

Last and not least, Mark Weber reports on the little-known 
facts of the FDR-approved plan for American bombing attacks 
on Japan— from China in American planes flown by American 
pilots (disguised as Chinese planes piloted by American 
"volunteers")- months before Pearl Harbor! Readers who 
watched ABC's recent "20/20" episode dealing with Plan 
JB-355 will marvel at the network's inability to integrate the 
documentary evidence for this plan— available at the National 
Archives for two decades, although ignored until very recently 
by historians -with the background to FDR's "back door to 
war" as revealed over the past 50 years by Revisionist 

-Theodore J. O'Keefe 


In-Depth Report of "Holocaust Trial" 
Provides Valuable Overview 

THE HOLOCAUST ON TRIAL: The Case of Ernst Ziindel 
by Robert Lenski. Decatur, Ala.: The Reporter Press, 1990. 
Paperback. 544 pages. Photographs. Index. ISBN: 
0-9623220-0-8. (Available from the IHR for $29.00, plus 
$2.00 postage and handling.) 

Reviewed by Mark Weber 

Anyone with an interest in twentieth-century history or 
who truly cares about the issue of free speech in a 
democratic society will appreciate this book. Written as a day- 
by-day account of the 1988 "Holocaust Trial" in Toronto of 
German-Canadian publisher Ernst Ziindel, and illustrated 
with dozens of well-chosen photographs, this highly readable, 
balanced and yet comprehensive survey may well be the best 
single introduction to the Holocaust issue now available. 

Ziindel's troubles began in November 1983 when Jewish 
community activist Sabina Citron filed a complaint against 
him for reprinting and distributing Did Six Million Really Die?, 
a polemical booklet by British writer Richard Harwood (Ver- 
rall) that refutes the generally accepted Holocaust extermina- 
tion story. Responding to complaints from Canada's Jewish 
community, it wasn't long before Ontario's provincial govern- 
ment took over the case, and in early 1985 Ziindel was brought 
to court for "knowingly spreading false news." 

He was found guilty after a highly emotional seven-week 
trial that attracted enormous media attention in Canada. After 
the verdict was set aside by a higher court, Ziindel was tried 
again in 1988 on the same charge, and was again found guilty. 
The verdict is currently under review by Canada's Supreme 

For his part, Ziindel could have made things much 
easier— or at least simpler— for himself if he had chosen to de- 
fend himself on narrower legal grounds. He might, for exam- 
ple, have simply argued that he was entitled to publish the 



booklet under Canada's supposedly guaranteed right of free 
speech. But Ziindel was determined at the outset, as he put it, 
to "put the Nuremberg Trial on trial," and decisively discredit 
the Holocaust extermination story. 

The German-born defendant never intended to devote 
several years and enormous effort to the Holocaust issue. A 
passionate German nationalist, Ziindel has regarded these 
Holocaust trials as an unintended but unfortunately necessary 
detour from what he sees as his mission: restoring a sense of 
purpose, pride and confidence to his beloved German people. 

In spite of the guilty verdicts, it is now obvious that govern- 
ment officials and Jewish community leaders badly 
miscalculated when they decided to go after Ziindel 
because— as Lenski's book makes abundantly clear— Holocaust 
Revisionism has been immeasurably strengthened as a result 
of these trials. Apparently viewing him as little more than a 
bigoted simpleton, his adversaries grossly underestimated 
Ziindel's intelligence, skill and perseverance, and did not an- 
ticipate his ability to assemble and hold together a team of 
loyal and talented supporters. 

Much of the credit for the effectiveness of ZundePs legal 
campaign must go to his courageous attorney, Doug Christie. 
In his tough and often brilliant cross-examination of prosecu- 
tion witnesses in the 1985 trial, he obliged many of them to 
make revealing and sometimes incriminating concessions to 
truth. This highly intelligent, sensitive and idealistic man con- 
tinued his work in the 1988 trial, ably assisted by Keltie Zubko 
and attorney Barbara Kulaszka. (Audio cassette recordings of 
Christie's eloquent banquet address at the 1986 IHR con- 
ference are available from the IHR for $9.95.) 

Free Speech in Canada 

For those who challenge the official view of the semi- 
sacrosanct Holocaust story, "free speech" is not quite free in 
Canada. Regardless of one's views about the Holocaust issue, 
or even of Ziindel, any open-minded reader of The Holocaust 
on Trial will appreciate the significance of this trial for the 
issue of free speech. 

Contrary to what the Canadian government has insisted all 
along, this was unquestionably a "free speech" case, as even 
the New York Times acknowledged in a rare American 
newspaper report on the trial. Alan Borovoy, a leading Cana- 

Book Reviews 


dian civil liberties advocate, declared that the arcane and rare- 
ly invoked law under which Ziindel was tried should be 
abolished. It is no exaggeration to say that the Ziindel trial was 
one of the most important tests in many years of fundamental 
legal rights in North America. (As this review goes to press, 
Canada's Supreme Court is reviewing the Ziindel case to 
decide the constitutionality of the law under which he was 

The author of The Holocaust on Trial is an American writer 
in his late thirties. Robert Lenski is also the compiler-editor of 
Toward a New Science of Man, a collection of insightful and 
thought-provoking quotations on society, race, liberty and 
human behavior. (This 250-page work, published in 1981, is 
available from The Noontide Press for $ 7.00 plus $ 2.00 
postage and handling). To write his Holocaust book, Lenski 
carefully went through every line of the official transcript of 
the four-month-long trial. He also took account of numerous 
newspaper and magazine articles, and spoke with a number of 
the key individuals involved in the case. 

Although the author treats Ziindel and Holocaust Revi- 
sionism sympathetically, this is by no means a one-sided Revi- 
sionist polemic. In fact, Lenski gives the impression of being a 
Holocaust agnostic. Mistakes and fumblings by ZiindePs 
witnesses are not ignored, and telling arguments and effective 
points by prosecution witnesses and the Crown attorney are 
duly presented. 

In the introduction and in the first chapter, Lenski provides 
essential background information and effectively sets the 
book's tone. He tells of the defendant's youth in Germany, his 
emigration to Canada, successful career as an artist, and his 
"political awakening." Lenski succinctly explains how Ziindel 
became a focus of national attention during the first 
"Holocaust Trial" in 1985. 

As Lenski relates in Chapter 2, Canada's newspapers and 
television closely followed the unfolding drama of that first 
trial. Canadians across the country were able to learn— albeit 
in an often sensationalized way— that there is an alternative 
view of the orthodox Holocaust extermination story. In strik- 
ing contrast to this copious coverage, the media almost com- 
pletely ignored the second trial in 1988. The role of organized 
Jewry in pressuring publishers and editors to curtail reporting 
of the second Ziindel trial has been nothing less than 



outrageous, as Canadian journalist Doug Collins and others 
have emphasized. (See Collins' essay in the Fall 1991 Journal.) 

The Testimony 

Lenski reviews the 1985 testimony of Raul Hilberg, a promi- 
nent Holocaust historian and author of the three-volume stan- 
dard study, The Destruction of the European Jews. Shaken by 
defense attorney Doug Christie's rigorous cross-examination 
questioning during the first trial, the Austrian-born Jewish 
professor refused to return as a prosecution witness. Conse- 
quently, Hilberg's lengthy testimony was laboriously read 
aloud to the bored members of the jury in the second Ziindel 
trial by prosecution attorney John Pearson. 

The prosecution's main witness, American Holocaust 
historian Christopher Browning, was asked to comment in 
detail on the Harwood booklet. Lenski faithfully reports on the 
highlights of Browning's testimony— for which he was paid 
$150 (Canadian) per hour— including his most persuasive 
arguments and pointed criticisms of the Harwood booklet. 

As a "functionalist" Holocaust historian who knows that 
hard evidence for the Holocaust is elusive, Browning 
postulates that the extermination of Europe's Jews began 
without a budget, central plan or even a direct order. He has 
speculated that Hitler may have set an enormous extermina- 
tion program into motion with nothing more than a silent 
"nod" to subordinates. 

In a relentless and sometimes brilliant cross-examination in- 
terrogation, defense attorney Doug Christie wrung numerous 
damaging admissions from Browning. As Lenski relates, for 
example, the 4 3 -year-old university professor (who is also a 
member of the advisory board of the vehemently Zionist 
Simon Wiesenthal Center) claimed not to be aware that the 
Allies had used torture and threats to force German officials 
into signing incriminating statements about alleged German 
atrocities. Nor was Browning aware of the massive persecu- 
tion of members of the ethnic German minority community in 
Poland just prior to the outbreak of war in 1939 (which was a 
decisive factor in Hitler's decision to attack). 

Browning expressed confidence in the reliability of the 
postwar "confessions" of SS officer Kurt Gerstein, which have 
served as a major pillar of the Holocaust extermination story. 
But the historian did not know, for example, that Gerstein had 

Book Reviews 


"confessed" that at Auschwitz alone "millions of children" had 
been killed by holding cotton wads of poison under their 
noses. (Henri Roques thoroughly discredits this key "witness" 
in his doctoral dissertation, The "Confessions" of Kurt Gerstein, 
which is available from the IHR.) 

Questioned by prosecution attorney Pearson, Browning 
confidently cited a portion of the official wartime journal of 
the German governor of Poland, Hans Frank, as critically im- 
portant evidence for the Holocaust extermination thesis. But 
under cross examination, Browning was obliged to acknowl- 
edge that he had not read the complete text of Frank's wartime 
journal, and that he was ignorant of what Frank had said on 
this subject as a Nuremberg Tribunal defendant. 

No witness testimony is overlooked by Lenski, including the 

— Ditlieb Felderer spoke in detail about his numerous inspec- 
tion visits of camp sites in Poland. He presented and com- 
mented on some 300 slides taken during those trips. 

—German writer Thies Christophersen was stationed at 
Auschwitz in 1944 as a junior army officer. He visited 
Birkenau— supposedly the most important killing center- 
several times during the height of the alleged extermination 
period, and saw no sign of killings. 

—Russell Barton, a British-born physician who served with 
British forces as a medical orderly in the infamous Bergen- 
Belsen camp at the end of the war, confirmed that mass deaths 
there were an indirect consequence of the conflict, and not of 
any deliberate German policy. He noted that Jewish inmates in 
eastern camps, including Auschwitz, were given a choice by 
their German captors of either remaining behind to wait for 
the advancing Soviets, or leaving, usually on foot, with the 
retreating German forces. 

—Austrian-born Canadian Maria Van Herwaarden, who sur- 
vived two years of internment in Auschwitz I and II 
(Birkenau), confirmed that conditions were generally dread- 
ful, and that many fellow inmates succumbed to disease. At 
the same time, though, and contrary to widespread "rumors," 
she testified that she saw no evidence of extermination or 
homicidal gassings. 

—Joseph G. Burg confirmed that he, along with many other 
Jews, had been cruelly mistreated by Romanian authorities 



during the war. But he emphatically rejected the allegations of 
a German extermination policy or program. Indeed, he 
testified, the Germans treated the Jews much more humanely 
than did the Romanians. Burg said that he inspected the 
Auschwitz and Majdanek camps in 1945, just months after the 
end of the war, but found no evidence of extermination gas 
chambers at either site. 

— Emil Lachout certified the contents of a 1948 Austrian 
Military Police Service document which confirmed that 
numerous false claims about homicidal gas chambers were 
based on perjured testimony by former inmates and 
statements obtained from Germans by torture. (See: IHR Jour- 
nal, Spring 1988, pp. 117-126.) 

-In spite of a bad cold, Bradley Smith proved to be one of the 
more effective witnesses. The jury members seemed to be 
visibly impressed with the straight-forward, common-sense 
responses and observations of this veteran free thinker and 
libertarian. He held up admirably under Pearson's barrage of 
badgering and often exasperatingly petty questions. 

— Ivan Lagac£, a funeral director and crematorium manager 
from Calgary, explained in detail why widely accepted claims 
about cremation at Auschwitz and Birkenau are not technical- 
ly possible. Allegations that SS camp officials were able to 
cremate Jewish corpses in just 15 or 20 minutes cannot 
possibly be true, he said, pointing out that even modern 
crematory facilities require about an hour and a half to 
cremate a body. Claims by Holocaust historian Hilberg and 
others that 4,400 bodies were cremated daily in Birkenau's 
facilities are "preposterous" and "beyond the realm of reality," 
Lagacg declared. 

Lenski devotes most of a chapter to my testimony, which 
was given during five often grueling days on the stand. 
Christie took me line by line through the Harwood booklet, 
asking me to comment on the accuracy of just about every 
sentence. As a result, my testimony touched on virtually every 
aspect of the Holocaust issue, including the role of the Einsatz- 
gruppen security police units in the occupied Soviet ter- 
ritories, the origins and precise nature of Germany's wartime 
Jewish policy, and the Nuremberg Tribunal testimony of war- 
time SS prosecutor Konrad Morgen. (For more on my 
testimony and role in the trial, see the IHR Journal, Winter 
1989-90, pp. 389-425.) 

Book Reviews 


While readily acknowledging the errors and misleading 
statements of Harwood's booklet, I affirmed its central thesis: 
there was no German policy or program to exterminate 
Europe's Jews, and nothing like six million Jews perished dur- 
ing the Second World War. Like Faurisson and Irving who 
would testify later, I stressed that the booklet's errors are 
almost entirely minor, and that in any case are not critically 
important to its main thesis. 

During his wide-ranging and detailed testimony, French 
professor Robert Faurisson also touched on virtually every 
major aspect of the Holocaust story. He focused particularly 
on his investigation of execution gas chambers in the United 
States, and the alleged extermination gas chambers at the 
former German camps. Europe's leading Holocaust Revi- 
sionist also further discredited the testimony of star prosecu- 
tion witness Browning. 

Faurisson spoke at some length about the costly and ex- 
hausting trials and other outrageous legal difficulties he has 
had to endure in France as a result of his statements and 
writings on this issue. His ordeal— which is almost 
unbelievable in a late twentieth century European 
democracy— has included nearly fatal physical attacks by 
bigoted thugs. (See also Faurisson's essays: "The Ziindel 
Trials," IHR Journal, Winter 1988-89, pp. 417-431, and, "My 
Life as a Revisionist," IHR Journal, Spring 1989, pp. 5-63.) 

Without a doubt, the trial's most important witness was 
Massachusetts execution hardware expert Fred Leuchter, 
who testified at length about his on-site investigation of the 
alleged extermination gas chambers at Auschwitz, Birkenau 
and Majdanek. For some years, Faurisson had been saying 
that a neutral American gas chamber expert should carry out 
an impartial investigation of the alleged extermination gas 
chambers of Auschwitz and Auschwitz-Birkenau— the five 
sites that are the core of the Holocaust extermination story. 
Persuaded by Faurisson, Ziindel commissioned Leuchter to 
carry out this history-making investigation. 

Leuchter's qualifications as America's foremost execution 
hardware expert were well established in the Toronto court- 
room. For one thing, William Armontrout, warden of the 
Missouri State Penitentiary, testified under oath that he had 
consulted with Leuchter on the design of his state's execution 
gas chamber, and declared that Leuchter is the only such 
specialist in the United States. 



As is now well known, of course, Leuchter concluded that 
the inspected sites were never used as extermination gas 
chambers, and never could have been used for that purpose. 
Since the 1988 trial, his detailed report on his investigation 
has been widely circulated around the world in numerous 
languages, and has itself become history-making. As a result, 
Leuchter has become the target of a vicious campaign by the 
same mafia that has tried to silence Ziindel. 

The final defense witness was David Irving, arguably the 
most widely read and recognized historian in the world today. 
Speaking in clear and imposing language, the tall, handsome 
British scholar made a striking impression. Lenski's record of 
his wide-ranging and often fascinating testimony alone makes 
this book well worth reading. 

Irving's appearance as a witness for Ziindel was all the more 
remarkable because prosecution attorney Pearson had praised 
him earlier as a dissident historian who nevertheless did not 
"deny the Holocaust." For some years, though, Irving had 
privately been disturbed by the absence of any documentary 
evidence for a German extermination program or policy. Stud- 
ying the just-completed Leuchter Report in Toronto settled 
the matter. In the courtroom, as Lenski reports, Irving 
dramatically repudiated his earlier position and endorsed the 
Revisionist view of the Holocaust story. After referring to 
Leuchter's report as "shattering" and "a stroke of genius on the 
part of the defense," the judge forbade Irving from making any 
further reference to it. 

Irving endorsed the central thesis of the Harwood booklet, 
while also conceding its obvious flaws. "I don't think there was 
any overall Reich policy to kill the Jews," he said. He pointed 
out the injustices of the Nuremberg Tribunal, and spoke of the 
persecution that invariably befalls anyone who seriously 
challenges the Holocaust extermination story. 

Just as Ziindel had intended, this legal contest became to a 
considerable extent a "trial on the Nuremberg trial." As the 
trial progressed, the narrower legal questions of his alleged 
guilt and the character of the Harwood booklet became less 
and less relevant. Indeed, Judge Thomas complained that "this 
trial became a showpiece for the Institute for Historical 

In his concluding chapter, "Summation, Verdict, 
Aftermath," the author ably summarizes the final pleas to the 

Book Reviews 


jury by attorneys Christie and Pearson. Lenski also attempts to 
explain the seemingly inexplicable guilty verdict, and 
describes some of the consequences and implications of this 
trial for Canada and the Western world. 

In spite of claims by both prosecutor Pearson and Judge 
Thomas that the Harwood booklet "will likely cause racial and 
social intolerance unless something is done about it," not one 
bit of evidence was presented to show that anyone had ever 
been harmed or injured as a result of Ziindel's publication of 
Did Six Million Really Die?. On this point alone, an open- 
minded outsider might easily assume that the jury would 
decide to acquit the defendant. And yet, in spite of all the 
testimony and evidence, the jury members agreed on a guilty 
verdict. Judge Thomas then sentenced Ziindel to nine months 

Why did the jury members decide to convict? Lenski pro- 
vides some probable but unavoidably speculative answers. For 
one thing, by pointing to Ziindel's publication of booklets that 
uncritically praise Hitler and the Third Reich, the prosecution 
succeeded in portraying the defendant as an unrepentant 
Nazi— just about the most damning accusation that can be 
made against anyone these days. 

The prosecution was also able to discredit— to a greater or 
lesser degree— just about every one of Ziindel's witnesses. The 
impact of Russell Barton's helpful and enlightening 
eyewitness testimony about Bergen-Belsen, for example, was 
lost on the jury when he readily agreed with Pearson that Ger- 
man officials had exterminated six million Jews. It did not 
seem to matter that, as he admitted, this belief was derived 
from what he had casually read and heard from others, and 
was not based on any personal experience or systematic 
study. Robert Faurisson's trials and legal difficulties in France 
were cited by the prosecution attorney to cast doubt on his 
motives and ethics, and to portray him as a threat to social 
peace and public order. Similarly, Irving was portrayed as a 
right-winger, Felderer as mentally unsound, Christophersen 
as a Nazi, and so forth. 

Time and time again, this trial proved that Holocaust Revi- 
sionists are held to a more exacting standard than other 
dissidents. Canadian authorities do not bother themselves 
about publications that challenge any other generally accepted 
view of contemporary history. 



As unfair as it was, the Ziindel trial points up the impor- 
tance of rigorous accuracy on the part of Holocaust Revi- 
sionists. Revisionists have set themselves the great task of try- 
ing to persuade people that what they have been told by 
leading historians, standard reference works and governmen- 
tal authorities is not true. For this reason, Revisionists have 
the burden of proof. It is not enough to convince those who 
are already inclined to doubt the Holocaust extermination 
story. To have any significant or lasting impact, it is essential 
to reach and, persuade those who are understandably quite 
skeptical of Holocaust Revisionism— particularly intelligent 
and open-minded men and women of good will who influence 

This book is not without defects. Like Sergeant Friday in the 
old "Dragnet" series, Lenski has given us a mostly "just the 
facts, Ma'am" account. The main weakness of this essentially 
journalistic work is probably its paucity of analysis, which 
would have helped the reader to make better sense of the 
abundant historical information. 

Also, because Lenski was not in Toronto during the trial 
itself, his book does not adequately communicate the trial's 
dramatic tension. The electric atmosphere in the large and 
often packed Toronto courtroom easily rivaled the drama of a 
LA Law television showdown. Nor does the author quite cap- 
ture the sense of dynamic purpose, idealism and drama that 
suffused ZiindeJhaus, the defendant's barracks-like campaign 
command center. Finally, Lenski's less than relevant and 
sometimes subjective comments about racial/social issues 
detract from the book's effectiveness. 

But these are relatively minor defects. On balance, I heartily 
recommend this readable, well-organized, engaging and even 
fascinating account. 

For those interested in what is probably the most socially 
and political significant historians' debate of our time, this is 
both an excellent introduction to the dispute and a valuable 
reference survey of the entire Holocaust issue. And whatever 
one may think of Ernst Ziindel or Revisionism, the author 
deserves our thanks for producing this memorable account of 
a history-making trial with the most profound social implica- 

Book Reviews 


York: Oxford University Press, 1990. Hb., 404 pp., il- 
lustrated, $24.95; ISBN 0-19-505700-7. 

Reviewed by Jack Wikoff 

Flamboyant and opinionated, Walter Duranty represented 
the quintessence of the star newspaper reporter. His beat 
was the Soviet Union. From the Revolution to the Second 
World War, Duranty's dispatches were front page news. 

Yet readers of The New York Times had little idea of the real 
Walter Duranty, who was a complex, amoral figure. S.J. 
Taylor's superb biography explores the dark side of Duranty's 
personality as well as the impact his reporting had on the 
world's perception of Joseph Stalin's Marxist dictatorship. 

Taylor demonstrates how Duranty's character flaws in- 
fluenced his reporting. Stalin's Apologist is the story of how 
Walter Duranty sold out for perks and privileges granted by 
the Stalinist elite. Abandoning any last shred of personal 
ethics, Duranty allowed himself to be prostituted and used to 
cover up the crimes of the Soviet regime. 

Duranty's journalistic corruption hit bottom in the early 
1930's. During the forced collectivization of agriculture in the 
Ukraine, brutal implementation of Stalin's Five-Year Plan was 
achieved through a contrived famine and massive deporta- 
tions resulting in up to eight to ten million deaths. Knowing 
full well this atrocity was taking place, Walter Duranty chose 
to cover up rather than report it to the world (a decision which 
evidently had the full approval of his bosses at the Times). 

Duranty's self-indulgent, egoistic approach to living surfac- 
ed early in life. The son of a prosperous, staunchly Presby- 
terian English family, he attended the elite "public" schools of 
Harrow and Bedford, then was graduated from Cambridge. 
But despite his ruling-class education, Duranty despised the 
British aristocracy, while simultaneously evincing no sym- 
pathy for working people (or at least those who lacked power 
and influence). 

During his adult years, Duranty rarely returned to England. 
His biographer succinctly describes his family relations, or 
lack thereof, in the following passage: 



When his mother died in 1916, there was no word from 
Duranty. Fourteen years later, his sister died at forty-five, a 
spinster. Her life has been devoted to her father, who outlived 
her by three years. And when in 1933, plagued by senility and 
the diseases of old age, William Steel Duranty died, he left a 
personal estate valued at merely £430, besides the house his 
daughter had left him- a pathetic come-down from his early 
days of opulence and plenty. Walter Duranty's only 
acknowledgement of his family in all of those years was a curt 
document notorized in Moscow, authorizing his father's 
solicitors to sell the house, take their fee, and send him the pro- 

Publicly, he solved the problem once and for all in his 
autobiography, Search for a Key, by killing off his parents in a 
railway accident and orphaning himself at the age of ten, an 
only child. 

It put an end to any unwelcome questions. 

On leaving college, he spent several years touring, coming to 
ground in pre-World War-I Paris, after he had squandered 
an inheritance left him by his grandfather. 

Bohemian and rou6, Duranty secured a reputation as a 
cosmopolitan globe-trotter through his witty conversation and 
fluency in several languages. Despite his short stature and lack 
of good looks, he was never at a loss for female companion- 
ship, even after a train accident left him with a wooden leg. 

Head-up for money, Duranty persuaded Wythe Williams, 
head of the Paris bureau of The New York Times, to pay him to 
write a story about a Frenchman who was going to fly an 
airplane upside down. Three months later, on December 1, 
1913, Duranty was hired by The New York Times. 

Duranty spent his days in Paris perfecting his journalistic 
technique, while his nights were devoted to dissolute med- 
dling in hobbies that are today styled "New Age." A constant 
companion of Duranty in the pre-war "City of Light" was the 
occultist and black magician, Aleister Crowley, whom the 
Britsh press had dubbed "the Wickedest Man in the World." 
Crowley claimed other titles for himself, but preferred to be 
called "Beast 666." 

One of Crowley's many female companions, Jane Cheron, 
performed the role of Scarlet Woman (as in the Book of Revela- 
tions) in Crowley's debauched rituals. Duranty was later to 
marry Cheron, although they rarely lived together. Marriage 
did not, of course, prevent him from perpetually chasing 
skirts, sometimes before his wife's eyes. 

Book Reviews 


On December 31, 1913 Crowley began a series of 23 
ritualistic "workings" of sex magic with Duranty and another 
partner named Victor Neuburg. Crowley was later to claim 
pompously that these "Paris workings" had been the "magical" 
cause of the First World War, a prelude to the new Aeon, the 
Age of Horus. 1 As for Duranty's opinion of the Paris rituals, 
Ms. Taylor reports that he "would later say little, only that he 
no longer believed in anything." 

Aleister Crowley and Jane Cheron were lifelong heroin ad- 
dicts. Duranty, too, was quite partial to alcohol and drugs, be- 
ing at one time addicted to opium, although in fairness his 
opium habit can be traced in part to recuperation for the acci- 
dent which cost him his leg. 

When the First World War began in August 1914, Duranty 
initially covered the war for The New York Times from the 
French capital. When he had gained sufficient professional ex- 
perience, he was promoted to war correspondent, filing many 
dispatches on the horrors of trench warfare based on his visits 
to the front. 

When Duranty began work as a reporter, his writing 
reflected the prevalent bias of English society. At the time of 
the First World War, his personal prejudices were as virulent- 
ly anti-German as those of most other Englishmen: in his auto- 
biographical I Write As I Please he later admitted to having 
written at least one falsified WWI propaganda story. 

After the war, Duranty traveled through Germany, Poland, 
and the Baltic states, reporting on the poverty and revolu- 
tionary turmoil besetting war-torn Eastern Europe. 

In 1920, famine began to ravage the Soviet Union, a direct 
result of the turmoil of the Revolution. Five to six million peo- 
ple starved to death or died from disease, a mass tragedy of the 
early years of Bolshevism which was to foreshadow the far 
greater evil to befall the Ukraine, North Caucasus and the 
Lower Volga a decade later. 

The Soviet leadership sought financial aid from the West, 
ostensibly to aid victims of the famine, but in reality to secure 
the Red tyranny. One of the stipulations of Herbert Hoover's 
American Relief Association was that the Bolsheviks allow 
Western reporters into Russia. Maxim Litvonov, a Jew and 
prominent Bolshevik, later to become Soviet Foreign Minister, 
determined which journalists were granted visas. After some 
wrangling (he had written a few anti-Soviet articles earlier), 
Duranty was allowed into the Soviet Union as a reporter. 



In the economic free-for-all of Lenin's short-lived New 
Economic Policy, Duranty was able to parlay his access to 
foreign currency into a house in Moscow, complete with 
English-style fireplace. He lived in luxury, particularly when 
compared to the average citizen in the "Worker's Paradise," and 
was able to purchase imported food, candies, cigarettes and 
razor blades. He owned an automobile and had a retinue of 
servants including a chauffeur, cleaning lady, secretary, cook, 
and mistress (Duranty's wife chose conveniently to live in 

Walter Duranty had also considerable travel privileges 
within the Soviet Union, and could of course leave the country 
for pleasure or business in Paris, New York and other world 
capitals. He learned to speak and read Russian, an invaluable 
skill for discovering what really went on in the Soviet Union. 
Soon enough, The New York Times's man in Moscow had 
many friends among the Soviet elite. 

When Lenin died in January, 1924, a struggle for power en- 
sued among the Bolshevist elite. Duranty shrewdly predicted 
that Stalin would come out on top. 2 During this period many 
pundits were forecasting that communism would not last, yet 
Duranty confidently predicted the survival of the Soviet 

Duranty was among the earliest Western journalists to 
praise the Soviet crash programs that forced Marxism on the 
Russian people. He coined the infamous slogan "You can't 
make an omelette without breaking eggs," 3 which he was to 
use frequently in his writing. Inevitably, he was seen by many 
as an apologist for Soviet communism, and Duranty's detrac- 
tors took to calling The New York Times "the Uptown Daily 

In January an all-out drive to collectivize Soviet agriculture 
was announced in Pravda. On a trip to Central Asia that year, 
Duranty managed to see a trainload of exiled kulaks. 4 
Transported in foul, wretchedly hot railroad cars with barred 
windows, Duranty described them as: 

. . . more like caged animals than human beings, not wild beasts 
but dumb cattle, patient with suffering eyes. Debris and jetsam, 
victims of the March to Progress. 5 

Bolshevism was returning the peasant to a condition of ser- 
vitude far more hideous than any Tsarist-era serfdom. 
Seeing such magnitude of mass suffering should have 

Book Reviews 


alerted Duranty to what was really happening in the Soviet 
Union, yet as Taylor details, Duranty quickly dismissed what 
he had seen, writing that he had "seen worse debris than that, 
trains full of wounded from the Front in France going back to 
be patched up for a fresh bout of slaughter." 

In late 1930, Duranty was honored by being granted an in- 
terview with Stalin himself. 6 The author of Stalin's Apologist 
details how with the publication of this exclusive interview 
with Stalin, Duranty became an international celebrity and 
one of the best-known journalists in the world. 

Duranty won the Pulitzer Prize for best news correspondent 
in 1932. Special citation was made of his dispatches dealing 
with the Soviet Five-Year Plan. In his acceptance speech he 
said that he had come "to respect the Soviet leaders, especially 
Stalin, whom I consider to have grown into a really great 
statesman." 7 

During that year a debate was raging in the United States 
over recognition of the Soviet Union. Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt, while campaigning for the presidency, invited 
Duranty to lunch to discuss the situation in the USSR. 

While Walter Duranty was rubbing elbows with the power- 
ful, a conspiracy of deliberate starvation was being im- 
plemented in the Soviet Union. One of the first to report the 
famine in Ukraine to the West was Andrew Cairns. In the 
spring of 1932 this young Canadian agricultural expert traveled 
through the grain-growing districts of southern Russia, report- 
ing to his superiors on widespread food shortages and starva- 
tion. He was accompanied by D. Otto Schiller, an agricultural 
specialist attached to the German embassy in Moscow, who 
was fluent in both Russian and Ukrainian. Cairn's detailed let- 
ters describing the widespread suffering he had seen were 
made available to the highest levels of the British Government. 

But Cairns's reports were never published by British 
authorities. J.S. Taylor reports: 

Many years later, asked why he had not published the report 
on his own authority, Cairns would admit that he had been 
overly discouraged, even threatened, from doing so by power- 
ful political figures of the Left in Great Britain whom he be- 
lieved at the time could do him great harm. He named Beatrice 
Webb, specifically, who, with her husband Sidney, would 
praise the accomplishments of Stalin's Five-Year Plan in their 
massive, two-volume work Soviet Communism: A New Civiliza- 



Cairns's employer, the Empire Trading Board, went into li- 
quidation, and Cairns did not return to the Soviet Union. Dr. 
Schiller published a "devastating" report in Germany, which 
resulted in his being immediately expelled from the Soviet 

During this period the Soviets were attempting to ap- 
propriate as much agricultural produce from the peasants as 
possible, to sell abroad. The foreign exchange thus obtained 
was used to finance heavy industry. In private conversations 
late in 1932 with William Strang, counsellor at the British Em- 
bassy in Moscow, Duranty confirmed that there was indeed a 
"present breakdown in [Soviet] agriculture." Duranty told 
Strang: "There are millions of people in Russia, peasants, 
whom it is fairly safe to leave in want. But the industrial pro- 
letariat, about 10 percent of the population, must at all costs be 
fed if the revolution is to be safeguarded." 

Duranty filed a dispatch in December 1932 which described 
the situation in Soviet agriculture in negative terms. As a 
result Duranty was visited by powerful Soviet authorities, who 
upbraided him for his faithlessness. Fearful he would not be 
allowed back into Russia, Duranty postponed a trip to France 
(at this time Duranty's Soviet mistress, Katya, was pregnant 
with his child). 

Taylor details how, at the end of 1932, the noose was steadily 
drawn around the collective neck of the Soviet peasant. 8 An 
international passport system was introduced which kept the 
starving kulaks from migrating to the cities. In the spring of 
1933 a law was passed which forbade a peasant to leave the 
collective farm where he was employed "without a contract 
from his future employers, ratified by the collective farm 
authorities." Duranty praised these measures, claiming they 
were designed "to purge the city of undesirable elements." 

After two American newspapermen, William Stoneman of 
the Chicago Daily News and Ralph Barnes of the New York 
Herald Tribune, filed reports on the famine, the Soviet 
authorities instituted a ban on travel for foreign journalists. 

Malcolm Muggeridge, a young English journalist for the 
Manchester Guardian with pro-Soviet sympathies, arrived in 
Moscow in September 1932. Soon he became disenchanted 
with the Soviet system. By late winter, 1933, reporters in 
Moscow were hearing rumors that the grain crop would be 
totally inadequate to feed the population. Muggeridge set off 
on his own, without permission, to investigate the situation. 

Book Reviews 


At the end of March 1933 he published a series of articles in 
the Guardian confirming widespread famine. His reports had 
been delivered to England in the British diplomatic bag. Mug- 
geridge wrote that 'The famine is an organized one" and that it 
was "a military occupation; worse, active war." He wrote of 
"frequent cases of suicides and sometimes even of cannibalism 
. . . the conditions would have been incredible to [Muggeridge] 
if he had not seen them with his own eyes." 

The Guardian played down the stories and Muggeridge ac- 
cused the editors of mutilating his accounts. Muggeridge was 
attacked by the left-leaning British establishment and 

Several other journalists visited the stricken regions and 
honestly reported what they had seen. William Henry 
Chamberlin sent dispatches to The Christian Science Monitor 
and the Manchester Guardian. Gareth Jones traveled through 
the stricken area for three weeks. In a press conference in 
Berlin, a lecture in London, and finally in an article in the 
Guardian, Jones reported the mass starvation. 

Alarmed at the publicity, Moscow applied strong pressure 
on Western journalists to contradict Jones' account. Duranty 
obligingly obeyed his masters and for the occassion again trot- 
ted out his "omelette" quote. His article was titled "Russians 
Hungry But Not Starving." 9 

But— to put it brutally— you can't make an omelette without 
breaking eggs, and the Bolshevik leaders are just as indifferent 
to the casualties that may be involved in their drive toward 
socialism as any General during the World War who ordered a 
costly attack in order to show his superiors that he and his divi- 
sion possessed the proper soldierly spirit. In fact, the 
Bolsheviki are more indifferent because they are animated by 
fanatical conviction. 

Throughout 1933 Duranty continued to play down the ex- 
tent of the famine. He claimed "There is no actual starvation or 
deaths from starvation but there is widespread mortality from 
diseases due to malnutrition ..." 

In September of that year he reported that "the use of the 
word famine in connection with the North Caucasus is a sheer 
absurdity." He wrote of "plump babies" and "fat calves." Max- 
im Litvinov found Duranty's words useful in deflecting a letter 
of inquiry from an American Congressman, Herman 
Kopelmann of Connecticut. 



Shocking proof of the discrepancy between what Duranty 
reported and what he knew to be the truth is revealed in a 
September 30, 1933 British Embassy dispatch which reads in 

According to Mr. Duranty the population of the North 
Caucasus and the Lower Volga had decreased in the past year 
by three million, and the population of the Ukraine by four to 
five million. The Ukraine has been bled white . . . Mr. Duranty 
thinks it quite possible that as many as ten million people may 
have died directly or indirectly from lack of food in the Soviet 
Union during the past year. 

Newspaper readers did not get the unvarnished truth. What 
they got was evasion, cover-up and falsification. 

Walter Duranty had reached the peak of international suc- 
cess and fame by selling out to a totalitarian regime and cover- 
ing up one of the greatest atrocities of the twentieth century. 

Malcolm Muggeridge was later to say that Duranty was "the 
greatest liar of any journalist I have met in fifty years of jour- 
nalism. "Stuart Alsop's verdict was that Duranty was "a fash- 
ionable prostitute" and "lying was his stock in trade." 

Duranty was awarded for his mendacity by the American 
and Soviet establishment. He received permission to accom- 
pany Litvinov across the Atlantic on the S.S. Berengaria for 
negotiations leading to American recognition of the Soviet 
Union. Duranty was present at the November 18, 1933 press 
conference in which President Roosevelt proudly announced 
that the U.S. would recognize the U.S.S.R. Duranty was also 
among the guests of honor at a lavish dinner for 1,500 
dignitaries at New York's Waldorf-Astoria. 

Stalin granted Duranty a second exclusive interview on 
Christmas Day, 1933. 10 

There were to be other occasions when Walter Duranty 
would conspicuously serve as apologist for the Soviet regime. 
In 1936 a series of show trials and purges began against alleg- 
ed opponents of the Stalinist regime. 

In January 1937, sixteen prominent Soviet officials were ac- 
cused of conspiring with Germany and Japan to overthrow the 
Soviet government. Trotsky, in exile in Mexico, was absurdly 
accused in absentia of plotting with the Nazis. 

Public confession of guilt by many of the defendants as- 
tounded the West. Ms. Taylor writes: 

Book Reviews 


Predictably, Western response to this second trial was one of 
confusion, and there was a half-willing reluctance to believe in 
the guilt of the accused. If the confessions were true, the 
reasoning went, it demonstrated that conditions within the 
country were so bad that avowed and dedicated Party 
members would conspire with Fascists to overthrow their own 
government. If untrue, the trials were an indictment of the en- 
tire system in the Soviet Union. 

Duranty wrote in The New Republic that he believed the con- 
fessions to be true. Outraged, Trotsky directly attacked Duran- 
ty in a speech for his "psychological divinations." In 1938, at 
the last and largest of the trials, Nikolai Bukharin, a former 
member of the Politburo, condemned Duranty from the dock. 

With the coming of World War II, the New York Times 
began to cut back on and centralize operations. Late in 1940, 
the Moscow bureau was closed down. At the end of that year, 
Walter Duranty's twenty-five years with the New York Times 
came to an end. 

Duranty left his mistress Katya and their seven-year-old son 
Michael behind in Moscow. He did not make it easy for them 
to contact him. In 1948 Katya managed to get a letter through 
to him. In awkward English she wrote: 

I don't believe it is possible to forget, that here, in Moscow 
growing up your only the son, that we lived together nearly for 
twenty years, that I gave you the best years of my life . . . Could 
not you write to me something, or if you don't want to do that, 
for God knows what reason, you must send a letter to Mike. He 
is already 15 years old, he is not a child any longer and 
understands things very well. He wants to know and must 
know where his father is, why his father keeps silence for such 
a long time. 

Although he occasionally sent a little money, Duranty never 
made an effort to see them again. 

In the last years of his life Duranty lived in Hollywood and 
Florida. Until his death in 1957 he continued to write and lec- 
ture, although increasingly his political views were out of date. 

Now, three and a half decades after Walter Duranty's death, 
the Soviet system is defunct, assigned to the garbage heap of 
history. What is astounding is that it managed to survive for 
seventy years. 

J.S. Taylor's excellent book demonstrates how, in addition to 
Duranty, many Western journalists, "intellectuals," 
businessmen and diplomats ignored the crimes of Stalin and 



company. The New York Times, the so-called "Newspaper of 
Record," and scores of other publications suppressed the truth 
and spewed the Soviet line. 

Nor did Western complicity in an apology for Soviet 
atrocities end with Stalin's death. At the 1945-46 show trials in 
Nuremberg, Germany, Allied apologists for Stalin worked 
hand-in-hand with the murderous functionaries who had 
created the Ukrainian famine, the show trials and the gulag. 
The same physical and mental torture techniques developed 
by Soviet commissars were used on Germans. 

Even today, the "Nazi-hunting" office of Special Investiga- 
tions hunts down and deports from America aged immigrants 
who served, often in their teenage years, as guards and other 
low-ranking functionaries of the Axis nations half a century 
ago, using information, evidence, and testimony originally 
supplied by the same henchmen who helped carry out Stalin's 
terror famine and his numerous other sanguinary crimes. 
Meanwhile, leading lieutenants, not infrequently Jewish, of 
Stalin and his successors live on untroubled, in the "post- 
communist" Soviet Union or in Israel and the West, to be sent 
off with discreet obituaries in Duranty's old paper, The New 
York Times, when they finally expire. Clearly, for the media 
which dominates today's popular (and "informed") mentality, 
the duty of "memory" and the "demands of "justice" (as regards 
the "Holocaust") are not to be honored for far greater, and 
essentially unpunished, crimes of communism. 

Marxism's deady toll of human suffering would have been 
impossible without the complicity of thousands of apologists 
for Stalin. Walter Duranty was but a single sordid example. 
Many more biographies remain to be written. Much more 
revising of the lies and evasions of the Western 
Establishment's "Sovietologists," revision based on the public 
record of the past seventy-five years as well as the documents 
coming to light in Russian and other archives, lies before us. 


1. Only portions of two pages in Stalin's Apologist are devoted to a 
description of the ritual magic employed by Crowley and Duranty. For 
more information see the following source material listed by J.S. 
Taylor: Martin Starr's Sex & Religion (Nashville, 1981), which contains 
a diary of the Paris workings, and John Symond's The Great Beast: The 

Book Reviews 


Life and Magick of Aleister Crowley (London: MacDonald, 1971). 

Additional material on the relationship between Duranty, Crowley 
and Neuburg can be found in Francis King's The Magical World of 
Aleister Crowley (New York: Coward, McCann & Geoghegan, Inc., 

The occultism practiced by Aleister Crowley appears repeatedly in 
the twentieth century as a sinister undercurrent of sociopolitical 
revolution. For a detailed, candid description of the history and 
method of this subversive philosophy by a knowledgeable adherent, 
see Peter Tompkin's The Magic of Obelisks (New York: Harper and 
Row, 1981), pages 309 through 462. 

2. Walter Duranty, "Five Men Directing Destiny of Russia," New York 
Times, January 18, 1923, p. 3. 

3. The "omelette" quotation first appeared in Duranty's mediocre poem 
"Red Square" in a two-page spread with six photographs in the 
September 18, 1932, NYT (VI: p. 10). The lines containing the 
"omelette" quotation read: 

"Russians may be hungry and short of clothes and comfort, But you 
can't make an omelette without breaking eggs." 

4. The kuJaks were "middle- ranked peasants" in Soviet agricultural 
regions. This "class" of farmer generally worked hard and owned 
enough land and livestock to be moderately prosperous (by Soviet 

5. Walter Duranty, I Write As I Please (New York: Simon and Schuster, 
1935), p. 288. 

6. Walter Duranty, "Stalin Sees Capitalists Drifting Surely to War," NYT, 
December 1, 1930. Duranty also wrote a follow-up article in The New 
York Times Magazine, January 18, 1931. 

7. "Musical Play Gets the Pulitzer Award; Mrs. Buck, Pershing, Duranty 
Honored," NYT, May 3, 1932, p. 1. Duranty expanded on this in an 
interview with John F. Roche. "Uninterpreted News of Russia Puzzles 
Prejudiced World, Says Duranty," Editor &• Publisher, June 4, 1932. 

8. In the acknowledgements to Stalin's Apologist, S.J. Taylor credits 
Robert Conquest's The Harvest of Sorrow (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1986) as a very important inspiration for her 
biography of Walter Duranty. The Harvest of Sorrow is the only 
thorough, complete account of the Ukrainian famine of 1932-33, and 
belongs in every Revisionist library. 

9. Walter Duranty, "Russians Hungry But Not Starving," NYT, March 31, 
1933, p. 13. 

10. Walter Duranty, "Stalin Says Japan Is Great Danger, Hopes for Peace," 
NYT, December 28, 1933, p. 8. 


Mercy for Japs 

The following exchange of letters was published in The Best 
from Yank, The Army Weekly (Cleveland: The World Publish- 
ing Co., 1945). Yank, to quote from its editors introduction to the 
anthology, "was written by and for enlisted men" during the Se- 
cond World War; The Best from Yank draws on material 
published between the summer of 1942 and the fall of 1944 in 
the sixteen different regional editions worldwide. 

As the editors point out: 

The writings, drawings, photographs and cartoons in this col- 
lection were never intended originally to please civilian tastes. 
They were made to order for the pages of Yank, The Army 
Weekly, by enlisted men on active duty in the armed forces who 
wanted to please other enlisted men and nobody else. 

These letters would seem to indicate that the standards of 
American GTs on observing the laws of warfare were somewhat 
more flexible than those of American prosecutors at the war- 
crimes trials at Tokyo, Nuremberg, and elsewhere, understand- 
able though that may be. 

Dear Yank: 

As God is my witness I am sorry to read of the way two 
American soldiers treated the enemy on Makin Island; they 
shot some Japanese when they might have been able to take 
them alive. I don't believe in killing unless it has to be done. I 
am a servant of God, so when I get into battle I hope by His 
help to take as many Japs alive as I can. If I am compelled to 
destroy lives in battle I shall do so, but when U.S. troops throw 
grenades into an enemy position and Japs run out unarmed 
we should make an effort to take them alive. I know that if I 
were in a dugout and forced to run out I would want mercy. 

Camp Davis, N.C. -Pvt. Ralph H. Luckey 



Dear Yank: 

We just read the letter written by that servant of God, Pvt. 
Luckey, and wish to state that he has the wrong slant . . . After 
being in combat and seeing medics being killed trying to help 
our wounded makes you want to kill the bastards . . . Fair play 
is fine among sportsmen but we are fighting back stabbers! 

Hawaii Jap Killers* 

♦Signed by Pvt. P. Stupar 

Dear Yank: 

. . . No mercy for murderers! 
On Maneuvers 
Dear Yank: 

-Pvt. Sam Bonanno 

Brother, Pvt. Luckey better live up to his last name if goes 
into combat with the idea of taking Jap prisoners alive! 

Port o/ Embarkation -Sgt. Carl Bethea* 

*AJso signed by 13 others. 
Dear Yank: 

We are all Navy men who are suffering from combat fatigue. 
Many of us have been strafed by Jap Zeros while floating 
helplessly in the sea and have seen what the soldiers and 
marines have gone through in this fight. If Pvt. Luckey heeds 
his own call for mercy for Japs, his soul will belong to God but 
his body will belong to the Japs . . . 

-Vets ofWorldWarll 

Norfolk Naval Hosp., Portsmouth, VA 
Dear Yank: 

... If I had another chance I certainly would do the same 
thing those Yanks on Makin did. Shoot 'em and shoot 'em 
dead. I know what I'm talking about. I have been there. 

Camp BJanding, FJa. -T/Sgt. J.N. Olsen 

Dear Yank: 

. . . Please notify the FBI, G-2, anything -but have that guy 
locked up! 

Fort Custer, Mich. -Cpl. S. Schwartz 



Dear Yank: 

Has Pvt. Luckey ever seen his friends and buddies shot 
down by the Japs? Has he ever carried our dead out of the 
jungle for burial? I have -and more, during the eight months I 
spent on Guadalcanal. Pvt. Luckey will have no dead Japs on 
his conscience when they kill him. 

Harmon Gen. Hosp., Longview, Tex. —Pvt. C.E. Carter 

Dear Yank: 

. . . Luckey is out of this world and should be confined in a 
small room heavily padded on four sides. 

Bermuda -S/Sgt. Arthur J. Kaplan 

Dear Yank: 

Me and my buddies sure were mad as hell when we read 
Pvt. Ralph Luckey's letter. He sure shot off his mouth about 
our treatment of the Japs. The trouble is that he has had it nice 
and soft so far . . . 

Trinidad - Pfc. Edward Staffin 

Dear Yank: 

. . . We don't know whether to feel sorry for this guy or just 
laugh the thing off . . . 

-M/Sgt. W.F. Hardgrove* 
NC Hosp., Mitchel Field, N. Y. (South Pacific) 

♦Signed also by M/Sgt. R.M. Stephens fSWPJ; T/Sgts. L.C. 
Sheehan (Britain] and N. Sedorick (BritianJ; S/Sgts. P.F. 
Teraberry (Italy, Africa), R.I. Vogel (Italy, Africa), L.V. Behout 
(CBIJ, J.M. Haresign (ItaJyJ and H.R. Garrison (New Guinea]; 
Sgts. W.J. PoJera, P. Nadzak (CBIJ and J. Seginah (Britain], and 
Cpl. M.J. Bursie (New Guinea], 

Dear Yank: 

. . . Wake up, Luckey. The Jap doesn't care if God is his 
witness or not. 

Worthington Gen. Hosp., Tuscaloosa, Ala. —PFC. C.J. Nichols 



Dear Yank: 

It's evening. We're sitting about two feet from our foxhole 
thinking about a letter written by Pvt. Ralph H. Luckey from 
Camp Davis, N.C. in a recent issue of Yank. Do you mind if we 
ask him a question? Pvt. Luckey, you're now living in an Army 
camp, just as we did. Making friends, just as we did. Friends 
who, in time, will be much closer, dearer, to you than you 
would believe possible. 

We bunked together, ate together, laughed and played 
together, worked and dated together. Recently we fought 
together. During the battle, Blackie was wounded and taken 
prisoner. When we advanced several hours later, we found 
Blackie. His cheeks were punctured by sharp sticks— pulled 
tight by a wire tourniquet, the sticks acting as a bit does for a 
horse's mouth. There were slits made by a knife along the 
center of his legs and on his side— just as if an artist had taken 
pride in an act of torture well done. 

We continued to move on. Do you think that we also 
continued to remember the niceties of civilized warfare? 
Central Pacific -S/Sgt. B.W. Milewski 

This is the last of a series of GI comments in reply to Pvt. 
Luckey's letter. Yank has received a great number of letters on 
the subject, but only two readers supported the point of view 
advocated by Pvt. Luckey. 


An Interview with Admiral Kimmel 

Dean Clarence Manion 

December 7. Whenever this fateful date reoccurs on the 
calendar, it invariably revives a flood of tragic and pain- 
ful recollections. The pain of recollection will be intensified 
this year when you read the recently published frank, and 
informative, memoirs of the widely experienced and 
universally respected General Albert C. Wedemeyer 
[Wedemeyer Reports! —Ed.]. This big revealing book begins 
and ends with the emphatic and unequivocal assurance that 
the attack on Pearl Harbor could have been— and should have 
been— prevented, and that the United States could have— and 
should have— stayed out of World War II. 

Says Wedemeyer, and I quote: "The Soviet colossus would 
not now bestride half the world had the United States kept out 
of war— at least until Soviet Russia and Nazi Germany had 
exhausted each other. But Franklin D. Roosevelt, the 
proclaimed champion of democracy," continues the General, 
"was as successful as any dictator could have been in keeping 
Congress and the public in ignorance of his secret 
commitments to Britain, commitments which flouted the will 
and the wishes of the voters who had reelected him only after 
he had assured them that he would keep us out of the war. The 
fact that Japan's attack had been deliberately provoked was 
obscured by the disaster at Pearl Harbor," says Wedemeyer. 
"President Roosevelt had maneuvered us into the war by his 
patently unneutral actions against Germany and the final 
ultimatum against Japan." 

So much for the beginning of Wedemeyer Reports! Near the 
conclusion we find this, and I quote again: 

"On December 4th, 1941, we received definite information 
from two independent sources that Japan would attack the 
United States and Britain, but would maintain peace with 
Russia. On December 6, our intercepts told us, the Japanese 
would strike somewhere the very next day. President 



Roosevelt," he says "had ample time to broadcast a warning 
that might have caused the Japanese to call off the attack." "In 
any event," continues the General, "we should not have 
permitted 2,500 Americans to die in Hawaii without an 
opportunity to fight back." 

Who, then, was responsible for the bloody surprise at Pearl 
Harbor? A few days after the bombs fell there, President 
Roosevelt made a radio speech to the American people in 
which he condemned the treachery that propelled us into war, 
and called Sunday, December 7, 1941 a day that will live in 
infamy. Mr. Roosevelt was never more truly prophetic than he 
was when he spoke those words. The infamy of Sunday, 
December 7, 1941 becomes increasingly notorious with each 
passing year. Ever more and more certainly that calamitous 
day is being firmly established in history as the infamous time 
when more than 3,000 American soldiers and sailors were 
sentenced to sudden and violent death by the calculated and 
deliberate dereliction of their own Commander-in-Chief. 

Pearl Harbor was but the bloody beginning of what is yet an 
endless tale of woe. Down with the sacrificed sailors and 
soldiers went the heart and soul of our proud Pacific Fleet. But 
with the flotsam of this powerful and humiliating holocaust 
came the corrosive curse of Communism to poison the whole 
stream of human civilization. The bright light of freedom that 
was extinguished by Mr. Roosevelt's dreadful "day of infamy" 
may not come on again for a thousand years. 

Fixing the responsibility for this terrible catastrophe has 
been a delayed and difficult task. In war the truth is always the 
first casualty. It was so at Pearl Harbor. The American people 
were shocked by this successful sneak attack, and enraged at 
the realization that it had dragged them into the foreign war 
from which the president had promised "again, and again, and 
again" to steer them clear. Popular clamor demanded appro- 
priate scapegoats, and the president obligingly and promptly 
met the popular demand by nominating for disgrace two men 
who, respectively, commanded the United States Army and 
Navy forces in Hawaii on that fatal day. 

The American people did not know then that the president 
and his top military advisors in Washington had been in- 
tercepting Japanese secret messages for many months, and 
that as General Wedemeyer has said, "These messages had 
finally indicated the time, the place, and the character of the 

Historical News and Comment 


Pearl Harbor attack, days in advance of December 7," Neither 
did the American people know then that this dreadful and im- 
portant information had been deliberately withheld from the 
men who were most entitled to know it, namely, the top com- 
manders of the United States Army and Navy forces in 

Ten years ago the distinguished newsman George 
Morgenstern wrote and published what he called Pearl Har- 
bor: The Story of the Secret War. The politicians saw to it that 
Morgenstern's early revelation was given the silent treatment 
in the press of the country. But, in that book today, you can 
trace the long, sadistic persecution that was forced upon two 
great military men who were selected as the scapegoats for the 
day of infamy. 

Namely, Lieutenant Walter C. Short and Rear Admiral Hus- 
band E. Kimmel. General Short is now dead, but Admiral Kim- 
mel is now living in Connecticut. Three years ago, he publish- 
ed his own book about Pearl Harbor, which is authentic, 
remarkably restrained and entirely without rancor [Admiral 
Kimmers Story -Ed.]. 

In the magazine section of the Chicago Tribune, he writes an 
up-date of his findings concerning the available warning that 
was never given to him. Admiral Kimmel happens to be my 
life-long personal friend. Last week I went to his home to ob- 
tain his direct answers to key questions about the Pearl Harbor 
attack. Here is my recorded interview with this distinguished, 
long-suffering man, to whom the officers and trustees of his 
alma mater, The United States Naval Academy, recently gave 
an extended testimonial for the patriotism, loyalty, ability, for- 
titude and devotion to duty that he displayed at Pearl Harbor, 
before, on and after the 7th day of December, 1941. 

CM: Admiral Kimmel, for myself and the radio audience, I 
am very greatful for the privilege of this interview. You know, 
of course, that you hold the key to one of the great tragic 
mysteries in our country's history. What you are doing here to- 
day is a continuation of the great patriotic service to which 
your whole life has been dedicated. 

HEK: Thank you, Dean Manion. In view of our long family 
friendship, I'm delighted to give this information to you, and 
through you, to the American people. 



CM: To your present knowledge, how many people knew in 
advance that the Japanese planned to attack Pearl Harbor on 
December 7? 

HEK: I believe those who had seen the intercepted and 
decoded Japanese messages, including the 14 -part message 
received on December 6 and December 7, 1941, knew war 
with Japan was inevitable. And the almost certain objective of 
the Japanese attack would be the fleet at Pearl Harbor, on 
December 7, 1941, at 1 p.m. Washington time. 

CM: Who are some of these people and from what source did 
they get the information? 

HEK: Those who saw the intercepted Japanese messages as 
they were received included: the President, Mr. Roosevelt; the 
Secretary of State, Mr. Hull; the Secretary of War, Mr. Stim- 
son; the Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Knox; the Chief of Staff of 
the Army, General Marshall; the Chief of Naval Operations, 
Admiral Stark; the Chief of War Plans, Army, General Gerow; 
the Chief of War Plans, Navy, Admiral Turner; the Chief of 
Army Intelligence, General Miles; Chief of Naval Intelligence, 
Admiral Worthington. Recorded testimony shows that all of 
these, except General Marshall and Admiral Stark were 
shown 13 parts of the 14-part message by 9 p.m. December 6, 
1941, or shortly thereafter. When Mr. Roosevelt had read the 
13 parts, about 9 p.m. December 6, 1941, he remarked: "This 
means war." All investigations of the disaster have failed to 
disclose where George Marshall spent the evening of 
December 6, 1941, or what he did. Admiral Stark, some two 
years after he had first been asked, finally produced evidence 
that he had attended the theater on that evening, though he 
still maintained that he had no independent recollection of 
where he spent the evening or what he did during the evening 
of December 6, 1941. In 1957, 1 received information, which I 
believe to be reliable, that the British subject serving in the 
Chinese government as commissioner of education and in- 
telligence in China received on November 30, 1941, from his 
intelligence sources in Japan, information of the planned at- 
tack on Pearl Harbor to be launched on December 7: Where 
the Japanese fleet would congregate to launch the planes, the 
hour the planes were to be launched, the berths of the U.S. 
fleet in Pearl and which ships were to be bombed first. This in- 
formation was sent to London in a coded message, on Sunday, 

Historical News and Comment 


November 30, and Monday, December 1, 1941. Whether the 
Chinese commissioner's intelligence was transmitted from 
London to Washington, I do not know, but it appears highly 
probable that it was made available to Mr. Roosevelt. If Mr. 
Roosevelt did, in fact, receive the Chinese commissioner's in- 
telligence, it was merely a detailed confirmation of the in- 
tercepted Japanese messages already available to him. 

CM: In your opinion, why were you and General Short not 
notified well in advance that the attack was expected? 

HEK: My belief is that General Short and I were not given the 
information available in Washington and were not informed 
of the impending attack because it was feared that action in 
Hawaii might deter the Japanese from making the attack. Our 
president had repeatedly assured the American people that 
the United States would not enter the war unless we were at- 
tacked. The Japanese attack on the fleet would put the United 
States in the war with the full suppport of the American 

CM: Thank you, Admiral Kimmel, for this interview and for 
the patriotic persistence with which you have pursued and 
corralled the tragic facts about the attack upon Pearl Harbor. 

My friends, you now have the authentic postscript on 
memorable day of infamy in 1941. 

Seventeen years later the United States stands poised once 
more on the brink of shooting war. If the fighting must start 
again, let us demand the full truth in advance as a condition 
precedent to the conflict. Are we again bound by secret com- 
mitments which put the interest of other countries ahead of 
the interests of the United States? Are our far-flung armed 
forces spread around the world for our own defense, or as an 
assurance that we will automatically participate in every 
brushfire that breaks out any place on earth? The terrible truth 
about Pearl Harbor should galvanize our foreign policy with 
impenetrable armor of our own national self interest. 

At long last, the finally revealed truth has revived righteous 
respectability of a policy that put the interest of America first. 

(This interview was broadcast under the auspices of The 
Manion Forum in Fall, 1958.) 



Holocaust Education: Cui Bono? 


The following letter was written to the editor of the 
Asbury Park Press on August 20, 1991. As an answer to 
the question posed in the above title, it would be difficult to 

A 14-line single-column item inserted inconspicuously into 
an inside page of your July 7, 1991 issue revealed to 
attentive readers that "Florio OKs bill to aid Holocaust 

For the last thirty years the newspapers have been 
drenching us in "survivor" epics and other horror tales of the 
"Holocaust," while film, radio, and television have been 
bombarding us incessantly with the most spectacular and 
imaginative "Holocaust" stories. One would think, then, that 
nothing is less in need of further aid than is "Holocaust 

However, Florio put it over. New Jersey's children and 
young people, already deficient in reading and writing, having 
but a vague knowledge of geography and history, practically 
ignorant of logic, mathematics, and the sciences, will have 
vital learning time stolen from them so that their minds can be 
numbed by "Holocaust education." How will that "education" 
prepare them for a productive career, to compete on an equal 
basis with Asians and with Europeans? 

As a state governor Florio must know, if only from what is 
happening in another state — Illinois— that "Holocaust 
education" is designed to achieve aims that have nothing to do 
with education, but have everything to do with "diseducation." 
Three of those aims, summarily stated, are: 

to instill guilt-feelings in non-Jews, and to serve as a pretext 
for prostituted politicians to vote ever more billions of 
dollars for Israel, to bind America to Israel's atrocious 
practices, to approve tax exemption for the billions of non- 

Historical News and Comment 


governmental, private contributions to Israel, thereby 
increasing the tax burden on the rest of us; to perpetuate 
our subservience to Israel and to Zionism— despite their 
numerous grave offenses against the United States. 

To incite hatred, especially against Germans, though in 
proportionately equal degree, as it were, against Baits, 
Croatians, Hungarians, Poles, Romanians, Ukrainians, and 
other Christians, often focussing their vituperation on Pius 
XII, despite the asylum accorded by this saintly pope to 
uncounted thousands of Jews. 

At the same time, while playing down, when it can't be 
suppressed entirely, information about Israeli atrocities in 
Lebanon, in Palestine, and elsewhere, "Holocaust 
education" seeks to generate disproportionate, some would 
say excessive, sympathy for Jews, to the exclusion of every 
other ethnic group in the country, and on the planet, and at 
the expense of peoples who have suffered far worse and in 
infinitely greater numbers. In conjunction with above, 
"Holocaust education" is calculated to condition Americans 
to submit to Jewish hegemony in our society, and to tolerate 
the extraordinary privileges Jews have arrogated to 

"Holocaust education" intends to expunge American (and 
other) history from American memory, and to replace it 
with a new Jewish scripture. Thus, in Illinois, children are 
taught: "The period from 1933 to 1945 is known as the 
Holocaust . . ." The headline over a full-page New York 
Times Book Review (May 13, 1990) advertisement for the 
Encyclopedia of the Holocaust proclaims it to be 'The 
Definitive Guide to the Most Important Event of the 20th 

For the "Holocaust educators" there was no Boer war, no 
Russo-Japanese War, no World War, no Bolshevist Russian 
Revolution, no Sino-Japanese War, no Chinese floods that 
drowned millions, no African, Chinese, Indian famines that 
killed millions; Stalin's forced starvation of the Ukrainians 
isn't worth mentining; there was no World War II with its 
additional tens of millions of Russian and German soldier and 
civilian dead; of thousands of American soldiers dead, and 
many more mutilated since 1917 — all in the twentieth century. 
There is only the "Holocaust." 



There were holocausts. Berlin, Cologne, Dresden, Hamburg, 
and a hundred other German cities. Nagoya, Osaka, Tokyo, 
Yokohama, and a hundred other Japanese cities, until the 
ultimate hells of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Those were British 
and American holocausts. No one tries any longer to deny 
them. Nevertheless, it has never occurred to any German, or 
to any Japanese, to want to force these searing events into the 
minds of young Americans, and that least of all under the 
pretense of "combatting hatred," "fostering sensitivity," and 
"promoting understanding." 

But the "Holocaust"— as we have been led to understand 
it— becomes more and more controversial. When the great 
Frenchman, Paul Rassinier, began in the the 1950's to ques- 
tion the stories that came out of the concentration camps, 
demographers, historians, scholars and scientists were moved 
to look critically at the assertion "Hitler ordered the extermina- 
tion of the Jews" and at the "6,000,000," the "gas chambers," the 
"death factories" and the rest. No evidence to support the ex- 
istence of any of these was found, and has not been found to 
this day. 

The brilliant young Italian, Carlo Mattogno, specialist in 
contemporary European history, has examined, and exposed, 
the successive reptilian twists of the "Exterminationist" 
writers through edition after edition of their works. Among 
the first Americans to stand publicly against the "Holocaust" 
onslaught is Professor Arthur P. Butz, of Northwestern 
University. His Hoax of the Twentieth Century is the basic 
American text on the "Holocaust." 

The Costa Mesa, California-based Institute for Historical 
Review inquires into the truth of the "Holocaust." Contribu- 
tions to the IHR quarterly Journal are invited, even solicited, 
from all sides. Historians and scientists of every continent 
have been responding. In the dozen or so years of The Journal's 
publication, among the hundreds of contributions that have 
been submitted, not one has ventured to substantiate the 

Little publicity has been given the Institute's standing offer, 
and challenge, to debate the question of the "Holocaust." Even 
less publicity has been accorded the premature withdrawal of 
the very "Exterminationists" who have trumpeted their "accep- 
tance" of the challenge., 

No newspaper, and no radio or televisions station, has in- 
formed the American people that those who most strenuously, 

Historical News and Comment 


and stridently, want— at public expense— to force the 
'Holocaust" dogma on them and their children refuse to 
debate its veracity. 

Among these curious "refuseniks" are the leaders and 
members of the myriad Jewish organizations in the United 
States, the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, the 
American Jewish Committee, the American Jewish Congress, 
the World Jewish Congress. 

Individuals who have made fortunes on the 
"Holocaust"— "There's no business like Shoah business"— but 
shun debate on it include "Nazi-hunter" Simon Wiesenthal, 
hater-in-chief Eli Wiesel, and "Mr. Holocaust" himself, Pro- 
fessor Raoul Hilberg. Nor should the swarms of "survivors" 
who have profitably published their memoirs be overlooked. 

The "Exterminationists," the professionals of the 
"Holocaust," when asked to debate their position, respond by 
wailing "discrimination," or "persecution," or screaming "anti- 
Semite," "neo-Nazi," "fascist"— but they won't debate. Why not? 

Do not the American people have the right to hear, in open 
debate, all sides of a question that has cost them so much 
blood and treasure, and threatens to cost them more still? 

At least until this question is resolved fairly and 
democratically— not, as is being pressed now, autocratically 
and dictatorially— to the satisfaction of the American people, 
the intolerable outrage of forcing a special-interest mind-set on 
our children and young people should be stopped. 

Roosevelt's Secret Pre- War 
Plan to Bomb Japan 


Several months before Japan's December 7, 1941 attack on 
Pearl Harbor, President Franklin Roosevelt secretly 
authorized devastating American bombing raids against 
Japanese cities. A top secret document de-classified in 1970, 
but only made public a few years ago, shows that in July 1941 



Roosevelt and his top military advisers approved a daring plan 
to use American pilots and American war planes— deceitfully 
flying under the Chinese flag— to bomb Japan's major cities. 1 
The bombers would be under the command of Claire 
Chennault, a former U.S. Air Corps flyer who had been in the 
employ of Chinese Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek since 
1937. In July 1941 Chennault already headed the "American 
Volunteer Group" squadron of U.S. "Flying Tiger" fighter 
planes that fought with great success against Japanese forces 
in China. Chennault's colorful unit was glorified in American 
newspapers and magazines, and in the 1942 Hollywood 
propaganda motion picture Flying Tigers, starring John 

The young pilots who flew the distinctively "shark-toothed" 
B-40 warplanes were ostensibly mercenaries, and the AVG 
force had no official connection with the U.S. government. In 
reality, though, the squadron was secretly organized and 
funded by Washington— in flagrant violation of both 
American and international law. Set up without consultation 
or consent of Congress, it specifically violated the U.S. 
Neutrality Act, the Reserves Act of 1940, and the Selective 
Service Act of 1940. Chennault's squadron was also a breach 
of Roosevelt's own formal declarations of U.S. neutrality in the 
conflict between Japan and China, which had been raging 
since 1937. 

By aiding China, Roosevelt sought to keep Japanese forces 
tied up there. As long as the Japanese were fully occupied in 
China, he thought, they would not be a threat to British and 
U.S. interests in Asia. If China fell, Britain would have to 
divert war ships, troops and materiel badly needed in Europe. 

A secret memorandum from the Office of the Chief of Naval 
Operations dated January 17, 1940 confirms that almost two 
years before the Pearl Harbor attack, the Roosevelt 
administration was considering war against the Japanese with 
U.S. mercenaries organized in "an efficient guerrilla corps." 
The memo also discussed a clandestine U.S. combat air 
operation against Japanese forces. Some months later, in May 
1941, another memorandum for Roosevelt from Admiral 
Thomas C. Hart, Commander of the U.S. Asiatic fleet, began: 
"The concept of a war with Japan is believed to be sound," and 
went on to discuss how Japan could be attacked by American- 
piloted bombers. 2 

Historical News and Comment 


To put such ideas into effect, Chennault pushed for the 
formation of a task force of American-piloted bombers under 
his command that would raid Japan itself. "If the men and 
equipment were of good quality, such a force could cripple the 
Japanese war effort," he wrote. "A small number of long-range 
bombers carrying incendiary bombs could quickly reduce 
Japan's paper-and-matchwood cities to heaps of smoking 

Chennault's proposal quickly received the enthusiastic 
support of China's ambassador in Washington, T. V. Soong 
(multi-millionaire banker brother-in-law of Chinese 
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek), British ambassador Lord 
Lothian, U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull and FDR's 
Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau. 

The idea to bomb Japan was first formally presented to 
Roosevelt on December 19, 1940. As Dr. Duane Schultz relates 
in his 1987 study, The Maverick War, FDR's response was to 
exclaim 'Wonderful!," and to immediately instruct his 
Secretaries of State, Treasury, War and Navy to begin working 
out the details of a battle plan. 3 

Not everyone was so enthusiastic, though. Secretary of War 
Henry Stimson and Army Chief of Staff General George 
Marshall expressed misgivings. Marshall cautioned that 
having American pilots bomb Japan using American planes 
with Chinese markings was a trick that would not really fool 
anybody, but would simply plunge the United States into a 
war with Japan at a time when the U.S. was still woefully 

As a result of such misgivings, the plan was temporarily 
shelved. A few months later, though, a somewhat modified 
version was revived as 'Joint Army-Navy Board Paper No. 
355." 4 

As finally laid out in JB 355, an air strike force of 500 
Lockheed Hudson bombers was to be organized as The 
Second American Volunteer Group" under Chennault's com- 
mand. Its mission would be the "pre-emptive" bombing of 
Japan. The strategic objective of JB 355 was the "destruction of 
Japanese factories in order to cripple munitions and essential 
articles for maintenance of economic structure in Japan." 
From bases about 1,300 miles away in eastern China, the 
American bombers would strike Japan's industrial centers, in- 
cluding Osaka, Nagasaki, Yokohama and Tokyo. (These air 




JUL 1 8 1941 

The President; 

Tho White House. 

Deer ttr. President! 

At the request of Mr. Leuchlln Currie, Administrative 
Assi stent to The President, The Joint Board has aide *ecomme>- 
detions for furnishing aircraft to the Chinese Government under 
the Lend- Lease Act. These recommendations ere contained in the 
Joint ilenninc Coaaittee report of July 9. 19U, J.B. Wo. 355 
(Sortel (#1), which The Joint Board approved, and which ie 
transmitted herewith for your consideration. 

In connection with this setter, may we point out that 
the accomplishment of The Joint Board* e proposals to furnish 
aircraft equipment to China in accordance with Mr. Currie 1 s 
8hort Tern Requlremento for China, requiree the collaboration 
of Greut Britain in diverelone of allocations already made to 
them; however, it le our belief that the suggested diversions 
present no in surmountable difficulty nor occasion any grant 

?We have approved this report and in forwarding it. 
to you, recommend your approval, 

7ff^ ^ Secretary of the Navy. 

Cover letter of official U.S. "Joint Army-Navy Board No. 355" paper 
authorizing American bombing raids against Japan. The top secret docu- 
ment is signed by the Secretaries of War and Navy, and bears Franklin 
Roosevelt's initials of authorization and a handwritten date, July 23, 1941 
— more than four months before the Japanese attack against Pearl Harbor. 

strikes would have unavoidably claimed the lives of many 
civilians. By contrast, the Japanese planes that attacked Pearl 
Harbor carefully avoided civilian targets.) 

U.S. funds for the operation were to be provided as part of a 
general loan to China and channeled through a dummy cor- 
poration. The American military personnel involved were 
given deceptive passports. (Chennault's gave his occupation as 
"farmer," and cited him as an "advisor to the Central Bank of 

Secret plan JB 355 was approved by the Secretary of War, 
the Secretary of the Navy, and— on July 23, 1941— by Presi- 
dent Franklin Roosevelt. 

Historical News and Comment 


No one played a more important role in promoting and 
organizing this plan than Lauchlin Bernard Currie, a close 
Roosevelt White House adviser. Now 89 years old and living 
in South America, he provided details of his role in the secret 
operation, and of Roosevelt's support for it, in a November 
1991 television interview. 5 A major motive behind Currie's 
eagerness to get the U.S. into war with Japan, it seems, was his 
strongly pro-Soviet sympathies. There is even tantalizing but 
still inconclusive evidence to suggest that Currie was a Soviet 
agent. 6 

When Roosevelt approved plan JB 355, Currie sent a secret 
cable to Chennault: "I am very happy to be able to report that 
today the President directed that 66 bombers be made 
available to China [sic] this year, with 24 to be delivered 

Although it received approval from numerous high-level 
officials, the plan was not well conceived. In the view of Yale 
University history professor Gaddis Smith, the Lockheed Hud- 
son bombers that were to carry out the raids would have been 
easily shot down by Japan's first-rate fighter planes. 7 

Two days after approving JB 355, Roosevelt declared a 
crippling trade embargo against Japan, an act of economic 
strangulation that he knew full well would virtually assure 
war. (At that time, about 90 percent of Japan's oil and iron 
came from the United States.) And having broken Japanese 
codes, British and American officials learned in early July of 
Japan's sure intentions in the Pacific: war with the U.S. was 
now inevitable. 8 

Understandably viewing Roosevelt's campaign as a mortal 
threat to their country's very existence as a modern industrial 
nation, Japan's leaders resolved to strike a first blow. They 
reasoned that by destroying the U.S. Pacific fleet in Hawaii in 
one decisive surprise attack, they would remove the one great 
obstacle to forging a self sufficient Japanese empire in eastern 

History thus intervened to thwart Roosevelt's plan to bomb 
Japan. Before JB 355 Japan could be put into effect, and before 
Japan felt the full impact of FDR's trade embargo, the Japanese 
attacked Pearl Harbor— and Roosevelt had the open war with 
Japan that he had anticipated. In effect, Japan beat America to 
the punch. 

On December 11, 1941, four days after the Pearl Harbor 
debacle, all further action on the JB 355 plan was suspended, 



and the bomber pilots who had been recruited were quickly 
incorporated into the regular U.S. armed forces. 

Franklin Roosevelt branded December 7, 1941, as "a date 
which will live in Infamy." And although many millions of 
Americans still regard Japan's "sneak attack" as the ultimate 
act of international deceit and treachery, it was hardly unique. 

In 1801, Britain's Lord Nelson destroyed Denmark's fleet in 
a surprise attack on Copenhagen. In May 1846, the U.S. Army 
invaded Mexican territory before Congress got around to 
declaring that a state of war existed with Mexico. Far from 
feeling ashamed about it, Americans later elected as President 
the commander who lead the expedition, Zachary Taylor. In 
June 1967, Israel carried out a surprise attack against Egypt, 
and was widely praised in the U.S. for its adroit skill in 
destroying almost the entire Egyptian air force while it was 
still on the ground. 

Just about every major power has resorted to surprise attack 
at one time or another, according to a study by British army 
officer and historian Sir Frederick Maurice. Between 1700 
and 1870, he calculated, France carried out 36 surprise at- 
tacks, Britian 30, Austria twelve, Russia seven, Prussia seven, 
and the United States at least five. 9 

The long-suppressed story of FDR's plan to bomb Japan cer- 
tainly deserves to be better known. As sensational as it is, 
though, it is only one chapter of the larger— and still largely 
unknown— story of Roosevelt's extensive and illegal campaign 
to bring a supposedly neutral United States into the Second 
World War. 10 Indeed even before the outbreak of war in 
Europe in September 1939, Roosevelt was secretly doing 
everything in his power to incite conflict there. 11 

In the months before the Pearl Harbor attack, the American 
president accelerated his illegal campaign. For example, after 
Axis forces launched the fateful June 22, 1941, "Barbarossa" at- 
tack against Soviet Russia, he promptly began sending 
American aid to Stalin. On July 25, 1941, Roosevelt froze 
Japanese assets of $130 million in the United States, thus en- 
ding trade relations. He closed the American-run Panama 
Canal to Japanese shipping. In June and July 1941, he dispat- 
ched U.S. troops to occupy Greenland and Iceland. And by 
September-October 1941, U.S. warships were actively engag- 
ing German U-boats in the Atlantic, in flagrant violation of 
U.S. and international law. 12 

Historical News and Comment 


From a larger historical perspective, the magnitude of 
Roosevelt's undercover military operations against Japan and 
Germany, at a time when the U.S. was ostensibly neutral, 
dwarfs other, much ballyhooed, clandestine U.S. military 
operations in later years, such as President Reagan's help to 
the Nicaraguan "Contra" fighters, or the infamous Iran-Contra 


1. Much of the information for this essay is derived from: Don McLean, 
'Tigers of a Different Stripe: FDR's Secret Plan to Torch Japan Before 
Pearl Harbor," Soldier of Fortune, January 1989, pp. 66-93.; Transcript, 
ABC television "20/20" broadcast, Friday, Nov. 22, 1991 (No. 1149). 

2. D. McLean, Soldier of Fortune, Jan. 1989, pp. 67-68. 

3. Dr. Duane Schultz, The Maverick War: Chennault and the Flying 
Tigers. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987. 

4. Joint Army-Navy Board Paper 355, ("Aircraft Requirements of the 
Chinese Government"), Serial 691, National Archives, Washington, 

5. Transcript, ABC television "20/20" broadcast, Nov. 22, 1991. 

6. D. McLean, Soldier of Fortune, Jan. 1989, pp. 70-71. 

7. Transcript, "20/20" broadcast, Nov. 22, 1991. 

8. James Rushbridger and Eric Nave, Betrayal at Pearl Harbor (1991); 
John Toland, Infamy (1982); John Costello, The Pacific War (1981); 
Percy L. Greaves, Jr., "Three 'Day of Infamy' Assessment," Journal of 
Historical Review, Fall 1982, pp. 319-340. 

9. William H. Honan, "Remember Pearl Harbor," Los AngeJes Times, 
Nov. 6, 1991. 

10. For example, the ABC television "20/20" broadcast of Nov. 22, 1991, 
which gave sensational treatment to the JB 355 bombing plan, failed to 
put the story in the larger context of FDR's ongoing campaign to bring 
the U.S. into war.; On FDR's campaign to bring America into war, see: 
George Morgenstern, Pearl Harbor: The Secret War (1947 and 1991); 
Charles A. Beard, President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War 1941 
(1948); William H. Chamberlin, America's Second Crusade (1952 and 
1962); Charles C. Tansill, Back Door to War (1952); Harry Elmer 
Barnes, Barnes Against the Blackout (1991). 

11. Mark Weber, "President Roosevelt's Campaign to Incite War in 
Europe," Journal of Historical Review, Summer 1983, pp. 135-172. 

12. For a more detailed listing of such acts, see: George Morgenstern, 
Pearl Harbor: The Secret War, pp. 87-88; "Hitler's Declaration of War 
Against the United States," Journal of Historical Review, Winter 
1988-89, pp. 406-410. 

About the Contributors 

CARL HOTTELET, a retired businessman, was born in New 
York City. He was graduated from Fordham University and is 
a veteran of the Second World War. Mr. Hottelet, who has 
traveled widely, is the translator, from several different 
languages, of a number of articles and books published by 
IHR, the latest of which is Flashpoint -Kristallnacht 1938 by 
Ingrid Weckert. 

CHARLES LUTTON, Ph.D., is a specialist in diplomatic and 
military history. A previous contributor to the JHR, he resides 
outside of Seattle. 

DEAN CLARENCE MANION, formerly of the University of 
Notre Dame Law School, was an author, lecturer, and 
respected constitutional lawyer who had written extensively 
on important historical and political issues. 

ANDREAS WESSERLE was born in Prague, Bohemia, and 
grew up in Bavaria. He is the holder of four academic degrees, 
with distinction, in the fields of political science and political 
sociology. Dr. Wesserle has taught at several American col- 
leges and universities, and has published many articles on 
politics in American and European journals. 

JACK WIKOFF is a writer and researcher living in central 
New York State, where he publishes a Revisionist newsletter 
(Remarks, P.O. Box 234, Aurora, NY 13026). 


pe» wmmi 

"SWZZ tof aZwwf December 7> 1941 
Pearl Harbor attack, despite a formidable 
volume of subsequent writing by many 
others on the subject. " 

— James J. Martin 

With all the elements at hand, the reader has the ingredients of a 
mystery. There are victims — 3,000 of them in the Pearl Harbor 
attack. There are a variety of clues ... a multitude of false leads 
. . . numerous possible motives. Innumerable obstructions are put in 
the way of the discovery of truth. Many of the characters betray 
guilty knowledge. 

From the Foreword to Pearl Harbor— The Story of the Secret War 

Did Morgenstern Unravel 
the Mystery of Pearl Harbor? 
Experts Comment: 

Brilliant and impressive 

— Harry Elmer Barnes 

A permanent contribution to the quest 
for an understanding of the tragedy 

— Charles A. Beard 

Discloses with great ability the lessons 
of secret diplomacy and national 
betrayal — Charles C. Tansill 

Mr. Morgenstern is to be 
congratulated on marshalling the 
available facts of this tragedy in such 
a manner as to make it clear to every 
reader where the responsibility lies 

— Adm. H.E. Yarnell 

ISBN 0-939484-38-2 
Softcover • 425 pp • $14.95 
From Institute for Historical Review 



The Story ot 
The Secret War